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This Article describes the process for deciding Second Amendment cases, 
as set forth by the Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals. The focus of 
the Article is how the circuit courts analyze Second Amendment cases. 
In the eight years since the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. 
Heller, the circuit courts have collectively worked out a Second Amendment 
methodology. Although there are differences among the circuits, and 
sometimes among panels within the same circuit, the methodology described 
below has become standard, albeit not universal. 
We have examined every post-Heller circuit case, including the 
unpublished ones. The cases are listed in the Appendix by circuit. We 
occasionally cite state court and federal district court cases that are especially 
illuminating. 
Part I summarizes the key legal rules from Heller. Part II does the same for 
McDonald v. Chicago, which holds that the Second Amendment right is 
enforceable against the states. Part III enumerates the various rights that are 
included within the Second Amendment, in addition to the home defense right 
which was at issue in Heller. Part IV explicates the Two-Part Test nearly every 
circuit has adopted for analyzing Second Amendment issues. Part V explains 
how the circuits have wrestled with Heller’s ambiguous language about certain 
“presumptively lawful” gun controls, and how that language has been applied 
to the Two-Part Test. Part VI examines in detail the application of Step One of 
the Two-Part Test—namely, whether something is part of the Second 
Amendment right as traditionally understood. Part VII summarizes the 
different ways courts have treated the Second Amendment outside the home, 
such as whether bearing arms in public places passes or fails Step One. Part 
VIII examines the first decision that must be made under Step Two of the 
Two-Part Test: which level of heightened scrutiny to use. Part IX describes 
how various levels of heightened scrutiny are applied in Second Amendment 
cases. Among the topics is how consideration of alternative measures (which 
infringe less of the right) is less stringent in intermediate scrutiny. In 
conclusion, Part X summarizes all the elements of the Circuit Courts’ Second 
Amendment doctrines. This Article was written in mid-2016; subsequent 
developments in cases that are discussed in the text are indicted in the 
footnotes. 
I.  HELLER’S RULES 
In 2008, the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia v. Heller, which 
the Court accurately described as its “first in-depth examination of the Second 
Amendment.”1 Heller involved three District of Columbia ordinances: a ban 
on handguns, with grandfathering for handguns that had been registered by 
 
 1. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
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January 1976; a prohibition on having an assembled, functional arm in one’s 
home; and a prohibition on carrying without a license. The carry prohibition 
applied even inside the home—such as carrying a registered handgun from one 
room to another; carry licenses were never issued. The Court held the handgun 
ban and the functional firearms ban to be unconstitutional, and further, that 
Heller was entitled to be issued a carry license. The Court explained that the 
Second Amendment guarantees a pre-existing individual right to keep and bear 
arms, unconnected to service in a militia.2 
The Court set forth many principles: 
• The Second Amendment protects arms “in common use”—those that are 
“[t]ypically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” 
Conversely, the Second Amendment does not protect arms which are 
“dangerous and unusual.”3 
• Like other constitutional rights, the Second Amendment right is “not 
unlimited.”4 
• A law that prohibits handguns in the home is plainly unconstitutional, 
without need to resort to strict or intermediate scrutiny.5 
 
 2. “There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second 
Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 595. 
 3. “We therefore read [United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)] to say only that the 
Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical 
understanding of the scope of the right.” Id. at 625. “Miller said, as we have explained, that the 
sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’” Id. at 627 (quoting Miller, 
307 U.S. at 179). “We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’” Id. 
 4. Id. at 595. “Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens 
to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to protect 
the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.” Id. 
 5.  
[T]he inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Amendment right. The 
handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly 
chosen by American society for that lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, moreover, 
to the home, where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute. Under 
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, 
banning from the home “the most preferred firearm in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for 
protection of one’s home and family,” would fail constitutional muster. 
Id. at 628–29 (internal citation omitted). “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right 
whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.” Id. at 
634. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Both Heller and 
McDonald suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment right—
like the handgun bans at issue in those cases, which prohibited handgun possession even in the 
home—are categorically unconstitutional.”). 
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• It is “bordering on the frivolous” to argue that only the types of arms in 
existence in the eighteenth century are protected by the Second 
Amendment.6 
• A ban on arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens cannot be 
justified by the existence of available alternatives.7 
• The choice of law-abiding citizens to prefer particular types of Second 
Amendment arms is conclusive.8 
• When the core Second Amendment right is at stake, a court may not 
conduct an interest-balancing inquiry.9 
• The right of self-defense is inherent to the Second Amendment.10 
• The Second Amendment right is especially important in the home.11 
“[W]hatever else [the Second Amendment] leaves to future evaluation, 
it surely elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”12 
 
 6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. “We do not interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the 
First Amendment protects modern forms of communications and the Fourth Amendment applies 
to modern forms of search, the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that 
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 7. “It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of 
handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed. It is enough to 
note, as we have observed, that the American people have considered the handgun to be the 
quintessential self-defense weapon.” Id. at 629. 
 8. “Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for 
self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” Id. 
 9. “We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. The very enumeration of the right takes 
out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on 
a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon . . . . [The Second 
Amendment] is the very product of an interest-balancing by the people.” Id. at 634–35. 
 10. “As the quotations earlier in this opinion demonstrate, the inherent right of self-defense 
has been central to the Second Amendment right.” Id. at 628. The inherent right is not limited to 
the home; as Judge Posner recognized, “the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside 
the home.” Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012). For an analysis of the natural 
rights basis of Heller, see David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for 
the World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (2008). For a collection of self-defense provisions in state 
constitutions, see Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of 
Property, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 399 (2007). 
 11. “The prohibition extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute. Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home the most preferred firearm in the nation 
to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family, would fail constitutional muster.” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 (internal quotation omitted). 
 12. Id. at 635. 
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• “[L]ongstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” 
are “presumptively lawful.”13 
• A law implicating the Second Amendment may not be subjected to 
rational basis review. Some form of heightened scrutiny is required.14 
This is because “the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily 
takes certain policy choices off the table.”15 
Although much of the above was, arguably, stated as dicta, circuit courts 
treat Supreme Court dicta, especially from recent cases, as nearly as binding as 
a Supreme Court holding.16 This principle has been repeatedly applied in 
 
 13. Id. at 626–27, 627 n.26. 
 14. “Obviously, [rational-basis scrutiny] could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a 
legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee 
against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms . . . . If all that 
was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second 
Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, 
and would have no effect.” Id. at 628 n.27. 
 15. Id. at 636. The phrase chosen by the Supreme Court was “in” sensitive places, not 
“around” or “near” sensitive places. This could suggest that the sensitive places rule is primarily 
for certain buildings, and not for areas around or near such buildings. See Amy Hetzner, Where 
Angels Tread: Gun-Free School Zone Laws and an Individual Right to Bear Arms, 95 MARQ. L. 
REV. 359, 392 (2011). 
 16. McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We think that federal 
appellate courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly as by the 
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when, as here, a dictum is of recent vintage and not 
enfeebled by any subsequent statement.”); Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 n.3 (2d Cir. 
2014) (“[W]e have an obligation to accord great deference to Supreme Court dicta”) (internal 
quotations omitted); Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 264–65 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]s a lower 
federal court, we are advised to follow the Supreme Court’s considered dicta.”) (internal 
quotation omitted); Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) 
(“[W]ith inferior courts, like ourselves . . . carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, 
even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); United States v. Becton, 632 F.2d 1294, 1296 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980) (“We are not bound 
by dicta, even of our own court . . . . Dicta of the Supreme Court are, of course, another matter.”) 
(citation omitted); United States v. Marlow, 278 F.3d 581, 588 n.7 (6th Cir. 2002) (“Appellate 
courts have noted that they are obligated to follow Supreme Court dicta, particularly when there 
is no substantial reason for disregarding it, such as age or subsequent statements undermining its 
rationale.”); Reich v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994) (“In such a case the 
dictum provides the best, though not an infallible, guide to what the law is, and it will ordinarily 
be the duty of a lower court to be guided by it.”); City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 557 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[F]ederal courts ‘are bound by the Supreme Court’s 
considered dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when . . . [the 
dicta] is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any [later] statement.’”) (citation omitted); United 
States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.17 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We do not treat 
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Second Amendment cases.17 This is appropriate, for the Court understood it 
was issuing the “first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment,” and 
 
considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly. Rather, we accord it appropriate deference. As 
we have frequently acknowledged, Supreme Court dicta have a weight that is greater than 
ordinary judicial dicta as prophecy of what that Court might hold; accordingly, we do not blandly 
shrug them off because they were not a holding.”) (internal citation and quotations omitted); 
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]his court considers itself bound 
by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly when 
the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.”); Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 
1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is dicta and then there is dicta, and then there is Supreme Court 
dicta.”); Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“For this inferior Court . . . 
carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must 
be treated as authoritative.”) (internal citation, quotations, and brackets omitted). 
 17. See Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Finally, amici argue that to the 
extent we rely on these passages from Heller, they are dicta. Amici may well be right as to some 
of the statements. Still, we are generally bound by Supreme Court dicta, especially when it is 
‘recent and detailed.’”); United States v. Khami, 362 F. Appx. 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[This 
Court has] noted that [we] are obligated to follow Supreme Court dicta, particularly when there is 
no substantial reason for disregarding it, such as age or subsequent statements undermining its 
rationale.”); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring); United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that 
this statement is superfluous to the central holding of Heller, we shall still give it considerable 
weight.”). 
  As the Third Circuit explained, most courts have treated Heller’s list of “presumptively 
lawful” gun controls as either part of the holding or as binding dicta: 
There is some dispute over whether the language from Heller limiting the scope of the 
Second Amendment is dicta. Compare United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th 
Cir. 2010) (characterizing this language as dicta), and United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 
1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (same), with United States v. 
Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating this language is not dicta), and 
United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (same). But even if dicta, 
it is Supreme Court dicta, and, as such, requires serious consideration. See Heleva v. 
Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 188 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not view [Supreme Court] dicta 
lightly.” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Schwab v. 
Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]here is dicta and then there is dicta, 
and then there is Supreme Court dicta.”). Several other courts of appeals have followed 
this dicta. See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640–41, (7th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010) (extending it to 
cover a ban on possession by domestic violence offenders); United States v. Rene E., 583 
F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2009) (finding the prohibition of juvenile possession of firearms was 
consistent with the approach of Heller’s dicta); McCane, 573 F.3d at 1047 (relying solely 
on this dicta to conclude a ban on possession of firearms by felons did not offend the 
Second Amendment); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 873–74 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding a ban on 
machine guns). Moreover, the Court itself reaffirmed the presence of these limitations in 
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion of Alito, J.). 
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presumably intended for the entire opinion to be instructive.18 On the other 
hand, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit rejects much of Heller’s 
language, and has created alternative approaches which he considers to be 
superior.19  
II.  MCDONALD’S RULES 
A. Core McDonald Principles 
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided McDonald v. City of Chicago, holding 
that “the Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States”20 through 
the Fourteenth Amendment.21 The Court made clear that the Second 
Amendment is just as “fundamental” as other Bill of Rights protections that 
have been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.22 “[T]he right to keep 
and bear arms [is] among those fundamental rights necessary to our system of 
ordered liberty”23 and must be “regarded as a substantive guarantee.”24 
Accordingly, the Second Amendment may not be treated as a “second-class” 
 
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 90 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations simplified). 
 18. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
 19. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The language we have 
quoted warns readers not to treat Heller as containing broader holdings than the Court set out to 
establish . . . . The opinion is not a comprehensive code; it is just an explanation for the Court’s 
disposition.”); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The 
language from Heller that we have quoted is precautionary: it warns against readings that go 
beyond the scope of Heller’s holding that ‘the Second Amendment creates individual rights, one 
of which is keeping operable handguns at home for self-defense.’”) (citation omitted). 
  Judge Easterbrook has earned a reputation among some in the legal profession for 
disregarding controlling precedent that does not support his desired conclusion. A recent law 
review article articulates especially blistering criticisms, and concludes that Judge Easterbrook is 
an unprincipled “stickler for rules who breaks the rules” with a “penchant for confabulation.” 
Albert W. Alschuler, How Frank Easterbrook Kept George Ryan in Prison, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 
7, 87 (2015). 
 20. 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
 21. A plurality of the Court concluded that the Second Amendment applies to the States by 
virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it is “fundamental to [the 
American] scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.” 
Id. at 767. Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, wrote that “the 
right to keep and bear arms is a privilege of American citizenship that applies to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause.” Id. at 806 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 22. Id. at 778 (“In sum, it is clear that the Framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment counted the right to keep and bear arms among those fundamental rights necessary to 
our system of ordered liberty.”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 780. 
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right.25 It may not be “singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—
treatment.”26 
The McDonald Court further made clear that “incorporation does not 
imperil every law regulating firearms”27 and “state and local experimentation 
with reasonable firearms regulations will continue under the Second 
Amendment.”28 
McDonald also reiterated Heller’s language declaring certain 
“longstanding regulatory measures to be “presumptively lawful”29: 
We made it clear in Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such 
longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” We 
repeat those assurances here. Despite municipal respondents’ doomsday 
proclamations, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms.30 
B. What Dates for Originalism? 
The Second Amendment (applying directly to the federal government) was 
ratified in 1791. The Fourteenth Amendment, which makes most of the Bill of 
Rights, including the Second Amendment, enforceable against state and local 
governments, was ratified in 1868. So when we are searching for original 
meaning, there are two periods to consider: around 1791 and around 1868. 
First Amendment jurisprudence shows how to use both of these “original” 
eras. Like the Second Amendment, the First Amendment was ratified in 1791 
and made applicable to the states in 1868. Courts do not treat the First 
Amendment as having a 1791 original meaning for federal laws and an 1868 
original meaning for state laws. There is just one First Amendment, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies it to the states, full-strength. The same is also 
true for other Bill of Rights provisions that the Supreme Court has held to be 
incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.31 
 
 25. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780. 
 26. Id. at 745–46. 
 27. Id. at 786. 
 28. Id. at 785 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 29. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 n. 26 (2008). 
 30. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (citation omitted); see also Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 
F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Then, to underscore the importance of that language and to 
remove any doubt about the care that went into it and its importance in understanding the holding 
in Heller, several years later [in McDonald] the Court repeated that exact same language, with 
forceful affirmation.”). 
 31. The lone exception is the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury trial, for which only 
a diluted version applies to the states. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970) (federal 
juries must have twelve jurors, but state juries can be as small as six); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 
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When Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment, sending it to the states 
for ratification, the intention to make states obey the Second Amendment was 
clear.32 Neither the proponents nor the opponents of the Fourteenth 
Amendment claimed that what the states would have to obey (e.g., freedom of 
the press, right to arms) was different from what the federal government 
already had to obey. So, there is just one Second Amendment and it applies 
equally to all governments within the American system. 
Thus, the period around 1791 is relevant to any Second Amendment case, 
regardless of what type of government is involved. The same is true for 1868. 
Heller involved a federal law, since the District of Columbia municipal 
government was exercising powers that had been delegated by Congress. Yet 
when elucidating the original meaning of the 1791 Second Amendment, 
Heller’s broad historical sweep found Second Amendment meaning in the 
Early Republic, the Age of Jackson, and all the way through Reconstruction.33 
Lower courts that examine original meaning have always looked at 1791, 
and have also considered 1868, to the extent that the latter adds relevant 
information.34 The one notable exception is the Seventh Circuit’s Highland 
Park case, which will be discussed below. That case contradicted Heller by 
considering what types of arms were common in 1791, rather than what types 
of arms are common today.35 Notably, the court did not consider 1868; for a 
results-oriented opinion, the omission of Fourteenth Amendment originalism 
was an understandable, albeit unjustifiable, approach.36 Magazines holding 
more than ten rounds were in existence in 1791, but were not yet common. 
They were common by 1868.37 
 
U.S. 356, 364 (1972) (federal juries must be unanimous, but state juries can convict on a 9–3 
vote). 
 32. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 775–76. 
 33. Heller, 554 U.S. at 614–19. For a survey of many of the nineteenth century sources, see 
David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359 
(1998). 
 34. E.g., United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (“the Second 
Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant historical moment—1791 [Bill of Rights 
ratification] or 1868 [Fourteenth Amendment ratification]”) (brackets in original). 
 35. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 36. In dissent, Judge Manion wrote, “Of course, our inquiry centers on the understanding of 
the right to keep arms in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment became law.” Id. at 417 
(Manion, J., dissenting); see also Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 705 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“As we have noted, the most relevant historical period for questions about the scope of the 
Second Amendment as applied to the States is the period leading up to and surrounding the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 37. David B. Kopel, The History of Firearm Magazines and Magazine Prohibitions, 78 ALB. 
L. REV. 849, 869 (2014–2015). 
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III.  IS THE SECOND AMENDMENT ONLY ABOUT GUNS FOR SELF-DEFENSE? 
In Heller and McDonald, the plaintiffs emphasized the issue of self-
defense. This has led some commentators to claim that the Second Amendment 
right is only about self-defense. Heller, however, repeatedly states that the 
right to keep and bear arms is for all legitimate uses: 
• “Americans valued the ancient [militia] right; most undoubtedly thought 
it even more important for self-defense and hunting.”38 
• “[T]he right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right to use such 
arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the ordinary modes usual in 
the country, and to which arms are adapted, limited by the duties of a 
good citizen in times of peace.”39 
• “The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms 
‘in common use at the time’ for lawful purposes like self-defense.”40 
• The right applies to arms “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens 
for lawful purposes.”41 
• While it is agreed that the Second Amendment protects militia use of 
arms, “[w]hether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for 
nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the 
question presented by this case.”42 
McDonald summarized “our central holding in Heller: that the Second 
Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.”43 While self-defense 
in the home is central to the Second Amendment right, it is not the sole 
purpose of the right. 
Every circuit court of appeals that has addressed the scope of the Second 
Amendment right has concluded that the right is not confined to self-defense. 
A. All Lawful Uses, Including Hunting and Target Practice 
The most influential post-Heller circuit court decision has been the Third 
Circuit’s United States v. Marzzarella.44 That case created the Two-Part Test, 
which will be discussed infra, and which has been adopted by most of the 
circuits. Marzzarella noted that Heller protected the right to defensive arms: 
 
 38. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. Several state constitutions include an enumerated right to hunt 
and fish. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Constitutional Right to Hunt: New Recognition of an Old 
Liberty in Virginia, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 197, 198 (2010). 
 39. Heller, 554 U.S. at 614 (quoting Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 178 (1871)). 
 40. Id. at 624. 
 41. Id. at 625. 
 42. Id. at 636–37. 
 43. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
 44. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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“And certainly, to some degree, it must protect the right of law-abiding citizens 
to possess firearms for other, as-yet-undefined, lawful purposes.”45 
One of the early post-Heller cases, the D.C. Circuit’s Heller II, wrote that 
the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, was “not only to 
maintain the militia, but also for self-defense and hunting.”46 As Heller II 
characterized the Supreme Court decision, “the Second Amendment protects 
the right to keep and bear arms for other ‘lawful purposes,’ such as hunting.”47 
In deciding the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to a gun registration 
requirement, the court settled on intermediate scrutiny after determining that 
“none of the District’s registration requirements prevents an individual from 
possessing a firearm in his home or elsewhere, whether for self-defense or 
hunting, or any other lawful purpose.”48 
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar formulation, explaining that a federal 
statute that allows young adults to purchase handguns privately, but not from 
gun stores,49 allows 18-to-20-year-olds to “possess and use handguns for self-
defense, hunting, or any other lawful purpose.”50 
In United States v. Rene E.,51 the First Circuit upheld a restriction on 
juvenile possession of handguns because the statute “contains important 
exceptions”52 for “self- and other-defense in the home, national guard duty, 
and hunting, among other things.”53 
In United States v. Masciandaro,54 the Fourth Circuit noted that the Heller 
Court “observed that throughout the country’s history, Americans have valued 
the right not only to be able to prevent the elimination of militia, but ‘even 
more important[ly], for self-defense and hunting.’”55 Judge Niemeyer, writing 
separately, explained: “the right to keep and bear arms was found to have been 
understood to exist not only for self-defense, but also for membership in a 
militia and for hunting.”56 
 
 45. Id. at 92. 
 46. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 1260. 
 48. Id. at 1258. 
 49. 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1), 922(c)(1) (2012), and attendant regulations. 
 50. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 206–07 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 51. 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 52. Id. at 14. 
 53. Id. at 16. 
 54. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 55. Id. at 466 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)). 
 56. Id. at 468 (internal citation omitted). The historical roots of the right to arms in the 
Fourth Circuit and Virginia are explored in Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in the 
Virginia Constitution and the Second Amendment: Historical Development and Precedent in 
Virginia and the Fourth Circuit, 8 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 619, 619–20 (2014). 
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In United States v. Carter (“Carter I”),57 the Fourth Circuit acknowledged 
that in Heller, “The Court noted that the right to keep and bear arms was 
understood by the founding generation to encompass not only militia service, 
but also ‘self-defense and hunting.’”58 
Later, in Woollard v. Gallagher,59 the Fourth Circuit upheld a permit 
requirement for handgun carrying partly because no permit was necessary to 
“wear, carry, and transport handguns” to engage “in target shoots and 
practices, sport shooting events, hunting and trapping, specified firearms and 
hunter safety classes, and gun exhibitions.”60 
Likewise, in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,61 the Second Circuit 
upheld a handgun licensing statute requiring an applicant to show “proper 
cause,” because state court precedent had defined “proper cause” to include 
“carrying a handgun for target practice, hunting, or self-defense.”62 
In Drake v. Filko,63 one of the reasons that a statute requiring applicants to 
demonstrate a “justifiable need” to publicly carry a handgun was constitutional 
was that the statute contained an exception for people employed in certain 
occupations, and for hunting.64 
Judge Manion’s dissenting opinion in Highland Park explained: 
Heller expressly rejected the view that the Second Amendment contained a 
unitary right and instead noted that lawmakers of the founding period routinely 
grouped multiple, related, rights under a singular right. Because the rights in 
the Second Amendment are many and varied, a court must identify the specific 
right implicated by a regulation.65 
Thus, a law that unconstitutionally infringes upon hunting, militia service, 
target shooting, or other lawful uses should not be upheld because its effect on 
self-defense is de minimis. Conversely, a law that unconstitutionally infringes 
upon self-defense should not be upheld because its effect on militia service is 
 
 57. 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Carter I]. 
 58. Id. at 414–15. 
 59. 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 879. For an overview of the circuit split on right to carry, see Elizabeth Beaman, 
Comment, Who Gets to Determine if You Need Self Defense?: Heller and McDonald’s 
Application Outside the House, 12 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 139, 141 (2015). 
 61. 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 62. Id. at 86. The court wrote that “[t]he proper cause requirement has remained a hallmark 
of New York’s handgun regulation” for over a century, as part of a statutory scheme whose 
purpose was “to prevent crimes of violence before they can happen, and at the same time preserve 
legitimate interests such as training for the national defense, the right of self defense, and 
recreational pursuits of hunting, target shooting and trophy collecting.” Id. at 97, 97 n.22. 
 63. 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 64. Id. at 428 n.1. 
 65. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 417 (7th Cir. 2015) (Manion, J., 
dissenting) (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008)). 
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de minimis. The full scope of all lawful uses is protected by the Second 
Amendment. 
B. Right to Practice and Training 
While many circuits have included target practice and training in their lists 
of the various rights protected by the Second Amendment, only one circuit has 
been required to address an actual governmental attempt to suppress such 
activities. After McDonald, the Chicago City Council enacted a new gun 
control statute, which prohibited firing ranges open to the public within city 
limits.66 In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit determined that range 
training is protected by the Second Amendment.67 “The right to possess 
firearms for protection implies a corresponding right to acquire and maintain 
proficiency in their use; the core right wouldn’t mean much without the 
training and practice that make it effective.”68 
In Teixeira v. County of Alameda,69 the Ninth Circuit found Ezell’s 
reasoning persuasive and relied on it to hold that the Second Amendment 
protects “services including ‘state-mandated Hunter Safety Classes, Handgun 
Safety Certificates,’ and ‘classes in gun safety, including safe storage of 
firearms in accordance with state law,’ [b]ecause the Second Amendment 
protects a ‘right not as connected to militia service, but as securing the militia 
by ensuring a populace familiar with arms.’”70 
Concurring in a case involving a government freeze on a defendant’s 
untainted assets, thus preventing the defendant from hiring counsel, and 
therefore violating the Sixth Amendment, Justice Thomas explained that 
“[c]onstitutional rights thus implicitly protect those closely related acts 
necessary to their exercise.”71 He provided a litany of precedent for this 
principle, including: 
 
 66. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 67. Id. at 711. 
 68. Id. at 704. After the Ezell decision, the city government created regulations that 
prohibited firing ranges in over ninety-eight percent of the city. This was held unconstitutional. 
See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 69. 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016). An en banc rehearing was ordered in December 2016. 
Texeira v. County of Alameda, 2016 WL 7438631 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 70. Texeira, 822 F.3d at 1056 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 617 
(2008)). The court elaborated, “to bear arms implies something more than the mere keeping; it 
implies the learning to handle and use them in a way that makes those who keep them ready for 
their efficient use; in other words, it implies the right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, 
observing in doing so the laws of public order.” Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 617–18 (quoting 
Thomas Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States of America 
271 (1868))). 
 71. Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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The right to keep and bear arms, for example, “implies a corresponding right to 
obtain the bullets necessary to use them,” Jackson v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967 (C.A.9 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and “to acquire and maintain proficiency in their use,” Ezell v. Chicago, 651 
F.3d 684, 704 (CA7 2011). See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
617–618, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008) (citing T. Cooley, General 
Principles of Constitutional Law 271 (2d ed. 1891) (discussing the implicit 
right to train with weapons)); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 180 (1939) 
(citing 1 H. Osgood, The American Colonies in the 17th Century 499 (1904) 
(discussing the implicit right to possess ammunition)); Andrews v. State, 50 
Tenn. 165, 178 (1871) (discussing both rights). Without protection for these 
closely related rights, the Second Amendment would be toothless.72 
In the federal circuits, the principles of Justice Thomas’s opinion have 
been uncontroversial. No circuit judge has disputed that the Second 
Amendment includes the right to training and practice, and includes the right to 
acquire ammunition. 
C. Militia 
Heller makes it clear that the Second Amendment is not solely for the 
militia. Given the prefatory clause of the Amendment, militia uses of arms 
must necessarily be protected. Heller affirms the importance of the militia: “It 
was understood across the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the 
ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive 
military force if the constitutional order broke down.”73 Indeed, 
There are many reasons why the militia was thought to be “necessary to the 
security of a free State.” See 3 Story § 1890. First, of course, it is useful in 
repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections. Second, it renders large 
standing armies unnecessary—an argument that Alexander Hamilton made in 
favor of federal control over the militia. The Federalist No. 29, pp. 226, 227 
(B. Wright ed.1961) (A. Hamilton). Third, when the able-bodied men of a 
nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist 
tyranny.74 
In the 1939 United States v. Miller case, the Supreme Court reversed a 
completely unreasoned lower court decision that had held a portion of the 
National Firearms Act of 1934 to be unconstitutional.75 The provision required 
 
 72. Id. (alterations in original). 
 73. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 74. Id. at 597–98. 
 75. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a history of the case, see Brian L. Frye, The Peculiar Story of 
United States v. Miller, 3 N.Y.U.J.L. & LIBERTY 48, 63–64 (2008) (explaining that the district 
judge was a gun control advocate who was colluding with the U.S. Attorney to set up a Supreme 
Court test case), cited in Heller, 554 U.S. at 623. 
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registration and a tax for the acquisition of short-barreled shotguns.76 Miller 
was opaquely written, and commentators spent decades arguing about its 
meaning. Some said that Miller meant that only militiamen had Second 
Amendment rights. Others said that only militia-type arms were covered by the 
Second Amendment. 
Heller elucidated that Miller does not limit the Second Amendment right to 
militia purposes, but instead limits which weapons the militia aspect of the 
right protects. “We therefore read Miller to say only that the Second 
Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.”77 
According to Heller, the Second Amendment does not protect “dangerous and 
unusual” arms—even if those might be the most suitable arms for militia use.78 
The Court suggested that the automatic M-16 rifle may not be covered by the 
Second Amendment.79 An earlier Supreme Court decision, United States v. 
Staples, had carefully distinguished the automatic M-16 from its semi-
automatic relative, the AR-15.80 The latter was “commonplace and generally 
available.”81 
Post-Heller, lower courts have not needed to devote much attention 
specifically to militia uses. No case has involved arms that were not 
“dangerous and unusual,” and yet were suitable mainly for militia service, 
rather than for self-defense, hunting, or other recreation. 
One opinion that does look at militia uses is the Seventh Circuit’s 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park,82 which involved a municipal ban on so-
 
 76. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175 n.1. The Miller Court upheld a conviction for transporting in 
interstate commerce an unregistered shotgun with a barrel less than eighteen inches in length 
because 
[I]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. 
Id. at 178. 
 77. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. See Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 445 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Heller, 
therefore, distinguished between two classes of weapons: (1) those that are useful in the militia or 
military, and (2) those that are ‘possessed at home’ and are in ‘common use at the time for lawful 
purposes like self-defense.’ The individual right protected by the Second Amendment applies 
only to the second category of weapons, though that category at times may overlap with the first. 
The Second Amendment does not create a right to possess a weapon solely because the weapon 
may be used in or is useful for militia or military service.”) (citation omitted). 
 78. Heller, 554 U.S. at 571. 
 79. Id. at 627. 
 80. 511 U.S. 600, 611 (1994). 
 81. Id. 
 82. 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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called “assault weapons”83 and “large-capacity magazines.”84 Eschewing 
Heller as insufficiently instructive, Judge Easterbrook announced his own 
three-part test for arms bans. One element was whether the arms “have ‘some 
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated 
militia.’”85 
Judge Easterbrook noted that the plaintiffs agreed that the suburb’s arms 
ban would be no less unconstitutional if it had been enacted by the State of 
Illinois. According to Judge Easterbrook, “states, which are in charge of 
militias, should be allowed to decide when civilians can possess military-grade 
firearms, so as to have them available when the militia is called to duty.”86 
Thus, any arms ban by a state could not violate the Second Amendment’s 
militia right, because states have full power to choose militia arms. 
Judge Easterbrook had read the Second Amendment, but he forgot about 
Article I. That Article grants Congress, not the States, the power “[t]o provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” while “reserving to the 
States” the appointment of officers and training.87 
Accordingly, Congress, rather than the states, is the source for what arms 
the militia should use. Since Congress has not banned these so-called “large-
capacity magazines” or “assault weapons,” such arms are necessarily militia 
arms under the Highland Park militia test. 
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented from the denial of certiorari in 
Highland Park. They pointed out Judge Easterbrook’s error about Article I, 
and they added: “Because the Second Amendment confers rights upon 
individual citizens—not state governments—it was doubly wrong for the 
Seventh Circuit to delegate to States and localities the power to decide which 
firearms people may possess.”88 
Although hardly a model of textual fidelity, Highland Park does correctly 
recognize that the Second Amendment protects militia rights. Heller added 
clarity to the militia-related right articulated in Miller, rather than eliminating 
that right. 
 
 83. “The ordinance defines an assault weapon as any semi-automatic gun that can accept a 
large-capacity magazine and has one of five other features: a pistol grip without a stock (for 
semiautomatic pistols, the capacity to accept a magazine outside the pistol grip); a folding, 
telescoping, or thumbhole stock; a grip for the non-trigger hand; a barrel shroud; or a muzzle 
brake or compensator. Some weapons, such as AR–15s and AK–47s, are prohibited by name.” Id. 
at 407. For an empirical analysis of “assault weapons,” see James B. Jacobs, Why Ban “Assault 
Weapons”?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 681 (2015). 
 84. “[T]hose that can accept more than ten rounds.” Highland Park, 784 F.3d at 407. 
 85. Id. at 410 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939)). 
 86. Id. 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16 (emphasis added). 
 88. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari). 
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Judge Easterbrook’s test was similar to one previously created by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Caetano, to 
uphold a ban on stun guns.89 The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed and 
remanded Caetano. The per curiam opinion pointed out that all three elements 
of the test violated Heller.90 
First, it was irrelevant whether stun guns existed in 1791. This contradicted 
Heller’s statement that the Second Amendment covers arms “that were not in 
existence at the time of the founding.”91 
Second, the Massachusetts court had said that stun guns were “dangerous 
and unusual.”92 Supposedly, they were unusual because they were “a 
thoroughly modern invention.”93 The Supreme Court responded that this was 
just another formulation for limiting the Second Amendment right to 1791 
arms, and thus contrary to Heller.94 
Third, the lower court had asserted that stun guns are not “readily 
adaptable to use in the military.”95 This contradicted Heller’s rejection of the 
assertion “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.”96 
Concurring, Justices Alito and Thomas argued that the case should not 
have been remanded; instead, the record was clear enough that the stun gun 
ban should have been stricken under a straightforward application of Heller.97 
A final point about the various purposes for exercising Second 
Amendment rights: Heller leaves no doubt that self-defense is at the core of the 
right. This does not mean that all other purposes are outside the core. The core 
of a right can contain more than one thing. For example, the “freedom ‘from 
bodily restraint’ lies ‘at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process 
Clause.’”98 This does not mean that such freedom is the only freedom in the 
core of Due Process Clause liberty. Nor are freedoms that may not be in the 
core unprotected by strict scrutiny.99 
 
 89. 26 N.E.3d 688, 695 (Mass. 2015). 
 90. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027 (2016) (per curiam). 
 91. Id. at 1028. 
 92. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 692. 
 93. Id. at 693–94. 
 94. Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1028. 
 95. Caetano, 26 N.E.3d at 694. 
 96. Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1028 (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624–25 
(2008)). 
 97. Id. at 1028–33 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 98. Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 433 (2011) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 
80 (1992)). 
 99.  “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment ‘forbids the government to infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ 
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 
(1997) (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). 
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Likewise, self-defense is not necessarily the only activity at the core of the 
Second Amendment. Surely defense of others (especially, family members in 
the home) and of property would be included. In Heller, “self-defense” is used 
as a shorthand that includes defense of others. While Heller repeatedly refers 
to the right of “self-defense,” Heller uses the term interchangeably with 
“lawful defense of self, family, and property,”100 “the defense of himself and 
family and his homestead,”101 “the home, where the need for defense of self, 
family, and property is most acute,”102 “for protection of one’s home and 
family,”103 and “using a gun to protect himself or his family from violence.”104 
Given the text of the Second Amendment, it would seem impossible to assert 
that militia uses are not also part of the core. 
IV.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE TWO-PART TEST 
Almost every circuit court has adopted the Two-Part Test, which was 
created by the Third Circuit in Marzzarella.105 The Third Circuit reasoned by 
analogy from the First Amendment—an approach that has become common in 
Second Amendment cases.106 
 
 100. Heller, 554 U.S. at 571. 
 101. Id. at 616. 
 102. Id. at 628. 
 103. Id. at 628–29. 
 104. Id. at 634. 
 105. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); Adopted in: NYSRPA, Inc. 
v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th 
Cir. 2010); NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 
F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–03 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(but see Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]nstead of 
trying to decide what ‘level’ of scrutiny applies, and how it works, inquiries that do not resolve 
any concrete dispute, we think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were 
common at the time of ratification or those that have ‘some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia,’ and whether law-abiding citizens retain 
adequate means of self-defense.”)) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 
1127, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(“Heller thus suggests a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges to federal 
statutes.”) (internal quotations omitted); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 
n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). 
  The basic structure of the Two-Part Test can be found in an earlier case, United States v. 
Skoien, a Seventh Circuit panel decision that was later reversed on other grounds by an en banc 
court. United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2009), reversed by 614 F.3d 638, 
645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 106. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“This inquiry bears strong analogies to the Supreme Court’s free-speech caselaw.”); Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 702–03, 706 (“Both Heller and McDonald suggest that First Amendment analogies are 
more appropriate, and on the strength of that suggestion, we and other circuits have already begun 
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Step One asks if the case involves the Second Amendment right.107 If the 
answer to Step One is “yes,” then Step Two applies some form of heightened 
scrutiny to evaluate the statute or other governmental action. A similar 
methodology is implicit in many other forms of constitutional adjudication. 
For example, imagine that a person is recorded while he is giving 
instructions for how to rob a particular bank at a particular time. He is 
indicated for conspiracy to rob a bank. He correctly points out that he is being 
punished because of what he spoke. So he argues that the conspiracy statute 
violates “the freedom of speech.” He will lose, because precedent establishes 
that speech which is integral to an underlying crime (such as bank robbery) is 
not part of “the freedom of speech.”108 The defendant loses at Step One. 
In another case, public school students are punished for wearing black 
armbands at school one day.109 In context, the armbands are widely understood 
as expressing opposition to the Vietnam War. It could be argued that the First 
Amendment freedom of speech is irrelevant to the case; after all, none of the 
students are being punished for speaking. The Supreme Court, however, held 
that the black armbands did communicate ideas and therefore, fell within the 
protection of the First Amendment’s freedom of speech. Accordingly, the 
majority proceeded to Step Two, and tested the armband prohibition under 
heightened scrutiny. 
Likewise, Central Hudson’s famous four-part test for commercial speech 
protection fits the broad structure of a Two-Part Test.110 Step One is whether 
the speech falls in the category of “commercial speech.” To pass Step One, the 
speech must relate in some way to a commercial transaction; the speech must 
not be misleading; and the proposed underlying transaction must not be illegal 
(such as illegal sale of the fur of an endangered species).111 If Step One is 
passed, then Central Hudson applies a multi-element test to determine whether 
the commercial speech restriction can be upheld. 
For the Second Amendment, the Two-Part Test is as follows: “First, we 
ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
 
to adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment context.”) (internal citation 
omitted); see generally David B. Kopel, The First Amendment Guide to the Second Amendment, 
81 TENN. L. REV. 419 (2014); Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. 
L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009). 
 107. Not every circuit says “Two-Part Test” or “Step One” and “Step Two.” For example, the 
Second Circuit writes that there is a “two-step inquiry.” See, e.g., NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 254. 
 108. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); Eugene Volokh, The 
“Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 981 (2016). 
 109. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 50, 504 (1969). 
 110. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 111. Id. 
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scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”112 “If it does not, our inquiry is 
complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end 
scrutiny. If the law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it 
fails, it is invalid.”113 
Under the Two-Part Test, the burden of proof is on the government 
throughout. At Step One, the government has the burden of proving that the 
activity or thing at issue is outside the scope of the Second Amendment, as 
traditionally understood.114 If the government fails to meet its burden on Step 
One, then the case proceeds to Step Two, which by definition involves some 
form of heightened scrutiny. Under all forms heightened scrutiny, the 
government always bears the burden of proof.115 
V.  “PRESUMPTIVELY LAWFUL” REGULATIONS 
The Two-Part Test is conceptually straightforward in most applications. 
But there is one group of cases where a special difficulty arises. Heller and 
McDonald both stated that certain “longstanding” gun controls are 
“presumptively lawful.”116 These were laws barring guns for felons and the 
mentally ill; prohibiting concealed carry; or imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.117 The Court noted that its 
three-item list was not an exhaustive enumeration of every constitutionally-
permissible gun control.118 
 
 112. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). “Heller suggests that some 
federal gun laws will survive Second Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling 
outside the terms of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified; 
McDonald confirms that if the claim concerns a state or local law, the ‘scope’ question asks how 
the right was publicly understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified.” 
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011); see also NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 
185, 197 (5th Cir. 2012) (“As for step one, Heller itself suggests that the threshold issue is 
whether the party is entitled to the Second Amendment’s protection. See District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (‘Assuming that Heller is not disqualified from the exercise of 
Second Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register his handgun . . . .’”)). 
 113. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
 114. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014); United 
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 
518 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ezell); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 702–03; United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 
673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 115. See infra note 681. In contrast, some state supreme courts, applying their own state’s 
constitution, require that the challenger prove a government action or statute to be 
unconstitutional, even when a fundamental right is involved. 
 116. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27, 627 n.26 (2008); McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010). 
 117. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786. 
 118. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26; see also United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2012) (“Although the Court did not expand on why these two classes of restrictions [carry 
restrictions in sensitive places; conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms] 
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As the Fourth Circuit observed, “The full significance of these 
pronouncements is far from self-evident.” At the least, the list of the 
presumptively lawful regulations “provided a hint as to the types of 
governmental interests that might be sufficient to withstand Second 
Amendment challenges, as well as the contexts in which those interests could 
be successfully invoked.”119 
The Supreme Court’s language about some “presumptively lawful” 
regulations does not fit easily into the Two-Part Test. As the Fifth Circuit 
explained: 
We admit that it is difficult to map Heller’s “longstanding,” “presumptively 
lawful regulatory measures,” onto this two-step framework. It is difficult to 
discern whether “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, ... or laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms,” by virtue of their presumptive validity, either 
(i) presumptively fail to burden conduct protected by the Second Amendment, 
or (ii) presumptively trigger and pass constitutional muster under a lenient 
level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (recognizing that the 
designation—longstanding, presumptively lawful measure—is ambiguous). 
For now, we state that a longstanding, presumptively lawful regulatory 
measure—whether or not it is specified on Heller’s illustrative list—would 
likely fall outside the ambit of the Second Amendment; that is, such a measure 
would likely be upheld at step one of our framework.120 
Heller’s “presumptively lawful” regulatory measures can, arguably, be 
applied to three different types of laws: 
• Laws that fit exactly within the Heller list, such as a law banning gun 
possession by convicted felons. 
• Laws that might be analogized to something on the Heller list, such as 
gun bans for other types of persons who are thought to be especially 
dangerous. 
• Other types of laws that are “longstanding.”121 
 
would be permissible, the natural explanation is that time, place and manner restrictions may not 
significantly impair the right to possess a firearm for self-defense, and may impose no appreciable 
burden on Second Amendment rights.”); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92–93 (“Heller’s list of 
presumptively lawful regulations is not exhaustive . . . . and accordingly, the Second Amendment 
appears to leave intact additional classes of restrictions.”). 
 119. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 120. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626, 627 n.26 (2008) (citations omitted)). 
 121. For an analysis of whether requiring advance permission from the government for the 
private lending or sale of a firearm is “longstanding,” see David B. Kopel, Background Checks 
for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 53 HARV. J. LEGISL. 303 (2015). 
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For each of these types of laws, the question arises: Does the government 
automatically win any case involving such laws, because the government 
prevails at Step One of the Two-Part Test? Or should some of these laws be 
scrutinized under Step Two? If certain laws are “presumptively constitutional,” 
can a litigant rebut the presumption? 
There is some dispute in the circuits about whether the “presumptively 
lawful” language is dicta or is a limitation on Heller’s holding.122 The 
difference is not of great importance, because recent Supreme Court dicta is 
generally considered to be nearly as binding as a holding.123 
Nor does the holding/dicta debate have much practical effect in limiting 
lower court discretion regarding the various categories. Broad statements in 
one case can be qualified by an exploration of exceptions in a subsequent case. 
Presumptions can be rebutted. Heller said “presumptively lawful,” not 
“conclusively lawful.”124 To treat Heller’s presumptions as irrebuttable would 
negate the Second Amendment, as the Third Circuit explained in 
Marzzarella.125 
The court explained why “Commercial regulations on the sale of firearms 
do not fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment”126: 
 
 122. On the dicta side: Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (“these passages 
are dicta”); United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Khami, 362 F. App’x 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Since Heller indicates that its holding does not 
bring into question the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1), and this Court has not been presented with 
any convincing argument that its dicta should not be very persuasive in this case, the district court 
did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss.”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 
640 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, 
J., concurring) (“This instruction, as McCane points out, is dictum.”). 
  On the holding side: United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Although 
some of our sister circuits have classified the ‘presumptively lawful’ language in Heller as 
dicta . . . we disagree.”); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 171–72 (3d Cir. 2011); Bonidy v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Although one could argue that 
language was dicta, it was in fact an important emphasis upon the narrowness of the holding itself 
and it directly informs the holding in that case.”); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“Vongxay nevertheless contends that the Court’s language about certain long-
standing restrictions on gun possession is dicta, and therefore not binding. We disagree. Courts 
often limit the scope of their holdings, and such limitations are integral to those holdings.”). 
  In favor of both dicta and holding: United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 n.6 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (“First, to the extent that this portion of Heller limits the Court’s opinion to possession 
of firearms by law-abiding and qualified individuals, it is not dicta. . . . Second, to the extent that 
this statement is superfluous to the central holding of Heller, we shall still give it considerable 
weight.”). 
 123. See supra notes 16–17. 
 124. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008). 
 125. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 92 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 126. Id. 
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Heller endorsed “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of firearms.” In order to uphold the constitutionality of a law 
imposing a condition on the commercial sale of firearms, a court necessarily 
must examine the nature and extent of the imposed condition. If there were 
somehow a categorical exception for these restrictions, it would follow that 
there would be no constitutional defect in prohibiting the commercial sale of 
firearms. Such a result would be untenable under Heller.127 
The Ninth Circuit similarly recognized that such a result is “untenable.” In 
Texeria v. County of Alameda,128 the court explained: 
an exemption for certain “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms,” does not mean that there is a categorical exception 
from Second Amendment scrutiny for the regulation of gun stores. If such 
were the case, the County could enact a total prohibition on the commercial 
sale of firearms. There is no question that “[s]uch a result would be untenable 
under Heller.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92 n. 8. Indeed, if all regulations 
relating to the commercial sale of firearms were exempt from heightened 
scrutiny, there would have been no need to specify that certain “conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms” were “presumptively lawful.” 
see [David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms 
Commerce?, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 230 (2014)] (“[T]he exception proves the 
rule. There is a right to the commercial sale of arms, but it is a right that may 
be regulated by ‘conditions and qualifications.’”). As discussed, supra, we are 
satisfied that the historical right that the Second Amendment enshrined 
embraces the purchase and sale of firearms. The proper question, therefore, is 
whether Alameda County’s ordinance is the type of longstanding 
“condition[ ]” or “qualification[ ] on the commercial sale of arms,” whose 
interference with the right to keep and to bear arms historically would have 
been tolerated.129 
Here is how the commercial qualifications presumption might be applied. 
Suppose that a regulation requires that when the owner of a retail gun store 
goes home for the night, the store must have security devices to prevent/deter 
theft; this includes locking the guns in this display cases. This is an easy fit 
with the Heller presumptions, and can speedily be held as lawful. 
Suppose instead that the anti-theft rule was that every gun in the store must 
be disassembled down to the smallest screw before the store closes at night. Or 
imagine a rule that gun stores may only be open for business five hours per 
week. Or that only persons with a college degree may work in a gun store. All 
of these would be “conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.” These laws are manifestly oppressive, extreme, and unreasonable. They 
 
 127. Id. (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 571 (2008)). 
 128. 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 129. Id. at 1057 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27, n.26 (citations omitted)). 
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should be subject to heightened scrutiny, and with heightened scrutiny applied, 
should be ruled unconstitutional. 
For convicted felons caught in possession of a firearm, many courts have 
speedily disposed of the felons’ claims, with a brusque citation to the Heller 
language, usually in unpublished opinions.130 In some circuits, the mentally ill 
 
 130. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009) (“McCane first argues 
that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, in which the Court held that the Second 
Amendment provides an individual with a right to possess and use a handgun for lawful purposes 
within the home . . . § 922(g) violates the Second Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, 
explicitly stated in Heller that ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’”); United States v. Bogle, 717 
F.3d 281, 281 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court clearly emphasized that recent developments 
in Second Amendment jurisprudence should not ‘be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’”). 
  Most such decisions are unpublished. See United States v. Stuckey, 317 F. App’x 48, 50 
(2d Cir. 2009) (“The Heller Court made it clear that ‘nothing in [the] opinion should be taken to 
cast doubt on longstanding prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons.’”); United States 
v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009) (“McRobie’s final 
claim of error founders on the very case upon which it relies. While the Heller opinion recognized 
a Second Amendment right for citizens to bear arms, it specifically cautioned that ‘nothing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons and the mentally ill.’ Accordingly, we affirm McRobie’s conviction and sentence.”) 
(internal citation omitted); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 261 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(“Regarding the Second Amendment, the Supreme Court has recently upheld the ‘longstanding 
prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons’ . . . . Accordingly, Brunson’s constitutional 
challenges to the firearm statute are meritless.”); United States v. Ritchie, 362 F. App’x 687, 688 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“As the Supreme Court emphasized in Heller, its ruling did not change the 
longstanding prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons.”); United States v. Nolan, 342 F. 
App’x 368, 372 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Nolan was a convicted felon when he possessed the firearm in 
question. Thus, the Court specifically foreclosed his argument that his possession of the firearm 
was protected by the Second Amendment.”); United States v. Molina, 484 F. App’x 276, 285 
(10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the argument “that Heller somehow makes 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) 
unconstitutional in its prohibition of felons possessing firearms”); United States v. Small, 494 F. 
App’x 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The Second Amendment. . .does not extend to felons and the 
mentally ill.”) (citation and brackets omitted); United States v. Lapier, 535 F. App’x 622, 622 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“Lapier’s contention that recent Supreme Court decisions undermine this 
precedent is unpersuasive.”); United States v. Brye, 318 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(relying entirely on Heller’s “longstanding” language); United States v. Banks, 350 F. App’x 419, 
421 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The Court expressly stated that nothing from its decision ‘should be taken 
to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’”); United 
States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326, 327 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not bar 
laws prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.”); United States v. Smith, 329 F. App’x 109, 
110 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Supreme Court expressly excluded felons from its holding that the 
Second Amendment confers a federal individual right to keep and bear arms.”); United States v. 
Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383, 386 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Under Heller. . .convicted felons, such as 
Gilbert, do not have the right to possess any firearms.”); United States v. Battle, 347 F. App’x 
478, 480 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the Supreme Court in Heller stated that ‘the right secured by 
the Second Amendment is not unlimited’ and ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
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have gotten the same treatment,131 as have unlicensed firearms dealers,132 and 
violators of concealed carry laws.133 However, the Fourth Circuit has rejected 
this approach.134 It remanded a case back to the district court, requiring the 
court to conduct a proper analysis by applying the Two-Part Test to a 
“presumptively lawful” ban on felons.135 The Fifth Circuit also requires more 
than a simple reference to Heller’s dicta to uphold a regulation.136 
As the Fourth Circuit observed in another case, “Some courts have treated 
Heller’s listing of ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures,’ for all practical 
purposes, as a kind of ‘safe harbor’ for unlisted regulatory measures.”137 These 
unlisted measures are said to be analogous to Heller’s felon/mentally ill ban. 
This has sometimes been done for persons convicted of domestic violence 
 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,’ 
Battle’s argument that the permanent prohibition of the right to bear arms, as found in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1), violates the Second Amendment is without merit.”). 
 131. McRobie, 2009 WL 82715 at *1 (“McRobie’s final claim of error founders on the very 
case upon which it relies. While the Heller opinion recognized a Second Amendment right for 
citizens to bear arms, it specifically cautioned that ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.’ 
Accordingly, we affirm McRobie’s conviction and sentence.”) (quoting District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 n.26 (2008)); Petramala v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 481 F. App’x 395, 396 
(9th Cir. 2012) (“Petramala’s inclusion in the National Instant Criminal Background Check 
System, after being adjudicated as a ‘mental defective’ under the Gun Control Act of 1968, 
imposed constitutionally permissible limits on his right to bear arms.”) 
 132. United States v. Castro, No. 10-50160, 2011 WL 6157466, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2011) 
(“Castro argues that his prosecution for dealing weapons violates the Second Amendment. We 
disagree. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the government can continue to regulate 
commercial gun dealing.”) 
 133. United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court 
specified that nothing in [Heller] was intended to cast doubt on the prohibition of concealed 
weapons in sensitive places.”). 
 134. The Fourth Circuit had previously followed this approach in two cases, but it has not 
followed the approach again since the court rejected it in United States v. Pruess (Pruess I), 416 
F. App’x 274, 275 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 135. “Here, the district court concluded, based on the statement in Heller that ‘nothing in 
[the] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons,’ that § 922(g)(1) was not unconstitutional. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 571 (2008). However, as we have determined that a district court must conduct an 
analysis of a challenged regulation in light of Heller, we remand to the district court with 
instructions to make this determination in accordance with our decision in Chester.” Pruess I, 416 
F. App’x at 275. 
 136. See Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016) (“We conclude that these 
passages from Heller directly apply to the claims Hollis advances. Still, it is appropriate to 
undertake an independent inquiry as to whether machineguns are protected by the Second 
Amendment because these passages are dicta.”). 
 137. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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misdemeanors,138 persons subject to domestic violence restraining orders,139 
and illegal drug users.140 The Fourth Circuit, though, rejected the argument 
 
 138. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24–25 (1st Cir. 2011) (“§ 922(g)(9) fits 
comfortably among the categories of regulations that Heller suggested would be ‘presumptively 
lawful.’ Section 922(g)(9) is, historically and practically, a corollary outgrowth of the federal 
felon disqualification statute. Moreover, in covering only those with a record of violent crime, § 
922(g)(9) is arguably more consistent with the historical regulation of firearm than § 922(g)(1), 
which extends to violent and nonviolent offenders alike.”) (internal citation omitted); United 
States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (conducting an analysis regarding the 
challenged ban on illegal drug users and concluding that a connection existed between drug use 
and violent crime, also justifying the ban by reasoning that “[k]eeping guns away from habitual 
drug abusers is analogous to disarming felons” and “[e]xtending the ban to those who regularly 
abuse drugs makes particular sense because the Court has noted the similarity between [illegal 
drug users and the mentally ill].”); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“although [it was] passed relatively recently, § 922(g)(9) addresses the thorny problem of 
domestic violence, a problem Congress recognized was not remedied by ‘longstanding’ felon-in-
possession laws. We see no reason to exclude § 922(g)(9) from the list of longstanding 
prohibitions on which Heller does not cast doubt.”). 
 139. United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Although persons 
restricted by § 922(g)(8) need not have been convicted of an offense involving domestic violence, 
this statute—like prohibitions on the possession of firearms by violent felons and the mentally 
ill—is focused on a threat presented by a specific category of presumptively dangerous 
individuals.”). 
 140. United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e see the same 
amount of danger in allowing habitual drug users to traffic in firearms as we see in allowing 
felons and mentally ill people to do so . . . . Because Congress may constitutionally deprive felons 
and mentally ill people of the right to possess and carry weapons, we conclude that Congress may 
also prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms.”); United States v. Richard, 350 F. 
App’x 252, 260 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding a prohibition on firearms possession by unlawful 
users of controlled substances; no analysis, other than asserting that Heller’s “presumptively 
lawful” list of gun controls is non-exhaustive). 
The most detailed analysis in a Step One opinion on illegal drug users came from the Ninth 
Circuit: 
[W]e see the same amount of danger in allowing habitual drug users to traffic in firearms 
as we see in allowing felons and mentally ill people to do so. . . . Habitual drug users, 
like . . . career criminals and the mentally ill, more likely will have difficulty exercising 
self-control, particularly when they are under the influence of controlled substances. 
Moreover, unlike people who have been convicted of a felony or committed to a mental 
institution and so face a lifetime ban, an unlawful drug user may regain his right to 
possess a firearm simply by ending his drug abuse. The restriction in § 922(g)(3) is far 
less onerous than those affecting felons and the mentally ill. Moreover, unlike people who 
have been convicted of a felony or committed to a mental institution and so face a lifetime 
ban, an unlawful drug user may regain his right to possess a firearm simply by ending his 
drug abuse. The restriction in § 922(g)(3) is far less onerous than those affecting felons 
and the mentally ill. 
Dugan, 657 F.3d at 999. Dugan is a good example of doing the right analysis, but incompletely, 
and in the wrong place. First, Dugan failed to acknowledge that the statutory prohibition applies 
to all users, not just to habitual ones. Second, the court failed to follow the usual Ninth Circuit 
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that a lifetime arms prohibition for domestic violence misdemeanants is 
presumptively lawful under Heller.141 And the Sixth Circuit refused to apply 
the language to a dangerous weapon enhancement.142 The Ninth Circuit also 
requires more: “a regulation that merely resembles something listed by the 
Court in Heller will not avoid heightened constitutional scrutiny. Instead, the 
type of law in question must be both longstanding and closely match a listed 
prohibition.”143 In United States v. Chovan,144 the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
government’s argument that a gun ban for misdemeanants was part of a “long 
line of prohibitions and restrictions on the right to possess firearms by people 
perceived as dangerous or violent”; so the ban was not presumptively 
lawful.145 
A. “Presumptively” in Step One 
Some courts incorporate their analysis of “presumptively lawful” measures 
in Step One of the Two-Part Test. The most thorough argument for doing so 
came from the Third Circuit: 
We recognize the phrase “presumptively lawful” could have different 
meanings under newly enunciated Second Amendment doctrine. On the one 
hand, this language could be read to suggest the identified restrictions are 
presumptively lawful because they regulate conduct outside the scope of the 
Second Amendment. On the other hand, it may suggest the restrictions are 
presumptively lawful because they pass muster under any standard of scrutiny. 
Both readings are reasonable interpretations, but we think the better reading, 
based on the text and the structure of Heller, is the former—in other words, 
that these longstanding limitations are exceptions to the right to bear arms. 
Immediately following the above-quoted passage, the Court discussed “another 
important limitation” on the Second Amendment—restrictions on the types of 
weapons individuals may possess. [Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 
570, 628 (2008)]. The Court made clear that restrictions on the possession of 
dangerous and unusual weapons are not constitutionally suspect because these 
 
standard that the government must prove that the gun control in question (here, on drug users) is 
“longstanding” and “traditional.” Accordingly, the court should have proceeded to Step Two, and 
required the government to introduce evidence demonstrating that the prohibition passes some 
level of heightened scrutiny. By flippantly analyzing the prohibition only under Step One, the 
Dugan court negated the Second Amendment rights of a large class of people, based on nothing 
more than the judges’ personal intuitions. 
 141. United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 160 (4th Cir. 2011) (relying on United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir. 2010)). 
 142. United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Because the list does not 
contain the Section 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous weapon enhancement at issue in this case, we cannot 
rely on the list, alone, to reject Greeno’s Second Amendment challenge.”). 
 143. Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 144. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 145. Id. at 1137. 
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weapons are outside the ambit of the amendment. [Heller, 554 U.S. at 625] 
(“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes....”). By equating the list 
of presumptively lawful regulations with restrictions on dangerous and unusual 
weapons, we believe the Court intended to treat them equivalently—as 
exceptions to the Second Amendment guarantee.146 
The Eighth Circuit agrees that the Heller language can be read various 
ways, but “[i]t seems most likely that the Supreme Court viewed the regulatory 
measures listed in Heller as presumptively lawful because they do not infringe 
on the Second Amendment right.”147 
The Ninth Circuit in Jackson v. San Francisco explained its methodology 
for Step One: 
To determine whether a challenged law falls outside the historical scope of the 
Second Amendment, we ask whether the regulation is one of the 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” identified in Heller, 554 U.S. at 
627 n. 26 or whether the record includes persuasive historical evidence 
establishing that the regulation at issue imposes prohibitions that fall outside 
the historical scope of the Second Amendment.148 
In a later case, the court elaborated: 
We . . . treat Heller’s “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” as examples 
of prohibitions that simply “fall outside the historical scope of the Second 
Amendment.” Jackson, 746 F.3d at 959–60. Given their longstanding 
acceptance, such measures are not subjected to the more exacting scrutiny 
normally applied when reviewing a regulation that burdens a fundamental right 
. . . . The burden is on the Government to demonstrate that a prohibition has 
historically fallen outside the Second Amendment’s scope before it can claim a 
presumption of validity.149 
Once the government carries its burden of proving that a certain law is 
covered by “presumptively,” the burden of proof shifts to the party challenging 
the law. The party must rebut the presumption of constitutionality. As the 
Third Circuit wrote, “[b]y describing the felon disarmament ban as 
‘presumptively’ lawful, the Supreme Court implied that the presumption may 
be rebutted.”150 
 
 146. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 147. United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011); cf. NYSRPA, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 257 n.73 (2d Cir. 2015) (“certain ‘presumptively lawful regulatory 
measures’ ostensibly fall outside of the Second Amendment’s prima facie protections”). 
 148. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation 
omitted); cf. Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Consequently, we need not 
determine at this juncture whether firing-capacity regulations are among the longstanding 
prohibitions that fall outside of the Second Amendment’s scope.”). 
 149. Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 150. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). 
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How to rebut the presumption? The D.C. Circuit analyzed the question in 
Heller II. “With respect to the first step, Heller tells us ‘longstanding’ 
regulations are ‘presumptively lawful’; that is, they are presumed not to burden 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment.”151 The court continued: 
This is a reasonable presumption because a regulation that is “longstanding,” 
which necessarily means it has long been accepted by the public, is not likely 
to burden a constitutional right; concomitantly the activities covered by a 
longstanding regulation are presumptively not protected from regulation by the 
Second Amendment. A plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing the 
regulation does have more than a de minimis effect upon his right. A 
requirement of newer vintage is not, however, presumed to be valid.152 
Heller II then determined that minimal laws for handgun registration (such 
as collecting records of sale from firearms dealers) are longstanding, and 
therefore presumptively lawful; the court upheld the de minimis handgun 
registration requirement because that presumption was unrebutted.153 A similar 
registration requirement on long guns, however, was not historic, but novel.154 
Accordingly, the case was remanded for evaluation under Step Two. After 
factual development in the district court, the D.C. Circuit in Heller III upheld 
some of D.C.’s novel gun registration laws and ruled others 
unconstitutional.155 
B. “Presumptively” in Step Two 
The Fourth Circuit suggests that the better place to analyze 
“presumptively” is in Step Two. In a case about whether a particular location 
was a “sensitive place” where gun-carrying could be banned, the Fourth 
Circuit wrote: 
 
 151. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal 
citation omitted). 
 152. Id.; see also Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1218 n.1 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Heller II: “A plaintiff may rebut the presumption of validity by showing that the regulation at 
issue has ‘more than a de minimis effect upon his right.’”). 
 153. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1253 (“The record supports the view that basic registration of 
handguns is deeply enough rooted in our history to support the presumption that a registration 
requirement is constitutional. The Court in Heller considered ‘prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons’ to be ‘longstanding’ although states did not start to enact them until the early 
20th century. At just about the same time, states and localities began to require registration of 
handguns.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 154. Id. at 1255. 
 155. A less burdensome registration requirement than those found in Heller III was upheld in 
Justice v. Town of Cicero, 577 F.3d 768, 774 (7th Cir. 2009). But the Justice court did not 
provide any substantive Second Amendment analysis. It largely relied on its misbelief that the 
Second Amendment does not apply to the states or their subdivisions, and hastily added that even 
if it does, the registration requirement is constitutional because none of Justice’s firearms were 
prohibited. 
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Because of the relation between the first statement and the examples [in 
Heller], one might conclude that a law prohibiting firearms in a sensitive place 
would fall beyond the scope of the Second Amendment and therefore would be 
subject to no further analysis. But the Court added a footnote to its language, 
calling these regulatory measures “presumptively lawful.” The Court’s use of 
the word “presumptively” suggests that the articulation of sensitive places may 
not be a limitation on the scope of the Second Amendment, but rather on the 
analysis to be conducted with respect to the burden on that right.156 
Soon after, the Fourth Circuit determined that either possible interpretation 
defeats a facial challenge to the “presumptively lawful” prohibition on felon 
gun possession: 
Whichever meaning the Supreme Court had in mind negates a facial challenge 
to a felon in possession statute like § 922(g)(1). If such restrictions were 
outside the scope of Second Amendment coverage at ratification, then 
obviously it is not within Second Amendment protection now. On the other 
hand, if a § 922(g)(1)-type statute has some Second Amendment coverage, the 
fact it is “presumptively lawful” indicates it must “pass muster under any 
standard of scrutiny.” Under the well recognized standard for assessing a facial 
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the Supreme Court has long 
declared that a statute cannot be held unconstitutional if it has constitutional 
application.157 
But as the Fourth Circuit observed in another case, some courts have turned 
“presumptively” into something that “approximates rational-basis review,” 
which Heller prohibits.158 
 
 156. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 472 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 n.26). The court declined to resolve the issue because it 
did not have to. “We need not, however, resolve the ambiguity in the ‘sensitive places’ language 
in this case, because even if Daingerfield Island is not a sensitive place, as Masciandaro argues, 
36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) still passes constitutional muster under the intermediate scrutiny standard.” Id. 
at 473. See also United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 (4th Cir. 2010) (“It is unclear to us 
whether Heller was suggesting that ‘longstanding prohibitions’ such as these were historically 
understood to be valid limitations on the right to bear arms or did not violate the Second 
Amendment for some other reason.”). 
 157. United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 2012). What the Fourth Circuit 
called the “well recognized standard” for facial vagueness challenges has been called into 
question by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Johnson held a statute 
unconstitutionally vague, even though it was capable of valid application. The Johnson Court 
explained, “although statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest otherwise, our 
holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because 
there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.” Id. at 2560–61. Thus, “[i]t 
seems to us that the dissent’s supposed requirement of vagueness in all applications is not a 
requirement at all . . . .” Id. at 2561. 
 158. Chester, 628 F.3d at 679; United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517–18 (6th Cir. 
2012); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 n.27 (2008). 
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In the Seventh Circuit, “[w]e do not think it profitable to parse these 
passages of Heller as if they contained an answer to the question whether § 
922(g)(9) is valid. They are precautionary language. Instead of resolving 
questions such as the one we must confront, the Justices have told us that the 
matters have been left open.”159 The First Circuit agrees with the Seventh’s 
assessment of the futility of parsing.160 
In a Seventh Circuit case, Judge Manion explained in dissent: 
[A] presumption is a very different thing from an assertion: we presume that 
laws are constitutional until and unless the regulation is challenged and a 
competent court informs us otherwise. In other words, it is a very different 
thing to presume a statute to be constitutional than to positively assert that it 
is.161 
One of the most recent examinations of the “presumptively” issue came 
from the Tenth Circuit in Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Service.162 The panel majority 
noted that Heller’s “presumptively lawful” list includes bans on gun carrying 
“in sensitive places, such as schools and government buildings.”163 The 
majority extrapolated to hold: “[T]he Second Amendment right to carry 
firearms does not apply to federal buildings, such as post offices.”164 
Concurring and dissenting, Judge Tymkovich wrote: 
I do not agree that the dicta necessarily means “the Second Amendment right 
to bear arms has not been extended to ‘government buildings.’” . . . That 
overreads Heller’s dicta. While the list could certainly mean the right does not 
extend to schools or government buildings, it could just as easily (perhaps 
more easily) mean the right extends to those locations but that regulations in 
those locations presumptively survive scrutiny at step two of our two-prong 
Second Amendment analysis. And the fact that the Heller Court provided its 
list of exceptions in the course of explaining that the Second Amendment right 
is subject to certain limitations, see Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, suggests it 
describes presumptively permissible limitations on the right, not cases where 
the right is not burdened at all. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 679 
(4th Cir.2010) (“[T]he phrase ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ 
suggests the possibility that one or more of [the] ‘longstanding’ regulations 
‘could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.’ ”) (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir.2010)). To say the right 
has not been extended to government buildings is to imply no plaintiff could 
 
 159. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 160. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 161. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 420 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 162. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 163. Id. at 1136. 
 164. Id. at 1125. 
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ever successfully challenge a restriction in any government buildings. That 
goes too far.165 
The Eleventh Circuit seems to favor the Step Two approach: “While felons 
do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon being convicted, their status as 
felons substantially affects the level of protection those rights are accorded.”166 
Regardless of whether “presumptively” is analyzed in Step One or Step 
Two, the Third Circuit makes an important point: “prudence counsels caution 
when extending these recognized exceptions to novel regulations unmentioned 
by Heller.”167 
C. As-applied Challenges to Presumptively Lawful Regulations 
As-applied challenges sometimes succeed, even when they involve a gun 
control which is “presumptively lawful.” 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 imposes a lifetime gun possession ban on all 
convicted felons.168 No convicted violent felon has succeeded in an as-applied 
challenge to the federal statute.169 
In United States v. Williams, the Seventh Circuit explained that although 
violent felons could not rebut the presumptive lawfulness of a gun ban, a non-
violent felon might be able to do so: “Heller referred to felon disarmament 
bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there 
must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of 
 
 165. Id. at 1136 n.7 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 166. United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 167. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 168. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). There are a few exceptions for certain business law 
felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2)(A). 
 169. See United States v. Stuckey, 317 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States 
v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Brunson, 292 F. App’x 259, 259 (4th Cir. 
2008) (per curiam); United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Anderson’s 
argument, as he acknowledges, was foreclosed in this circuit by United States v. Darrington, 351 
F.3d 632, 633–34 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 922(g) ‘does not violate the Second 
Amendment’) . . . Heller provides no basis for reconsidering Darrington. We therefore reaffirm 
Darrington and the constitutionality of § 922(g).”); United States v. Frazier, 314 F. App’x 801 
(6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Irish, 
285 F. App’x 326 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Khami, 362 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 329 F. App’x 
109 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gilbert, 286 F. App’x 383 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 10th Cir. 2009); Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (per curiam); United States v. 
Battle, 347 F. App’x 478 (11th Cir. 2009); Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695 (7th Cir. 2016). See 
also United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2016) (upholding ban based on prior 
conviction for misprision of felony, because while it “is not a violent crime,” it is not “purely 
passive” either, and because it has been a federal felony since even before the ratification of the 
Second Amendment). 
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an as-applied challenge.”170 So the lifetime prohibition for all felons “may be 
subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its 
disqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent.”171 
The First Circuit similarly noted: “given the ‘presumptively lawful’ 
reference in Heller—the Supreme Court may be open to claims that some 
felonies do not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for applying 
a categorical ban.”172 
In United States v. Pruess (“Pruess II”),173 the Fourth Circuit rejected a 
challenge by a non-violent felon who could not “rebut the presumption of 
lawfulness of the felon-in-possession prohibition as applied to him”; he had 
repeatedly violated firearms laws.174 
The Third Circuit elaborated on how “to raise a successful as-applied 
challenge”: 
Barton must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish 
his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second 
Amendment protections. For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-
violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-
abiding citizen. Similarly, a court might find that a felon whose crime of 
conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society. The North 
Carolina Supreme Court did just that in Britt v. State, 363 N.C. 546, 681 
S.E.2d 320 (2009), finding that a felon convicted in 1979 of one count of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute had a 
constitutional right to keep and bear arms, at least as that right is understood 
under the North Carolina Constitution.175 
 
 170. Williams, 616 F.3d at 692. 
 171. Id. at 693. 
 172. United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 173. United States v. Pruess, 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Pruess II]. 
 174. Id. at 246. 
 175. United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2011). The defendant in Barton was 
unable to develop the basis for his as-applied challenge and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was upheld. 
Cf. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1040 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Non-violent felons, for 
example, certainly have the same right to self-defense in their homes as non-felons . . . The 
question may be less clear, however, where the underlying felony is non-violent, such as financial 
fraud, perjury, or misleading federal investigators . . .”); United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 
685 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[F]elon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‘wildly overinclusive’ for 
encompassing nonviolent offenders . . .”); United States v. Duckett, 406 F. App’x 185, 187 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (“[W]ere I not bound by [Vongxay], I would examine whether, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s dicta in [Heller], the government has a substantial interest 
in limiting a non-violent felon’s constitutional right to bear arms . . . Indeed, other than felon 
disenfranchisement laws, which are grounded in §2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, I can think of 
no other constitutional disability that applies only to a certain category of persons. . .who may be 
excluded from ever exercising the right.”) (citations, brackets, emphasis, and quotations omitted); 
United States v. Phillips, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]here are good reasons to be 
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The Fourth Circuit offered similar guidance: 
[T]he Supreme Court’s declaration in Heller that felon in possession statutes 
are “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” reinforces the fact that a 
litigant claiming an otherwise constitutional enactment is invalid as applied to 
him must show that his factual circumstances remove his challenge from the 
realm of ordinary challenges.176 
The en banc Seventh Circuit in the influential Skoien case rejected a facial 
challenge to the lifetime gun ban for domestic violence misdemeanants, but 
suggested that there could be an as-applied challenge by misdemeanants who 
have been law-abiding for an extended period of time.177 The Ninth Circuit in 
Chovan rejected such a challenge asserted by a law-abiding citizen of fifteen 
years, because Chovan “ha[d] not presented evidence to directly contradict the 
government’s evidence that the rate of domestic violence recidivism is high. 
Nor has he directly proved that if a domestic abuser has not committed 
domestic violence for fifteen years, that abuser is highly unlikely to do so 
again.”178 In Schrader v. Holder,179 the D.C. Circuit did not directly address 
the issue, but explained that it “would hesitate to find” a sixty-four-year-old 
veteran who was convicted over four decades prior of common-law 
misdemeanor assault and battery to be “outside the class of ‘law-abiding, 
responsible citizens’ whose possession of firearms is, under Heller, protected 
by the Second Amendment.”180 
 
skeptical of the constitutional correctness of categorical, lifetime bans on firearm possession by 
all ‘felons’”). 
 176. United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 2012). The Moore court would “not 
foreclose the possibility that a case might exist in which an as-applied Second Amendment 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) could succeed,” but the defendant in that case was “not remotely close” 
to succeeding, because of his lengthy criminal history. The Fourth Circuit followed this 
framework in United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2012). “Smoot’s criminal history 
[was] likewise remarkably egregious.” Id. at 221. 
 177. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 638 (7th Cir. 2010). The case at issue, 
however, involved a recently charged recidivist, and did not require the court to examine the more 
complex issues surrounding § 922(g)(9). “Skoien is poorly situated to contend that the statute 
creates a lifetime ban for someone who does not pose any risk of further offenses . . . . A person 
to whom a statute properly applies can’t obtain relief based on arguments that a differently 
situation person might present.” Id. at 645. 
 178. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1142 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 179. 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 180. Id. at 991. 
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VI.  APPLYING STEP ONE OF THE TWO-PART TEST: DOES THE CHALLENGED 
LAW IMPOSE A BURDEN ON CONDUCT FALLING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT’S GUARANTEE? 
In this Part, we analyze decisions about whether something is within the 
scope of the right to arms. If something is not within the scope, then that is the 
end of any Second Amendment challenge. If something is within the Second 
Amendment scope, then the case continues, for evaluation under heightened 
scrutiny. We will address the heightened scrutiny rules later in this Article. 
Part VI.A examines whether various types of arms have any Second 
Amendment protection. Part VI.B considers whether various types of persons 
have any Second Amendment protection. Part VI.C examines various activities 
that may or may not have Second Amendment protection. To reiterate: we are 
only looking at whether particular cases rise to being Second Amendment 
cases at all. We are not yet considering whether a restriction on the Second 
Amendment might be upheld in Step Two, following application of heightened 
scrutiny. 
The most straightforward way for the government to win under Step One is 
to carry its burden of proving that the type of arm, person, or activity has 
historically been considered outside the scope of the Second Amendment 
right.181 
The inquiry at Step One is primarily textual and historical. In the words of 
the Fifth Circuit, “[t]o determine whether a law impinges on the Second 
Amendment right, we look to whether the law harmonizes with the historical 
traditions associated with the Second Amendment guarantee . . . Heller 
illustrates that we may rely on a wide array of interpretative materials to 
conduct a historical analysis.”182 
According to the Fourth Circuit: 
This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was 
understood to be within the scope of the right at the time of ratification. If it 
was not, then the challenged law is valid. If the challenged regulation burdens 
conduct that was within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically 
understood, then we move to the second step of applying an appropriate form 
of means-end scrutiny.183 
Thus, “there are certain types of firearms regulations that do not govern 
conduct within the scope of the Amendment,” said the D.C. Circuit.184 
All published opinions place the burden of proof on the government at 
Step One185: “If the government cannot establish this—if the historical 
 
 181. See supra note 114. 
 182. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 183. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 
 184. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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evidence is inconclusive or suggests that the regulated activity is not 
categorically unprotected—then there must be a second inquiry into the 
strength of the government’s justification for restricting or regulating the 
exercise of Second Amendment rights.”186 An unpublished opinion from the 
Fourth Circuit appears to place the burden of proof on the individual.187 
It should be noted that “even if the regulated activity presumably falls 
outside the scope of the Second Amendment right, a regulation may still be 
subject to an as-applied challenge.”188 
A. Which Arms Are Second Amendment Arms? 
The Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear “arms.” 
This is not limited to firearms.189 Under Heller, all bearable arms are presumed 
to be covered by the Second Amendment. The government may rebut the 
presumption by introducing sufficient historical evidence, as the Second 
Circuit explained: 
Heller emphasizes that the “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to 
all instruments that constitute bearable arms.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 582. In other 
words, it identifies a presumption in favor of Second Amendment protection, 
which the State bears the initial burden of rebutting. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 
702–03 (“[I]f the government can establish that a challenged firearms law 
regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment ... then 
the analysis can stop there....” (emphasis supplied)); cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 369 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment 
 
 185. Although, in Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d 843 
(7th Cir. 2016), Judge Easterbrook mistakenly applied a provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act that automatically places the burden on the challenger. Id. at 847–48. 
 186. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir. 2011). “[I]f the government can 
establish that a challenged firearms law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment right as it was understood at the relevant historical moment—1791 or 1868—then 
the analysis can stop there; the regulated activity is categorically unprotected, and the law is not 
subject to further Second Amendment review.” Id. at 702–03; see also supra note 114. 
 187. See United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342, 344 (4th Cir. 2011) (“Chafin contends 
that his conduct—the sale of a firearm to an unlawful user of drugs—falls within the historical 
scope of the Second Amendment. However, Chafin has not pointed this court to any authority, 
and we have found none, that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the Second 
Amendment was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm . . . . Accordingly, 
Chafin’s argument that § 922(d)(3) is unconstitutional under Heller must be rejected.”) (internal 
citation and quotation omitted). The unpublished Chafin opinion is plainly wrong. See infra Part 
VI.C. 
 188. United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Barton, 633 
F.3d 168, 172–73 (3d Cir. 2011); see infra Part V.C. 
 189. See, e.g., State v. DeCiccio, 105 A.3d 165 (Conn. 2014) (police batons, various knives); 
People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. App. 2012) (stun guns); State v. Herrmann, 873 
N.W.2d 257 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (switchblade knives); David B. Kopel, Clayton Cramer & 
Joseph P. Olson, Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 175 (2013). 
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in part, and dissenting in part) (defining “prima facie evidence” as that which, 
“if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor 
of the issue which it supports” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1190 (6th 
ed.1990))).190 
Heller itself explains that not all “arms” are protected by the Second 
Amendment. The arms that are not protected—that is, the arms for which the 
presumption of coverage has been rebutted—are those that are “dangerous and 
unusual.”191 These are the opposite of arms that are in “common use” and 
“[t]ypically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”192 
According to the Heller Court: 
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry 
arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected 
were those “in common use at the time.” We think that limitation is fairly 
supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous 
and unusual weapons.”193 
In Miller, the Supreme Court had held that a shotgun with a barrel less than 
eighteen inches in length was not necessarily covered by the Second 
Amendment.194 The case was remanded for fact-finding, because the district 
court had quashed an indictment for violating the tax and registration system 
for short shotguns, but had not received any evidence about the uses of such 
guns.195 According to Heller’s explanation of the meaning of Miller, the Miller 
case said “only that the Second Amendment does not protect those weapons 
not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as 
short-barreled shotguns. That accords with the historical understanding of the 
scope of the right.”196 
 
 190. NYSRA, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 257 n.3 (2d Cir. 2015). The court held a ban on 
the Remington 7615 unconstitutional because the government failed to rebut the presumption that 
it was protected by the Second Amendment; the government presented no evidence or argument 
regarding the weapon. See id. at 268–69. For an argument that the Second Amendment should not 
be limited to “bearable” arms, see Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) Arms, 117 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 755 (2013). 
 191. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
 192. Id. at 625. 
 193. Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
 194. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178. 
 195. Id. 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun 
having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. 
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary 
military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. 
Id. 
 196. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625. 
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What does “dangerous and unusual” mean? The Ninth Circuit followed the 
Supreme Court by treating the questions of “dangerous” and “unusual” as 
distinct: “To determine this, we consider whether the weapon has uniquely 
dangerous propensities and whether the weapon is commonly possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”197 In other words, a weapon can be 
“dangerous” but not “unusual,” or vice versa. The “dangerous and unusual 
exclusion” is only for arms that are dangerous and unusual. The Supreme 
Court took the same approach in Caetano, declining to consider the 
dangerousness of stun guns because it had already determined that the lower 
court’s unusualness analysis was flawed.198 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in 
Hollis v. Lynch199 conducted separate analyses to determine first whether 
machineguns are dangerous, then whether machineguns are also unusual.200 
Heller provides a useful baseline. All weapons are dangerous, and Heller 
tells us that handguns (which are very frequently used in crime, and 
disproportionately so, compared to their percentage of the gun stock) are 
protected by the Second Amendment.201 Ergo, a “dangerous” weapon must, at 
least, be more dangerous than handguns. 
Second, something that is “unusual” would, at the least, have to be much 
more unusual than the gun at issue before the Court—namely Dick Heller’s 9-
shot revolver.202 
The Third Circuit added more clarity to the phrase “dangerous and 
unusual” when it held that the doctrine pertains to the weapon itself, as 
opposed to the manner in which the weapon is used.203 Soon after, the Fifth 
Circuit reached the same conclusion in Hollis.204 
 
 197. Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 997 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 198. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (pur curiam); see also id. at 
1031 (Alito, J., concurring) (“As the per curiam opinion recognizes, this is a conjunctive test: A 
weapon may not be banned unless it is both dangerous and unusual. Because the Court rejects the 
lower court’s conclusion that stun guns are ‘unusual,’ it does not need to consider the lower 
court’s conclusion that they are also ‘dangerous.’”). 
 199. 827 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693–713 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing social science data about 
frequent criminal misuse of handguns). 
 202. See Exhibit A, in Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2004), 
rev’d sub nom., Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
 203. United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, 
Unknown Caliber Serial No. LW001804, 822 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter United 
States v. One (1) Palmetto]. “Heller plainly states that mere possession of certain weapons may 
be prohibited.” Id. 
 204. Hollis, 827 F.3d at 448 (“Hollis then argues that Heller’s dangerous and unusual test 
refers not to the characteristics of a class of weapons but the manner in which weapons are used. 
Heller, though, said ‘that the sorts of weapons protected [are] those in common use at the time . . . 
[and] that [this] limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying 
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1. Pipe Bombs 
An easy case for “dangerous and unusual” vs. common, typical, and for 
lawful purposes was United States v. Tagg.205 The Eleventh Circuit held that 
pipe bombs are not covered by the Second Amendment because they are not 
typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.206 
2. Machine Guns 
The 1939 Miller case had involved the National Firearms Act of 1934, 
whose tax and registration system applies to machine guns as well as short 
shotguns.207 Heller opined that it would be “startling” to interpret the Second 
Amendment as rendering the National Firearms Act’s restriction on machine 
guns unconstitutional.208 
The circuit courts have enthusiastically embraced this dicta.209 Every post-
Heller circuit court that has addressed the machine gun issue has rejected 
Second Amendment claims.210 
 
of dangerous and unusual weapons.’ Thus, Hollis’s argument is tantamount to asking us to 
overrule the Supreme Court.” Id. at 447–48 (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 205. 572 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 206. Id. at 1326 (“Applying Heller to the facts of this case, we conclude that the pipe bombs 
at issue were not protected by the Second Amendment. Unlike the handguns in Heller, pipe 
bombs are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”). 
 207. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 174 (1939). 
 208. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008). 
 209. That being said, the Fifth Circuit made clear that Heller’s dicta alone cannot justify 
restrictions on machine guns. See Hollis, 827 F.3d at 448 (“We conclude that these passages from 
Heller directly apply to the claims Hollis advances. Still, it is appropriate to undertake an 
independent inquiry as to whether machineguns are protected by the Second Amendment because 
these passages are dicta.”). 
 210. See United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Fincher’s possession of 
the [machine] guns did not fall within the protection of the Second Amendment.”); United States 
v. Ross, 323 F. App’x 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Nothing in Heller supports Ross’s challenge to 
the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing the possession of a machine gun.”); Hamblen v. 
United States, 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (“whatever the individual right to keep and bear 
arms might entail, it does not authorize an unlicensed individual to possess unregistered machine 
guns for personal use.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The 
Supreme Court has made clear the Second Amendment does not protect those types of 
weapons.”); United States v. Hatfield, 376 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[M]odern sawed-
off shotguns are not typically possessed for lawful purposes and constitute ‘dangerous and 
unusual weapons’ beyond the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection.”) (internal citation 
omitted); United States v. Allen, 630 F.3d 762, 766 (8th Cir. 2011) (Allen’s challenge to the 
constitutionality of the machinegun ban was foreclosed by Fincher, and “Nothing in 
[McDonald]—decided after Fincher—changes the rule in this circuit.”); United States v. Henry, 
688 F.3d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 2012) (“In short, machine guns are highly ‘dangerous and unusual 
weapons’ that are not ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’”) 
(citation omitted); United States v. Zaleski, 489 F. App’x 474, 475 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Regardless of 
his membership in the unorganized militia . . . the Second Amendment does not protect Zaleski’s 
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In United States v. Fincher,211 the Eighth Circuit upheld Fincher’s 
conviction for possessing a machine gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) 
and 924(a)(2) and for possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun in 
violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871. The court rejected 
Fincher’s argument that he had a Second Amendment right to possess these 
firearms. “In discussing the limitations the government can place on an 
individual’s right to possess firearms, the Court noted that Miller does not 
protect ‘weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.’”212 The court explained: 
[U]nder Heller, Fincher’s possession of the guns is not protected by the 
Second Amendment. Machine guns are not in common use by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of dangerous 
and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for individual use. 
Furthermore, Fincher has not directly attacked the federal registration 
requirements on firearms, and we doubt that any such attack would succeed in 
light of Heller. Accordingly, because Fincher’s possession of guns is not 
protected by the Second Amendment, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in preventing him from arguing otherwise to the jury.213 
Historically, machine guns have always been rare in the hands of law-
abiding citizens, partly because of the enormous cost of ammunition. When 
they were introduced to the U.S. market in the 1920s, they were a commercial 
failure for law-abiding citizens, although they did become popular with 
bootleggers.214 However, in compliance with the NFA system, over a hundred 
thousand machine guns were lawfully possessed by citizens as of 1986, when 
Congress enacted a statute prohibiting sales to citizens of machine guns 
manufactured after May 19, 1986. This led the Ninth Circuit to adopt the 
circular argument that the machine gun prohibition is constitutional because 
machine guns are prohibited: 
A machine gun is “unusual” because private possession of all new machine 
guns, as well as all existing machine guns that were not lawfully possessed 
before the enactment of § 922(o), has been unlawful since 1986. Outside of a 
 
personal possession of machine guns.”); United States v. One (1) Palmetto, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns. They are 
not in common use for lawful purposes.”); Hollis, 827 F.3d at 451 (“Machineguns are dangerous 
and unusual and therefore not in common use. They do not receive Second Amendment 
protection, so we uphold Section 922(o) at step one of our framework.”). 
 211. 538 F.3d at 870. 
 212. Id. at 873 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). 
 213. Id. at 874. 
 214. See JOHN ELLIS, THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE MACHINE GUN 151 (1975) (For sales to 
civilians: “Commercially, then, the gun was a flop.”); see id. at 152–60 (detailing extensive use 
by gangsters); Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 2015) (“nobody 
has argued, before or since, that ordinary citizens used these weapons for lawful purposes”). 
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few government-related uses, machine guns largely exist on the black 
market.215 
This type of reasoning was persuasively criticized by the Seventh Circuit in 
Friedman; a prohibition cannot be its own constitutional justification.216 
The Third Circuit held that § 922(o)’s ban on new machine guns applies to 
trusts.217 Although trusts are not specifically listed among the entities defined 
as a “person” in the Gun Control Act,218 the court reasoned that to hold 
otherwise “would allow any party—including convicted felons, who are 
expressly prohibited from possessing firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—to 
avoid liability under this section simply by placing a machine gun ‘in 
trust.’”219 The Fifth Circuit held the same in Hollis.220 
 
 215. Henry, 688 F.3d 640. 
 216.  
And relying on how common a weapon is at the time of litigation would be circular to 
boot. Machine guns aren’t commonly owned for lawful purposes today because they are 
illegal; semi-automatic weapons with large-capacity magazines are owned more 
commonly because, until recently (in some jurisdictions), they have been legal. Yet it 
would be absurd to say that the reason why a particular weapon can be banned is that 
there is a statute banning it, so that it isn’t commonly owned. A law’s existence can’t be 
the source of its own constitutional validity. 
Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409. But see Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2016) 
(“Hollis and amici make one more argument. They claim the reason machineguns are not more 
popular is because they have been banned. This exact point was made by Justice Breyer in his 
dissent in Heller . . . . This argument was made in dissent, though, illustrating that it was 
considered by the Heller majority and rejected. This argument was insufficient to carry the day in 
Heller and accordingly must fail here too.”). 
 217. United States v. One (1) Palmetto, 822 F.3d 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 218. Under 18 U.S.C. § 921, “The term ‘person’ and the term ‘whoever’ include any 
individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company.” 
18 U.S.C. § 921 (2012). 
 219. One (1) Palmetto, 822 F.3d at 140. The court elaborated: 
Interpreting the statute so as to include this exception would thereby swallow the rule. We 
refuse to conclude that with one hand Congress intended to enact a statutory rule that 
would restrict the transfer or possession of certain firearms, but with the other hand it 
created an exception that would destroy that very rule. 
Id. at 140–41. 
 220. Hollis, 827 F.3d at 443. 
Hollis contends that it is not he, personally, who would make and possess the machinegun 
but rather the Hollis Trust. Hollis argues that Section 922(o) only bars “persons” from 
making and possessing such weapons, and the relevant definition of persons does not 
include a trust. Therefore, because it is the Hollis Trust, with Hollis as trustee acting on its 
behalf, that desires to manufacture and possess the machinegun, Section 922(o) does not 
apply. This argument strains common sense and misunderstands trust law. Historically, “a 
trust was not considered a distinct legal entity[;]” it was “a ‘fiduciary relationship’ 
between multiple people.” . . . In addition, the relevant definition of “person” uses the 
term “include,” signifying a non-exhaustive list. 
Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
236 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:193 
3. Suppressors, Grenades, and Directional Mines 
In an unpublished opinion, U.S. v. McCartney,221 the Ninth Circuit held 
that machine guns, silencers, grenades, and directional mines all fall outside of 
the Second Amendment’s protections. While all these weapons were deemed 
dangerous and unusual, silencers, grenades, and directional mines were found 
to be “even more dangerous and unusual than machine guns.”222 For most of 
the listed items, the result in the unpublished McCartney seems unlikely to be 
changed by the fuller analysis that would be appropriate in a published 
opinion. For “silencers” (more properly, “suppressors” or “moderators”), the 
issue is much closer than McCartney recognized.223 
The Fifth Circuit stated that grenades “may lawfully be barred from private 
ownership” in dicta in Hollis.224 
4. Obliterated Serial Numbers 
In U.S. v. Marzzarella,225 the Third Circuit assumed that 18 U.S.C. § 
922(k), which prohibits the possession of firearms with “removed, obliterated, 
or altered” serial numbers, burdened the Second Amendment right,226 but was 
very skeptical in doing so.227 “Because the presence of a serial number does 
not impair the use or functioning of a weapon in any way, the burden on 
Marzzarella’s ability to defend himself is arguably de minimis.”228 But noting 
that “[a]n unmarked firearm . . . is no more damaging than a marked 
firearm,”229 the court proceeded to Step Two of the Two-Part Test with the 
understanding that “Marzzarella’s conduct may still fall within the Second 
 
 221. 357 F. App’x 73 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 222. Id. at 76. 
 223. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Firearm Sound Moderators: Issues of Criminalization & the 
Second Amendment, 46 CUMBERLAND L. REV. 33 (2016). 
 224. Hollis, 827 F.3d at 447. 
 225. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 226. “[W]e hesitate to say Marzzarella’s possession of an unmarked firearm in his home is 
unprotected conduct.” Id. at 101. “[W]e cannot be certain that the possession of unmarked 
firearms in the home is excluded from the right to bear arms. Because we conclude § 922(k) 
would pass constitutional muster even if it burdens protected conduct, we need not decide 
whether Marzzarella’s right to bear arms was infringed.” Id. at 95. 
 227.  
The District Court could not identify, and Marzzarella does not assert, any lawful purpose 
served by obliterating a serial number on a firearm. Because a firearm with a serial 
number is equally effective as a firearm without one, there would appear to be no 
compelling reason why a law-abiding citizen would prefer an unmarked firearm. These 
weapons would then have value primarily for persons seeking to use them for illicit 
purposes. 
Id. 
 228. Id. at 94. 
 229. Id. at 95. 
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Amendment because his possession of the Titan pistol in his home implicates 
his interest in the defense of hearth and home—the core protection of the 
Second Amendment.”230 
5. Bans on Certain Ammunition 
The Ninth Circuit in Jackson determined that a ban on the sale of hollow-
point ammunition implicated the Second Amendment: 
The Second Amendment protects “arms,” “weapons,” and “firearms”; it does 
not explicitly protect ammunition. Nevertheless, without bullets, the right to 
bear arms would be meaningless. A regulation eliminating a person’s ability to 
obtain or use ammunition could thereby make it impossible to use firearms for 
their core purpose . . . Thus “the right to possess firearms for protection 
implies a corresponding right” to obtain the bullets necessary to use them . . . 
Indeed, Heller did not differentiate between regulations governing ammunition 
and regulations governing the firearms themselves. Rather, the Court 
considered the burden certain gunpowder-storage laws imposed on the Second 
Amendment right, and determined that they did not burden “the right of self-
defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns.” This observation would 
make little sense if regulations on gunpowder and ammunition fell outside the 
historical scope of the Second Amendment. Conducting our historical review, 
we conclude that prohibitions on the sale of ammunition do not fall outside 
“the historical understanding of the scope of the [Second Amendment] 
right.”231 
Justice Thomas quoted Jackson in a Sixth Amendment case, illustrating the 
point that constitutional rights “implicitly protect those closely related acts 
necessary to their exercise.”232 
In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit upheld a ban on armor-
piercing ammunition, deciding that armor-piercing ammunition is not typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.233 
All other courts to consider the issue of ammunition have concluded that 
the Second Amendment includes ammunition.234 
 
 230. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 94. 
 231. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 632 (2008)). 
 232. Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016). 
 233. Kodak v. Holder, 342 F. App’x 907, 908–09 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 234. See Pruess II, 703 F.3d 242, 245 n.1 (4th Cir. 2012) (treating Supreme Court legal rule 
about guns as having the same meaning for ammunition); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 
704 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The right to possess firearms for protection implies a corresponding right to 
acquire and maintain proficiency in their use; the core right wouldn’t mean much without the 
training and practice that make it effective.”); Herrington v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1243 
(D.C. 2010) (right to ammunition is coextensive with the right to firearms); Andrews v. State, 50 
Tenn. 165, 178 (1871) (“The right to keep arms, necessarily involves the right . . . to purchase and 
provide ammunition suitable for such arms”). 
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6. Bans on Guns and Magazines 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, the 
District Council enacted a new set of gun control ordinances. These ordinances 
were challenged by several plaintiffs, including Dick Anthony Heller, the 
victorious Supreme Court plaintiff. Two D.C. Circuit opinions arising from the 
challenge have thus acquired the shorthand names Heller II and Heller III. This 
is something of a misnomer, because the D.C. Circuit cases were not 
continuations of the Supreme Court case, and they involve different issues.235 
In Heller II, the D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to a D.C. ordinance 
banning “large-capacity magazines” (over ten rounds) and also banning many 
semi-automatic rifles (labeled “assault weapons”).236 In American history, 
such bans were very rare. Accordingly, the prohibitions could not be 
considered “longstanding.”237 
The evidence at the summary judgment stage left no doubt that the 
prohibited arms were “common.”238 However, the Circuit was unsure about the 
exact nature of the common use: “whether these weapons are commonly used 
or are useful specifically for self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the 
prohibitions of certain semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than 
 
 235. Usually a case name earns a roman numeral when it is a continuation of the original 
case. For example, Brown v. Board of Education (1954) held that mandated racial segregation in 
the public schools violated the Equal Protection Clause. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954). In the same case, with all the same parties, the 1955 Brown II case detailed the 
remedy that would be required in segregated school districts. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 
753, 755–56 (1955). Likewise, the Turner I case upheld some congressionally-imposed 
restrictions on cable television providers, and remanded other issues for further fact-finding. 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 626–27 (1994). After the remand, the 
case returned to the Supreme Court, and, thanks to sufficient facts, other cable restrictions were 
upheld in Turner II. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 188, 185 (1997). The 
only continuity between the Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller and the 
D.C. Circuit decisions in Heller II and Heller III is that they have one plaintiff in common. 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller 
II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 236. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1249. 
 237. Id. at 1260. 
 238. Id. at 1261 (“semi-automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are 
indeed in ‘common use’ . . . Approximately 1.6 million AR–15s alone have been manufactured 
since 1986, and in 2007 this one popular model accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 
percent of all rifles, produced in the U.S. for the domestic market. As for magazines, fully 18 
percent of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were equipped with magazines holding more 
than ten rounds, and approximately 4.7 million more such magazines were imported into the 
United States between 1995 and 2000. There may well be some capacity above which magazines 
are not in common use but, if so, the record is devoid of evidence as to what that capacity is; in 
any event, that capacity surely is not ten.”). 
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ten rounds meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear arms.”239 The panel 
proceeded to Step Two of the Two-Part Test anyway, by assuming without 
deciding that the prohibition of these arms impinges upon the Second 
Amendment right.240 
The Second Circuit relied on this precedent in New York State Rifle & 
Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo (“NYSRPA”).241 The panel chose to “follow the 
approach taken by the District Courts and by the D.C. Circuit in Heller II and 
assume for the sake of argument that these ‘commonly used’ weapons and 
magazines are also ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes.’”242 It is surprising that the Second Circuit felt the need to make an 
assumption, after acknowledging that “nearly four million units of a single 
assault weapon, the popular AR-15, have been manufactured between 1986 
and March 2013.”243 Even the defendant’s figures (which were arguably too 
low) admitted that “approximately seven million” so-called assault weapons 
are owned nationwide;244 and about seventy-five million “large-capacity 
magazines” are owned nationwide.245 Yet the court could only muster an 
assumption that these arms are typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes.246 
 
 239. Id. This statement is especially perplexing because the court explained in just the 
previous paragraph that tens of millions of these arms are in common use. If not used for self-
defense, hunting, sport, or some other lawful purpose, it is impossible to imagine why these 
firearms and magazines are so overwhelmingly popular. Cf. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 
784 F.3d 406, 416 n.4 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Weapons can be commonly used by both criminals and 
law-abiding citizens. For example, the court correctly notes that handguns have long been the 
preferred weapon for criminals and are ‘responsible for the vast majority of gun violence in the 
United States . . . .’ This, of course, is the same type of weapon that McDonald recognized as 
covered under the Second Amendment because it was (and still is) ‘the most preferred firearm in 
the nation.’ . . . In evaluating common use, McDonald considered as relevant only use by law-
abiding citizens.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 240. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261. The court was uncertain whether the prohibitions impinged 
on the Second Amendment right, but it was “reasonably certain” that the prohibitions did not 
substantially burden the right. Id. at 1262. 
 241. 804 F.3d 242, 253 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 242. Id. at 257. 
 243. Id. at 255. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
 246. NYRSRA, 804 F.3d at 257. The court did find the far less common Remington 7615 to be 
deserving of Second Amendment protection, because by failing to present any argument at all 
regarding the Remington 7615, the government failed to rebut the presumption emphasized by 
Heller that the Second Amendment extends to all bearable arms. Id. at 257 n.73; see District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
  In Highland Park, the Seventh Circuit similarly had trouble determining whether 
“assault rifles” were common: 
Highland Park concedes uncertainty whether the banned weapons are commonly owned; 
if they are (or were before it enacted the ordinance), then they are not unusual. The record 
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The Ninth Circuit in Fyock v. Sunnyvale confronted a similar law—a 
municipal ordinance banning magazines over ten rounds, with no 
grandfathering. The Ninth Circuit found that the evidence, at the summary 
judgment stage, might support a finding that the magazines were “dangerous” 
but did not conclusively show that they were “unusual.”247 
The Fifth Circuit provided a useful summary in Hollis of the different 
methods courts have used to determine if particular arms are in common use. 
Heller concluded that handguns are “the most popular weapon chosen by 
Americans for self-defense in the home” and are therefore not unusual. 554 
U.S. at 629. Every post-Heller case to grapple with whether a weapon is 
“popular” enough to be considered “in common use” has relied on statistical 
data of some form, creating a consensus that “common use is an objective and 
largely statistical inquiry.” New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Cuomo, 804 
F.3d 242, 256 (2d Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). Still, “what line 
separates ‘common’ from ‘uncommon’ ownership is something the Court did 
not say.” Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 
2015). As a result, courts have differed in the statistics used and 
methodological approaches adopted. 
Some courts have taken the view that the total number of a particular weapon 
is the relevant inquiry. The Second Circuit determined that “large-capacity 
magazines” are in common use solely because of their high absolute number: 
50 million. Cuomo, 804 F.3d at 255. Other courts have relied on proportions 
 
shows that perhaps 9% of the nation’s firearms owners have assault weapons, but what 
line separates “common” from “uncommon” ownership is something the Court did not 
say. 
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 409 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 247. Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 998 (9th Cir. 2015). 
Although Sunnyvale presented evidence regarding the increased danger posed by large-
capacity magazines, it did not present significant evidence to show that large-capacity 
magazines are also “unusual.” Instead, Fyock presented evidence that magazines, 
including some meeting Sunnyvale’s definition of large-capacity magazines, are 
frequently offered for commercial sale and marketed for self-defense. He also presented 
sales statistics indicating that millions of magazines, some of which again were magazines 
fitting Sunnyvale’s definition of large-capacity magazines, have been sold over the last 
two decades in the United States. 
Because Fyock relies primarily on marketing materials and sales statistics, his evidence 
does not necessarily show that large-capacity magazines are in fact commonly possessed 
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. However, we cannot say that the district 
court abused its discretion by inferring from the evidence of record that, at a minimum, 
magazines are in common use. And, to the extent that certain firearms capable of use with 
a magazine—e.g., certain semiautomatic handguns—are commonly possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes, our case law supports the conclusion that there must 
also be some corollary, albeit not unfettered, right to possess the magazines necessary to 
render those firearms operable. 
Id. 
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and percentages. The Fourth Circuit found that AR–15s are in common use 
because they accounted for “5.5 percent of all firearms, and 14.4 percent of all 
rifles produced in the [United States] . . .” Kolbe v. Hogan, 813 F.3d 160, 174, 
reh'g en banc granted, 636 Fed. Appx. 880 (4th Cir. 2016). The Seventh 
Circuit, though, held the opposite when it determined that AR–15s are not in 
common use because only “9% of the nation's firearms owners have assault 
weapons.” Friedman, 784 F.3d at 409. These cases indicate there is 
considerable variety across the circuits as to what the relevant statistic is and 
what threshold is sufficient for a showing of common use. 
More recently, two Supreme Court justices observed that the “relevant 
statistic” involves the counting of jurisdictions. In addressing whether stun 
guns are in common use, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, implied that 
the number of states that allow or bar a particular weapon is important: 
[T]he number of Tasers and stun guns is dwarfed by the number of 
firearms. This observation may be true, but it is beside the point . . . . The 
more relevant statistic is that [200,000] . . . stun guns have been sold to 
private citizens, who it appears may lawfully possess them in 45 States 
. . . . While less popular than handguns, stun guns are widely owned and 
accepted as a legitimate means of self-defense across the country. 
[Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032–33 (2016)] (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). These two justices suggested that the 200,000 
absolute number, plus that 45 states have “accepted [stun guns] as a legitimate 
means of self-defense,” was enough to determine that the stun gun is in 
common use. [Caetano, 136 S. Ct. at 1032–33]. 
This wide variety in methodological approaches suggest that these statistics—
raw number, percentage and proportion, jurisdiction-counting—identify 
potentially relevant data for the common use inquiry. For purposes of the 
present case, we conclude it does not matter which set of numbers we adopt. 
None of them allow a conclusion that a machinegun is a usual weapon.248 
B. Types of Individuals 
As noted supra, there are many cases that tersely uphold gun bans for 
convicted felons or the mentally ill, with a straightforward cite to Heller’s 
language on the topic.249 There are also other cases, likewise noted above, 
which extrapolate from these two categories of prohibited persons to other 
prohibited person categories which were not enumerated by Heller. Other 
courts, however, have heeded the Third Circuit’s warning about not glibly 
using the felons/mentally ill language to simply assume that other prohibitions 
are constitutionally legitimate.250 In this Part VI.B, we examine cases where 
courts have taken a more deliberative approach. These prohibited persons cases 
 
 248. Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 448–49 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations simplified). 
 249. See supra notes 130–131. 
 250. See supra notes 139–145. 
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conclude that the prohibition does or may affect Second Amendment rights. 
Accordingly, the courts proceed to Step Two, select intermediate scrutiny, and 
then uphold the prohibition. 
1. Domestic Violence Misdemeanants and Persons Subject to Domestic 
Violence Protective Orders 
One of the most influential cases to apply Step Two to persons subject to 
domestic violence misdemeanor or restraining order prohibitions was the 
Seventh Circuit’s United States v. Skoien.251 The Seventh Circuit proceeded 
with the understanding that domestic violence misdemeanants had Second 
Amendment rights, and that any burden on those rights must be tested under 
heightened scrutiny.252 
The Ninth Circuit determined: “At the first step of the inquiry, we 
conclude that by prohibiting domestic violence misdemeanants from 
possessing firearms, § 922(g)(9) burdens rights protected by the Second 
Amendment.”253 The government had not met its burden of proving that as a 
historical matter, persons with domestic violence convictions were outside the 
Second Amendment right: 
Because of “the lack of historical evidence in the record before us, we are 
certainly not able to say that the Second Amendment, as historically 
understood, did not apply to persons convicted of domestic violence 
misdemeanors. We must assume, therefore, that [Chovan]’s Second 
Amendment rights are intact and that he is entitled to some measure of Second 
Amendment protection to keep and possess firearms in his home for self-
defense.”254 
 
 251. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 638 (7th Cir. 2010). The Seventh Circuit first 
applied a version of the Two-Part Test in United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2009), 
which was later vacated by the court’s en banc decision in Skoien, 614 F.3d 638. After deciding 
Skoien (en banc) and Williams without explicitly adopting the Two-Part Test but essentially 
applying it, the court formally adopted the Two-Part Test in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 
684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 252. The Seventh Circuit wrote: 
We simply cannot say with any certainty that persons convicted of a domestic-violence 
misdemeanor are wholly excluded from the Second Amendment right as originally 
understood. Because Skoien is not categorically unprotected, the government’s use of § 
922(g)(9) against him must survive Second Amendment scrutiny. My colleagues 
evidently agree; they move on to discuss the standard for determining whether the 
disarmament of domestic-violence misdemeanants is constitutionally permissible. This 
inquiry is necessary only if Skoien’s Second Amendment rights are intact notwithstanding 
his domestic-violence conviction. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 651 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 253. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 254. Id. (quoting United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681–82 (4th Cir. 2010)); see also 
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (categorical ban on firearms possession 
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Similarly, in United States v. Reese, the Tenth Circuit explained in a 
restraining order case: 
[T]here is little doubt that the challenged law, § 922(g)(8), imposes a burden 
on conduct, i.e., Reese’s possession of otherwise legal firearms, that generally 
falls within the scope of the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment. Thus, 
we must proceed to the second part of the analysis and evaluate § 922(g)(8) 
under some form of means-end scrutiny.255 
The Eighth Circuit was not sure if a person subject to a domestic violence 
restraining order could pass Step One. To be cautious, the court proceeded to 
Step Two, and upheld the ban under intermediate scrutiny.256 The Court found 
the prohibition “consistent with a common-law tradition that the right to bear 
arms is limited to peaceable or virtuous citizens.”257 
 
by a class of individuals must be supported by a “strong showing,” and § 922(g)(9)’s ban on 
domestic violence misdemeanants was supported by such a “strong showing.”). 
 255. United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations and 
brackets omitted). 
 256. United States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011). 
  In Chester, the Fourth Circuit refused to analogize the presumptively lawful ban for 
felons with the ban for domestic violence misdemeanants; the court was unable to say that “the 
Second Amendment, as historically understood, did not apply to persons convicted of domestic 
violence misdemeanors.” Chester, 628 F.3d at 681. 
  Then in Staten, the Fourth Circuit assumed arguendo that a domestic violence 
misdemeanant’s Second Amendment rights were intact, and thus should be examined under Step 
Two. United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 160–61 (4th Cir. 2011). Staten was necessary even 
though the Fourth Circuit addressed the same issue in Chester because Chester left major 
questions unresolved. First, the government failed to argue whether domestic violence 
misdemeanants were covered by the Second Amendment. Second, while the court did determine 
that intermediate scrutiny was the proper standard of review, it did not decide whether the ban 
passed intermediate scrutiny, but instead remanded to the district court for the parties to better 
develop their arguments. Meanwhile, Staten made its way up to the Court of Appeals, presenting 
the same issue. 
  Finally, in Chapman, the Fourth Circuit confronted the related issue of a defendant 
subject to a domestic violence restraining order: 
Chapman takes the position that § 922(g)(8) imposes a burden on conduct falling within 
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee as historically understood. The 
government takes the opposite position. We need not and do not resolve this issue 
because, assuming arguendo that Chapman’s Second Amendment rights are intact and 
that he is entitled to some measure of Second Amendment protection to keep and possess 
firearms and ammunition in his home for self-defense, our following analysis leads us to 
conclude that intermediate scrutiny applies and § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), as-applied 
to Chapman, survives intermediate scrutiny. 
United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 257. Bena, 664 F.3d at 1184. The court was also persuaded that the burden was mitigated by 
the time-limited nature of the law: 
The prohibition, moreover, need not apply in perpetuity, but only so long as a person is 
“subject to” a qualifying court order. In Iowa, the order terminates at the conclusion of a 
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It is true that the Framers and the public at large wanted gun owners to be 
virtuous and peaceable (except when fighting was necessary). This is one 
reason for the preference for militias over standing armies; because the 
professional soldier was entirely dependent on the government, and lived a life 
of constant obedience to others, it was believed that moral degradation would 
result.258 It is equally true that the Framers and the American people wanted 
virtuous people as voters, jurors, elected officials, and so on. But there is 
simply no tradition—from 1791 or 1866—of prohibiting gun possession (or 
voting, jury service, or government service) for people convicted of 
misdemeanors or subject to civil protective orders. The colonies and then the 
states certainly knew how to ban firearms possession for people who were 
considered dangerous (namely, slaves and Indians).259 This “tradition” cannot 
be extended to every person whom a modern legislature might consider 
dangerous. A modern ban might be upheld under heightened scrutiny, but there 
is no tradition that persons subject to novel modern bans have been historically 
considered to have no Second Amendment rights at all. 
2. Addicts or Users of Illegal Drugs 
In Carter I, the Fourth Circuit assumed arguendo that a law prohibiting 
firearms possession by a person “who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any 
controlled substance” implicates the Second Amendment. But the court 
rejected the argument that the core right of the Second Amendment was 
implicated, because Carter was not a law-abiding citizen.260 On remand, the 
 
criminal case, or after a prescribed period if the action results in a conviction or deferred 
judgment and the defendant ceases to pose a danger to the victim. On a facial challenge, 
we conclude that the Second Amendment does not preclude this type of regulatory 
measure. (internal citations omitted). 
Id. 
 258. See, e.g., Simeon Howard, A Sermon Preached to the Ancient and Honorable Artillery 
Company in Boston, June 7, 1773, reprinted in NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON, DAVID B. KOPEL, 
GEORGE P. MOCSARY & MICHAEL P. O’SHEA, FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT: 
REGULATION, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 126–32 (2012). 
 259. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 258, at 111–15 (collecting colonial statutes); Kopel, 
Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, supra note 121, at 
336–40 (state statutes disarming slaves and free people of color). 
 260. United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2012). 
[W]e will assume that Carter’s circumstances implicate the Second Amendment . . . and 
our remand in this case is to afford the government the opportunity to substantiate the 
record and Carter the opportunity to respond. If we ultimately conclude that step two 
cannot be satisfied, we will need to address the government’s argument under step one. 
Id. 
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government produced sufficient evidence to pass Step Two, and the prohibition 
was upheld.261 
Likewise, in United States v. Yancey, the Seventh Circuit required the 
government to make a Step Two “strong showing” in order to uphold the 
statutory ban on gun possession by drug users.262 
3. Juveniles and Young Adults 
In United States v. Rene E.,263 the First Circuit held that a ban on juvenile 
possession of handguns264 does not offend the Second Amendment. First, such 
prohibitions are longstanding and consistent with the founding generation’s 
understanding of the right to keep and bear arms.265 Second, the challenged 
law contained sufficient exceptions for hunting, national guard duty, and 
defense in the home.266 
Rene E. did not apply the two-part test, but rather a mixture of text, history, 
and policy analysis. 
In NRA v. BATFE, the Fifth Circuit found a ban on the sale of handguns 
from gun stores to adults under the age of twenty-one267 “consistent with a 
longstanding, historical tradition, which suggests that the conduct at issue falls 
outside the Second Amendment’s protection.”268 The court felt “inclined to 
uphold the challenged federal laws at step one of our analytical framework” 
but proceeded to step two “in an abundance of caution,”269 where it upheld the 
ban under intermediate scrutiny.270 
In NRA v. McCraw,271 the Fifth Circuit upheld a state ban prohibiting 
eighteen to twenty-year-old adults from carrying handguns in public. The court 
recognized that it was bound by the BATFE decision.272 
 
 261. United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014) (applying 
intermediate scrutiny). 
 262. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010). 
But though Congress may exclude certain categories of persons from firearm possession, 
the exclusion must be more than merely ‘rational,’ and must withstand ‘some form of 
strong showing.’ [United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010)]. (We have 
thus far, like the Supreme Court, declined to wade into the “‘levels of scrutiny’ 
quagmire,” id.; see also [District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008)] 
(striking down D.C.’s law “[u]nder any level of scrutiny”)). 
Id. 
 263. 583 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 264. 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2)(A) (2012). 
 265. Rene, 583 F.3d at 12–13. 
 266. Id. at 13. 
 267. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1), (c)(1) and attendant regulations. 
 268. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 203 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 269. Id. at 204. 
 270. Id. at 207. 
 271. 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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In Horsley v. Trame, the Seventh Circuit upheld a requirement that Firearm 
Owner Identification (FOID) card applicants between eighteen and twenty-one 
years old obtain the written consent of a parent or legal guardian.273 FOID 
cards are required to lawfully possess or acquire a firearm in Illinois. Without 
deciding whether eighteen- to twenty-year-olds are within the scope of the 
Second Amendment, the court upheld the requirement under intermediate 
scrutiny, based on the alternative channels available for eighteen- to twenty-
year-olds to obtain FOID cards, including an appeal to the Director of the 
Illinois State Police and upon denial there, judicial review.274 
4. Aliens 
The above cases about prohibited persons have involved American 
citizens, who as a general class have Second Amendment rights. But what 
about aliens? Lawful permanent resident aliens have Second Amendment 
rights, according to every federal district court to consider the issue. The courts 
have struck down various state laws (typically dating from the 1920s) which 
prohibited keeping or bearing arms by all non-citizens.275 
These decisions are fortified by Supreme Court doctrine on Equal 
Protection and the Supremacy Clause, which for decades have been interpreted 
to forbid almost all state discrimination against lawful resident aliens, except 
for some types of government employment.276 No state government which has 
lost a case involving the arms rights of resident aliens has bothered with an 
appeal, probably because of futility. 
Illegal aliens are a different matter. The majority of circuits to address the 
issue have held that illegal aliens have no Second Amendment rights. 
Consequently, a challenge to the federal statute prohibiting gun possession by 
 
 272. Id. at 347 (5th Cir. 2013) (proceeding to Step Two of the Two-Part Test because of a 
concern about the institutional challenges in conducting a definitive review of the relevant 
historical record, just as the BATFE court did). 
 273. 808 F.3d 1126, 1134 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 274. See id. at 1131–32. 
 275. E.g., Veasey v. Wilkins, No. 5:14–CV–369–BO, 2015 WL 1884832, at *2–3 (E.D.N.C. 
Apr. 24, 2015) (granting preliminary injunction against statute barring permanent resident aliens 
from obtaining concealed handgun carry permits); Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287, 301–02 
(D. Mass. 2012) (striking law against issuance of carry permits to legal aliens). Cf. People v. 
Zerillo, 219 Mich. 635, 635 (Mich. 1922) (arms ban for legal aliens violates state constitution); 
People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246, 247 (Colo. 1936) (same). The Veasey case was not appealed. 
The legislature subsequently amended the statute. See H.R. 562, § 14–415.12(a)(1), 2015 Leg. 
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015). 
 276. E.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418–20 (1948) (showing 
California may not forbid legal resident aliens to acquire commercial fishing licenses). For a pre-
Heller analysis, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Aliens with Guns: Equal Protection, Federal 
Power, and the Second Amendment, 92 IOWA L. REV. 891, 944 (2007) (arguing for expanded 
state discretion). 
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illegal aliens fails Step One. The most thorough analysis was in the Fifth 
Circuit’s United States v. Portillo-Munoz:277 
The courts have made clear that the Constitution does not prohibit Congress 
from making laws that distinguish between citizens and aliens and between 
lawful and illegal aliens. We find that analysis persuasive in interpreting the 
text of the Second Amendment. Whatever else the term means or includes, the 
phrase “the people” in the Second Amendment of the Constitution does not 
include aliens illegally in the United States such as Portillo . . . .278 
Because the Second and Fourth Amendments both protect rights of “the 
people,” the Fifth Circuit frankly acknowledged that its decision suggested that 
illegal aliens have no Fourth Amendment rights either: “[N]either this court 
nor the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment extends to a native 
and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in the United States 
illegally.”279 
Even if illegal aliens do have Fourth Amendment rights: 
[W]e do not find that the use of “the people” in both the Second and the Fourth 
Amendment mandates a holding that the two amendments cover exactly the 
same groups of people. The purposes of the Second and the Fourth 
Amendment are different. The Second Amendment grants an affirmative right 
to keep and bear arms, while the Fourth Amendment is at its core a protective 
right against abuses by the government. Attempts to precisely analogize the 
scope of these two amendments is misguided, and we find it reasonable that an 
affirmative right would be extended to fewer groups than would a protective 
right.280 
The Fifth Circuit’s attempt to delink the Second and Fourth Amendments 
misread Heller. The Supreme Court was very clear that the Second 
Amendment does not “grant an affirmative right.” Rather, the Second 
Amendment guarantees a pre-existing natural right. Also, it is odd for the Fifth 
Circuit to say that a right whose core is lawful self-defense is not a 
“protective” right. 
The Eighth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Portillo-Munoz.281 The Fourth 
Circuit remained agnostic on whether illegal aliens were among “the people.” 
Even if they were, they were neither “law-abiding, responsible citizens” nor 
 
 277. 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 278. Id. at 442. 
 279. Id. at 440 (arguing that at least some illegal aliens do have Second Amendment rights, 
and therefore they pass Step One). His reasoning was similar to that which was later adopted by 
the Seventh Circuit. Judge Dennis did not decide whether the illegal alien arms ban could be 
upheld under Step Two. 
 280. Id. at 440–41. 
 281. See United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he protections of 
the Second Amendment do not extend to aliens illegally present in this country.”). 
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among “the class of law-abiding members of the political community to whom 
the Second Amendment gives protection.”282 
In United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,283 the Seventh Circuit became the first 
circuit to hold that the Second Amendment protects illegal aliens.284 The court 
reasoned that Meza-Rodriguez was entitled to Second Amendment protection 
because he had substantial connections with the United States and was in the 
United States voluntarily.285 The court relied on the 1989 Supreme Court case 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.286 That case involved a United States Drug 
Enforcement Agency search of the property of a Mexican drug kingpin in 
Mexico. If the search had been conducted in the United States, it plainly would 
have violated the Fourth Amendment. The Verdugo-Urquidez Court quoted the 
Fourth Amendment, Second Amendment, and the First Amendment right to 
assemble, and pointed out that each of them protects a right of “the people.”287 
Who are “the people?” Certainly not a Mexican in Mexico, said the 
Court.288 Being one of “the people” requires that a non-citizen have 
“substantial connections” with the United States, which would require being in 
the United States voluntarily.289 
The Seventh Circuit considered Verdugo to be controlling, especially since 
it had been approvingly quoted by Heller: “[T]he Second and Fourth 
Amendments should be read consistently” because “Heller noted the 
similarities between the Second Amendment and the First and Fourth 
Amendments, implying that the phrase ‘the people’ (which occurs in all three) 
has the same meaning in all three provisions.”290 
In United States v. Huitron–Guizar, the Tenth Circuit avoided resolving 
the issue of whether illegal aliens have Second Amendment rights because the 
court determined § 922(g)(5) passed intermediate scrutiny regardless.291  
 
 282. United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
 283. 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 284. Id. at 673–74 (Flaum, J., concurring) (expressing “doubts that the Second Amendment 
grants undocumented immigrants the right to bear arms,” but thinking it best to “reserve 
resolution of this challenging constitutional question for a case that compels addressing it.”). 
 285. Id. at 672. 
 286. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670. 
 290. Id. at 669–70. The court upheld § 922(g)(5) under intermediate scrutiny, concluding that 
“Congress’s interest in prohibiting persons who are difficult to track and who have an interest in 
eluding law enforcement is strong enough to support the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) 
does not impermissibly restrict Meza–Rodriguez’s Second Amendment right to bear arms.” Id. at 
673. 
 291. 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012): 
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5. Use of a Gun in a Crime 
In United States v. Greeno, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that enhanced 
sentencing for using a gun in a crime is of “relatively recent vintage.”292 Even 
so, the sentencing enhancement “falls outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment right as historically understood.”293 The Second Amendment has 
been recognized to only protect the right to keep and bear arms for lawful 
purposes.294 The enhancement, “like other historical restrictions on the 
possession and use of weapons, punishes an individual who possesses a 
dangerous weapon for an unlawful purpose and, thus, it falls outside the scope 
of the Second Amendment right.”295 
Other courts have taken a similar approach. In United States v. Potter,296 
the Ninth Circuit upheld a statute proscribing firearm possession in furtherance 
of drug trafficking, explaining that “[b]oth implicitly and explicitly, the 
[Heller] Court made clear that its holding concerned the lawful possession and 
use of a firearm.”297 
The Seventh Circuit held the same in United States v. Jackson.298 “The 
Constitution does not give anyone the right to be armed while committing a 
felony, or even to have guns in the next room for emergency use should 
suppliers, customers, or the police threaten a dealer’s stash.”299 The Seventh 
Circuit confirmed this position in an unpublished opinion, United States v. 
 
That Congress saw fit to exclude illegal aliens from carrying guns may indicate its belief, 
entitled to our respect, that such aliens, as a class, possess no such constitutional right. We 
think we can avoid the constitutional question by assuming, for purposes of this case, that 
the Second Amendment, as a “right of the people,” could very well include, in the absence 
of a statute restricting such a right, at least some aliens unlawfully here—and still easily 
find § 922(g)(5) constitutional. The apparent inconsistency in assuming the existence of a 
right before sustaining a law that acts as a blanket prohibition on it is, we believe, 
outweighed by the prudence of abstaining on a question of such far-reaching dimensions 
without a full record and adversarial argument. If the right didn’t apply at all, the case 
would be at an end. If the right does apply, even if in less robust dimensions than it does 
for citizens, the question is the level of scrutiny. 
Id. 
 292. 679 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2012). Enhanced sentencing begins in the 1920s with the 
Revolver Association Act, which later became known as the Uniform Firearms Act. Background 
Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, supra note 121, at 346–47. 
 293. Greeno, 679 F.3d at 518. 
 294. Id. at 520. 
 295. Id. 
 296. 630 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 297. Id. at 1261. 
 298. 555 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 299. Id. at 636. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
250 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:193 
Spaulding,300 explaining, “[c]arrying a gun during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime does not implicate the Second Amendment.”301 
The Second Circuit read Heller as placing “an implicit limitation on the 
exercise of the Second Amendment right to bear arms for lawful purposes” and 
concluded that “the Second Amendment does not safeguard the unlawful 
purpose of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking.”302 
6. Mentally Ill 
In United States v. Rehlander,303 the First Circuit addressed § 922(g)(4)’s 
firearms prohibition for persons committed to a mental institution. Under state 
law, there were two procedures for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization: one 
procedure provided an adversary proceeding, and the other did not.304 The 
court held that Second Amendment rights could be deprived by the procedure 
that had an adversary proceeding, but not by the procedure that did not.305 The 
court explained that “section 922 should not be read to encompass a temporary 
hospitalization” with only “ex parte procedures.”306 
An unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion on the mentally ill failed to conduct 
a meaningful Second Amendment analysis.307 
C. Firearms Sales and Transfers 
1. Purchase and Sale of Firearms 
In Teixeira v. County of Alameda,308 the Ninth Circuit held that “the right 
to purchase and to sell firearms is part and parcel of the historically recognized 
right to keep and to bear arms.”309 The court reasoned: 
If “the right of the people to keep and bear arms” is to have any force, the 
people must have a right to acquire the very firearms they are entitled to keep 
and to bear. Indeed, where a right depends on subsidiary activity, it would 
make little sense if the right did not extend, at least partly, to such activity as 
well. . . . One cannot truly enjoy a constitutionally protected right when the 
 
 300. 366 F. App’x 670 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 301. Id. at 674. 
 302. United States v. Bryant, 711 F.3d 364, 366, 369 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 303. 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 304. Id. at 46. 
 305. Id. at 45. 
 306. Id. at 49. 
 307. See United States v. McRobie, No. 08-4632, 2009 WL 82715 (4th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009). 
 308. 822 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 309. Id. at 1056. As explained supra, the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the Second 
Amendment protects the sale of ammunition. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 
F.3d 953, 968 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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State is permitted to snuff out the means by which he exercises it; one cannot 
keep arms when the State prevents him from purchasing them. . . . Thus, the 
Second Amendment “right must also include the right to acquire a firearm.”310 
2. Gun Show Sales 
In Nordyke v. King,311 the Ninth Circuit found that the Second Amendment 
was implicated by a law requiring firearms at a gun show to be “secured to 
prevent unauthorized use” when “not in the actual possession of the authorized 
participant.”312 The court held this burden to be so minimal that the law would 
be upheld under any standard of scrutiny.313 
The Nordyke case was brought by a business that put on gun shows.314 Mr. 
Nordyke never claimed that the locking law for gun show vendors had any 
impact on his own ability to acquire a firearm, or to use a firearm for self-
defense.315 Rather, his Second Amendment claim was based solely on his right 
to engage in firearms commerce.316 Addressing Mr. Nordyke’s claims on the 
merits, the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that the Second Amendment 
includes the right to firearms commerce.317 
3. Restrictions on Interstate Purchases 
The Second Circuit says that it has adopted the Two-Part Test, but the 
Circuit does not always follow that test. In United States v. Decastro,318 the 
Second Circuit determined that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which, with 
exceptions,319 prohibits a person from transporting a firearm obtained outside 
 
 310. Teixeira, 822 F.3d at 1055, reh’g en banc granted 2016 WL 7438631 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 311. 681 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 312. Id. at 1044. In Nordyke, twelve years into the case, the County asserted that its 
prohibition against gun shows on county property was actually just a locking ordinance for guns 
displayed at gun shows. This drastically reduced the Second Amendment burden. 
 313. Id. at 1045. 
 314. Id. at 1044. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Nordyke, 681 F.3d at 1044. 
 317. Id. at 1045. 
 318. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 319. 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) states that it shall be unlawful: 
for any person, other than a licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or 
licensed collector to transport into or receive in the State where he resides (or if the person 
is a corporation or other business entity, the State where it maintains a place of business) 
any firearm purchased or otherwise obtained by such person outside that State, except that 
this paragraph (A) shall not preclude any person who lawfully acquires a firearm by 
bequest or intestate succession in a State other than his State of residence from 
transporting the firearm into or receiving it in that State, if it is lawful for such person to 
purchase or possess such firearm in that State, (B) shall not apply to the transportation or 
receipt of a firearm obtained in conformity with subsection (b)(3) of this section, and (C) 
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her home state into her home state, “only minimally affects the ability to 
acquire a firearm.”320 Therefore the interstate ban “does not substantially 
burden [the] right to keep and bear arms” because “it does nothing to keep 
someone from purchasing a firearm in her home state, which is presumptively 
the most convenient place to buy anything.”321 
In other words, the prohibition on interstate handgun purchases did 
implicate the Second Amendment—a holding consistent with the general rule 
that if there is a fundamental right to possess something, there is necessarily a 
right to buy and sell it. Under the normal Two-Step Test, the next step would 
be to apply some form of heightened scrutiny. The Second Circuit could have 
selected intermediate scrutiny and presumably would have had an easy time 
upholding the law under that standard of review. 
Instead, the panel said that because the law did not substantially burden the 
Second Amendment right, the law could be upheld under rational basis 
review.322 No other Circuit has adopted this variant of the Two-Part Test. 
Every case from every other Circuit has held that if Step One is passed, it is 
necessary to go to Step Two, which always requires heightened scrutiny. 
4. Return of Seized Firearms 
In Walters v. Wolf, the Eighth Circuit addressed a claim asserted against a 
city and its police chief for failing to return the plaintiff’s handgun and 
ammunition that had been seized at the time of the plaintiff’s arrest.323 The 
court determined that the refusal to return the handgun and ammunition 
violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights, but the court rejected the 
Second Amendment claim because “[t]he defendants’ policy and action 
affected one of Walter’s firearms, which was lawfully seized. The defendants 
did not prohibit Walters from retaining or acquiring other firearms.”324 The 
notion that a citizen can be deprived of a firearm he lawfully owns simply 
because other firearms may be available is irreconcilable with Heller. A court 
might as well assert that a government seizure of a person’s automobile does 
 
shall not apply to the transportation of any firearm acquired in any State prior to the 
effective date of this chapter. 
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3)(2012). 
 320. Decastro, 682 F.3d at 164. 
 321. Id. at 168. Notably, the court overlooked the fact that the defendant had purchased the 
firearm in another state because it was so difficult to acquire one in his home state. 
 322. The court did note, however, that while it found § 922(a)(3) constitutional on its face, it 
could conceivably be held unconstitutional as applied, particularly since it “has no exception for 
the transportation of firearms purchased out-of-state by someone who is licensed to possess a gun 
at home.” Id. at 169 n.7. 
 323. 660 F.3d 307, 309 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 324. Id. at 318. 
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not affect the Fourth or Fifth Amendments, as long as the person owns a 
second car, or could lawfully acquire one. 
A similar issue was presented to the Seventh Circuit in Rhein v. Coffman, 
where the plaintiff alleged that an official had taken too long to reinstate his 
firearms license after it was revoked.325 The court pointed out that the plaintiff 
had no case, because he had sued the wrong official. Accordingly, there was no 
need to decide what constitutional time limits might apply: 
The Supreme Court observed in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008), and McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), that many details 
about how to implement the Second Amendment need to be worked out. The 
timing of hearings on requests for the restoration of firearms is among those 
details. We know from Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D–4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004), 
and similar decisions that the First Amendment requires prompt decisions 
when the question is whether speech can occur. Meanwhile Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514 (1972), and similar decisions hold that the Speedy Trial Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment allows years to pass before a criminal trial, even 
when the defendant is in custody. Where the Second Amendment fits on this 
spectrum is a novel question. The closest parallel may be a motion under Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 41(g) for the return of guns seized in a criminal prosecution. As far 
as we can see, courts have not established time limits for holding hearings and 
making decisions on motions to return firearms. We need not resolve the 
timing question in this case either.326 
5. Transfers to Prohibited Persons 
It is self-evidently constitutional to prohibit providing arms to a person 
who is known by the provider to be prohibited, if the prohibition itself is 
constitutional. 
However, two odd decisions adopt broader reasoning, which could be read 
to negate the Second Amendment rights of other persons. In United States v. 
Huet,327 the Third Circuit determined that aiding and abetting the possession of 
a firearm by a convicted felon falls outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment. “Huet’s case presents no line-drawing problem. Because § 
922(g)(1) and § 2 do not restrict the right of possession of the aider and 
abettor, Count Three simply does not implicate Huet’s rights under the Second 
Amendment.”328 
In other words, if A helps B obtain a firearm, there is no Second 
Amendment issue involving A. This fails to consider the Third Circuit’s 
statement in Marzzarella that firearms commerce is protected by the Second 
Amendment. If B is a lawful possessor, then A has a Second Amendment right 
 
 325. 825 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 326. Id. at 826–27 (parallel cites omitted). 
 327. 665 F.3d 588 (2012). 
 328. Id. at 602–03. 
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to facilitate the possession. Similarly, if B has First Amendment rights, then A 
has his own First Amendment rights to facilitate A’s exercise, such as by 
teaching him how to read, or by providing him with books.329 The same is true 
for people who help women exercise their abortion rights.330 The First 
Amendment freedom “of the press” includes the right to own and use printing 
presses; it also includes the right to manufacture and sell them.331 
In the unpublished United States v. Chafin,332 the Fourth Circuit held that 
the act of selling a firearm to an unlawful user of drugs333 falls outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment: 
Chafin contends that his conduct—the sale of a firearm to an unlawful user of 
drugs—falls within the historical scope of the Second Amendment. However, 
Chafin has not pointed this court to any authority, and we have found none, 
that remotely suggests that, at the time of its ratification, the Second 
Amendment was understood to protect an individual’s right to sell a firearm. 
Indeed, although the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear 
arms, it does not necessarily give rise to a corresponding right to sell a firearm. 
Cf. United States v. 12 200–Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 
(1973) (“We have already indicated that the protected right to possess obscene 
material in the privacy of one’s home does not give rise to a correlative right to 
have someone sell or give it to others.”). Accordingly, Chafin’s argument that 
§ 922(d)(3) is unconstitutional under Heller must be rejected.334 
Chafin is deservedly unpublished, and erroneous in several ways. First, it 
violated Fourth Circuit precedent by improperly shifting the burden of proof 
from the government to the individual, requiring the individual to prove that 
his conduct is within the scope of the Second Amendment as historically 
understood.335 
Second, Chafin’s analogy to obscenity law is unsustainable. Obscenity has 
always been held to be outside the scope of First Amendment protection.336 In 
contrast, firearms are protected by the Second Amendment, and have always 
been held to be so protected. Even the dissenters in Heller agreed that the 
 
 329. See American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 328 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 
475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 330. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976). 
 331. The Founders believed that there were (at least) two manmade tools to which persons 
have a natural right: arms and presses. See Edward Lee, Guns And Speech Technologies: How 
The Right To Bear Arms Affects Copyright Regulations Of Speech Technologies, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1037, 1048–53 (2009). 
 332. United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 342 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 333. A federal statute makes it unlawful to sell or otherwise dispose of any firearm or 
ammunition to any person knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that such person is an 
unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance. 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(3) (2012). 
 334. Chafin, 423 F. App’x at 344. 
 335. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 336. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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Second Amendment has always been construed to guarantee the firearms rights 
of individuals.337 
The Supreme Court in the 1969 case Stanley v. Georgia held that a person 
may not be prosecuted for the possession of obscenity within his own home.338 
The 1973 case cited by Chafin declines to extend Stanley beyond the home.339 
Chafin treats Heller as if it were a handgun version of Stanley: an odious and 
constitutionally-unprotected item may be banned from manufacture, sale, 
purchase, or transportation, but individuals may not be prosecuted for home 
possession.340 This is not remotely close to the tenor of Heller. Nor is it 
consistent with McDonald’s holding that the Second Amendment is a 
“fundamental” right. The right to arms is the opposite of obscenity, for which 
there is no right at all, let alone a fundamental one. 
If the Chafin court had not shifted the burden of proof, it might have 
engaged in historical inquiry, which would have revealed that there was no 
tradition in 1791 or 1866 of restricting the sale, loan, or gift of firearms by or 
to citizens who possessed civil rights.341 In fact, King George’s restrictions on 
firearms commerce had played a major role in precipitating the American 
Revolution.342 Other courts have recognized that the Second Amendment right 
includes firearms commerce.343 
The Eighth Circuit upheld a conviction for providing a firearm to a 
prohibited person, but because of the bizarre facts of the case, the court 
focused on host liability instead of conducting a typical Second Amendment 
analysis.344 
 
 337. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008). 
 338. 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969). 
 339. United States v. 12 200–Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973). 
 340. United States v. Chafin, 423 F. App’x 344 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 341. See Kopel, Background Checks for Firearms Sales and Loans: Law, History, and Policy, 
supra note 121, at 336, 340; David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment Protect Firearms 
Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. REV. 230, 235–37 (2014). 
 342. David B. Kopel, How the British Gun Control Program Precipitated the American 
Revolution, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 283, 291–301 (2012). 
 343. See Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (“the right to 
purchase and to sell firearms is part and parcel of the historically recognized right to keep and to 
bear arms.”); Nordyke v. King, 681 F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2012). See also Jackson v. City 
& Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2014) (the Second Amendment protects 
the sale of ammunition); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The right 
to possess firearms for protection implies a corresponding right to acquire [firearms] . . .” It 
follows that the right to sell firearms is also implied. For if nobody had a right to sell arms, the 
right to keep and bear arms and the implied right to acquire arms would not just be infringed, but 
meaningless.). 
 344. United States v. Stegmeier, 701 F.3d 574, 578, 580, 583 (8th Cir. 2012). 
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D. Storage Laws and Licensing Fees 
In Jackson v. San Francisco,345 the Ninth Circuit determined that the 
Second Amendment was implicated by a city ordinance requiring that 
handguns be “stored in a locked container or disabled with a trigger lock that 
has been approved by the California Department of Justice” when not being 
“carried on the person of an individual over the age of 18.”346 “Because 
storage regulations . . . are not part of a long historical ‘tradition of 
proscription,’ we conclude that section 4512 burdens rights protected by the 
Second Amendment.”347 The court explained that the storage law had nothing 
to do with any of Heller’s “presumptively lawful” gun controls: 
In analyzing the scope of the Second Amendment, we begin with the list of 
“presumptively lawful” regulations provided by Heller. Section 4512 
resembles none of them, because it regulates conduct at home, not in “sensitive 
places”; applies to all residents of San Francisco, not just “felons or the 
mentally ill”; has no impact on the “commercial sale of arms,” and it regulates 
handguns, which Heller itself established were not “dangerous and 
unusual.”348 
In Kwong v. Bloomberg,349 the Second Circuit upheld a handgun licensing fee 
of several hundred dollars. The court determined the requirement would 
“easily” survive intermediate scrutiny “[b]ecause the record demonstrates that 
the licensing fee is designed to allow the City of New York to recover the costs 
incurred through operating its licensing scheme, which is designed to promote 
public safety and prevent gun violence.”350 Notably, none of the plaintiffs had 
complained that the City’s high fees impeded them from acquiring arms.351 
VII.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT OUTSIDE THE HOME 
The Second Amendment guarantees “the right to keep and bear arms.”352 
The text does not limit the exercise of this right solely to one’s home—any 
more than the text of the First Amendment limits the right of free exercise of 
religion or the freedom of speech to one’s home. When the Framers meant to 
limit a right to the home, they knew how to do so, as in the Third Amendment. 
Common sense and long historical practice show that First and Second 
Amendment rights are often exercised outside the home: carrying a gun for 
protection, attending a church, or speaking in a public place. 
 
 345. 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 346. Id. at 958. 
 347. Id. at 963 (internal citations omitted). 
 348. Id. at 962 (internal citations omitted). 
 349. 723 F.3d 160, 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 350. Id. at 168. 
 351. Id. 
 352. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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Some courts have read Heller as if it said nothing at all about bearing arms. 
For example, the Maryland Court of Appeals wrote that it would not recognize 
any right to bear arms unless the Supreme Court expressly so directed.353 
The Supreme Court, however, does not read Heller so obtusely. In 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,354 the Supreme Court 
identified “the right to bear arms” as among the “protected civil rights.”355 As 
McDonald explained, the Heller decision “held that the Second Amendment 
protects the right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense, and we 
struck down a District of Columbia law that banned the possession of 
handguns in the home.”356 According to McDonald, Heller held that the 
Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms “for the purpose 
of self-defense.”357 The holding is not limited to self-defense in the home. 
Rather, McDonald characterizes the D.C. ban on defensive home handguns as 
an example of the types of laws that violate the Second Amendment’s right of 
self-defense.358 
As to the contours of the right to bear arms, Heller offered two rules: First, 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were “longstanding” and 
“presumptively constitutional.”359 So were bans on carrying arms “in sensitive 
places such as schools and government buildings. . . .”360 These exceptions 
prove the rule.361 
 
 353. Williams v. Maryland, 10 A.3d 1167, 1177 (Md. 2011). 
 354. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 355. Id. at 2600. 
 356. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749–50 (2010). 
 357. Id. at 750. 
 358. Id. at 742. 
 359. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008). In Martinez, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the concealed carrying of firearms fell outside the scope of the Second 
Amendment, because concealed carry was expressly listed as a “presumptively lawful” 
longstanding law in Heller. Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1211–12 (10th Cir. 2013). “As 
an example of the limited nature of the Second Amendment right to keep and carry arms, the 
Court observed that ‘the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that 
prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state 
analogues.’ And the Court stressed that ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
longstanding prohibitions.’” Id. at 1210 (internal citations omitted). 
 360. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 361. The exceptions about concealed carry and sensitive places prove the rule that Americans 
have the right to carry firearms (openly, if the legislature so requires) in places which are not 
“sensitive.” If the Second Amendment only applied to the keeping of arms at home, and not to the 
bearing of arms in public places, then there would be no need to specify the exception for 
carrying arms in “sensitive places” or carrying concealed. Id. at 1208. 
  Similarly, the exception for “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill” is an exception to the general rule that individual Americans have a right to possess 
arms. The exception only makes sense if the general rule is valid. After all, if no-one had a right 
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In this Part, we examine federal circuit cases, which have taken various 
positions on whether the Second Amendment includes bearing arms outside 
one’s home. We also examine cases about the parameters of the right, such as 
whether it includes carrying in post offices, or on private property contrary to 
the wishes of the owner. We also describe the state of qualified immunity for 
law enforcement interactions with people who are lawfully carrying. 
A. Right Exists Outside the Home 
As of 2012, the only state that formally prohibited exercise of the right to 
bear arms, was Illinois. There, carrying arms outside of one’s home or place of 
business was illegal. There was no process for a person even to apply for a 
license to carry. The law had some exceptions for certain activities (e.g., 
hunting, taking a firearm to a gunsmith for repair) and for certain favored 
classes of people (e.g., city councilmen). But the ordinary carrying of arms in 
public for lawful self-defense was prohibited. 
The Seventh Circuit ruled the Illinois prohibition unconstitutional, in 
Moore v. Madigan,362 written by Judge Richard Posner. As he put it, “The 
Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for 
self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.”363 After all, 
“the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside the home,”364 for “in 
Chicago, at least, most murders occur outside the home.”365 The court 
elaborated: 
Both Heller and McDonald do say that “the need for defense of self, family, 
and property is most acute” in the home, id. at 3036 (emphasis added); 554 
U.S. at 628 but that doesn’t mean it is not acute outside the home. Heller 
repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a 
gun in one’s home, as when it says that the amendment “guarantee[s] the 
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” 554 
U.S. at 592. Confrontations are not limited to the home. 
 
to possess arms, then there would be no need for a special rule that felons and the mentally ill 
may be barred from possessing arms. Id. 
  The third Heller exception is “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the 
commercial sale of arms.” The word “commercial” does not appear because the Supreme Court 
was trying to use extra ink. The statement that “conditions and qualifications” on the commercial 
sale of arms demonstrates that the commercial sale of arms is a Second Amendment right, but one 
whose regulations should often be upheld. The commercial sales exception tells that restrictions 
on non-commercial firearms transfers—including sales, gifts, and loans—have no presumption of 
constitutionality. Id. 
 362. 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 363. Id. 
 364. Id. at 941. 
 365. Id. at 937. 
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The Second Amendment states in its entirety that “a well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” (emphasis added). The right to “bear” 
as distinct from the right to “keep” arms is unlikely to refer to the home. To 
speak of “bearing” arms within one’s home would at all times have been an 
awkward usage. A right to bear arms thus implies a right to carry a loaded gun 
outside the home.366 
The textual right to bear arms was consistent with self-defense needs, both 
in the olden days and in the modern urban jungle: 
[O]ne doesn’t have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear 
arms for personal self-defense in the eighteenth century could not rationally 
have been limited to the home. Suppose one lived in what was then the wild 
west—the Ohio Valley for example (for until the Louisiana Purchase the 
Mississippi River was the western boundary of the United States), where there 
were hostile Indians. One would need from time to time to leave one’s home to 
obtain supplies from the nearest trading post, and en route one would be as 
much (probably more) at risk if unarmed as one would be in one’s home 
unarmed. . . .367 
Twenty-first century Illinois has no hostile Indians. But a Chicagoan is a good 
deal more likely to be attacked on a sidewalk in a rough neighborhood than in 
his apartment on the 35th floor of the Park Tower. A woman who is being 
stalked or has obtained a protective order against a violent ex-husband is more 
vulnerable to being attacked while walking to or from her home than when 
inside. She has a stronger self-defense claim to be allowed to carry a gun in 
public than the resident of a fancy apartment building (complete with 
doorman) has a claim to sleep with a loaded gun under her mattress. But 
Illinois wants to deny the former claim, while compelled by McDonald to 
honor the latter. That creates an arbitrary difference. To confine the right to be 
armed to the home is to divorce the Second Amendment from the right of self-
defense described in Heller and McDonald. It is not a property right—a right 
to kill a houseguest who in a fit of aesthetic fury tries to slash your copy of 
Norman Rockwell’s painting Santa with Elves.368 That is not self-defense, and 
this case like Heller and McDonald is just about self-defense.369 
The Moore court did not apply strict or intermediate scrutiny. “[O]ur 
analysis is not based on degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify 
the most restrictive gun law of any of the 50 states.”370 
 
 366. Id. at 935–36 (citations simplified). 
 367. Madigan, 702 F.3d at 936. 
 368. Readers curious about what might provoke this hypothetical fit may view Santa With 
Elves, THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, http://www.saturdayeveningpost.com/wp-content/uploads 
/satevepost/20151202-9221202.jpg [http://perma.cc/FF5G3H78]. 
 369. Madigan, 702 F.3d at 937. 
 370. Id. at 941. 
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As to whether a complete prohibition on bearing arms benefits safety, 
Judge Posner found that the “theoretical empirical evidence . . . overall is 
inconclusive.” That evidence was actually “consistent with concluding that a 
right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense.”371 The public 
safety argument for the “uniquely sweeping ban” was severely weakened by 
the fact that bearing arms was statutorily allowed in all forty-nine other states; 
the Illinois Attorney General had not offered any reason why exercising the 
Second Amendment in Illinois was more dangerous than exercising it in other 
states.372 
Thus, the prohibition of the exercise of the enumerated right to bear arms 
was categorically unconstitutional. In Part VIII, we will further examine the 
doctrinal issues of categorical invalidation. 
The Illinois legislature complied with Moore by enacting a statute similar 
to those in over forty other states: concealed carry is allowed with a license; 
the license requires safety training and a background check. 
This licensing scheme was challenged in Berron v. Illinois Concealed 
Carry Licensing Review Board.373 In Berron, four separate appeals brought by 
persons denied concealed-carry permits were consolidated at the appellate 
level. These plaintiffs first complained that the licensing scheme was 
unconstitutional because it allowed them to be denied a permit without a 
sufficient explanation why, thus leaving them unable to challenge the denial. 
However, during the course of the appeal, the Illinois legislature adopted a 
new, revised set of regulations that appeared to remedy the deficiencies 
complained of by the plaintiffs, so their arguments were unripe.374 
The court then addressed the plaintiffs’ second claim: that requiring a 
license at all for concealed carry is unconstitutional.375 The plaintiffs compared 
the licensing requirement to an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech under 
the First Amendment.376 The court, however, was not convinced. It reasoned 
that since Heller had approved substantive limits on the Second Amendment 
right (e.g., only law-abiding citizens are entitled to exercise the right), surely 
“[a state] may use a licensing system to enforce them.”377 
Next, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that “even if licenses 
may be required, they must be issued unless the state proves a disqualifying 
 
 371. Id. at 942. 
 372. Id. 
 373. 825 F.3d. 843, 846 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 374. Except for one plaintiff, who won a suit in state court in which the court directed the 
Licensing Review Board to issue him a concealed-carry license, so his claim was dismissed for 
mootness. Id. at 845–46. 
 375. Id. at 846. 
 376. Id. at 847. 
 377. Id. 
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condition by clear and convincing evidence”378 rather than the statute’s 
preponderance of the evidence standard. Throughout the litigation, the 
government argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard was 
adequate.379 The Seventh Circuit took it a step further: 
Plaintiffs next maintain that, even if licenses may be required, they must be 
issued unless the state proves a disqualifying condition by clear and 
convincing evidence. Neither Heller nor McDonald is concerned with 
licensing, so this contention lacks support in the Supreme Court’s most-
applicable decisions. As a matter of administrative law, the proponent of a 
position bears the burden of showing entitlement by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Plaintiffs are the applicants for licenses, so they bear the burden of 
showing entitlement. To be more precise, a state may assign applicants that 
burden without transgressing the Constitution. Illinois is a little more generous, 
placing the burden on the state to show why an application should be 
denied.380 
Unfortunately, Judge Easterbrook’s excursion into administrative law was 
disingenuous. The Greenwich Collieries case did not announce some general 
rule of administrative law.381 Rather, the Supreme Court was applying 5 
U.S.C. § 556(d), part of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.382 That 
section does state that “the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of 
proof,” but the federal APA had nothing to do with the state administrative 
procedure at issue in Berron.383 
Second, Judge Easterbrook ignored the Heller and McDonald language, 
and the controlling Seventh Circuit opinion of Madigan, that the Second 
Amendment right to bear arms applies outside the home.384 
Third, Judge Easterbrook did not address Seventh Circuit precedents—
including his own—that the government always bears the burden of persuasion 
when restricting constitutional rights, including Second Amendment rights.385 
 
 378. Berron, 825 F.3d. at 847. 
 379. Moustakas v. Margolis, 154 F. Supp. 3d 719, 725, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2016); DeServi v. 
Bryant, 70 F. Supp. 3d 921, 923–24, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 
 380. Berron, 825 F.3d at 847–48 (citing Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 
267 (1994)). 
 381. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994). 
 382. Id. 
 383. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012). 
 384. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has decided 
that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the 
home as inside.”). 
 385. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook, who drafted the Berron opinion, has said in two different 
opinions that burdens on the Second Amendment right require heightened scrutiny, which 
necessarily puts the burden on the government. See United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“If a rational basis were enough, the Second Amendment would not do 
anything—because a rational basis is essential for legislation in general.”); Friedman v. City of 
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Thus, under Heller, a state cannot “assign applicants that burden” of 
proving their entitlement to exercise their constitutional right to bear arms.386 
The dicta was wrong, but that does not mean that the result in Berron, 
upholding the statute, was necessarily incorrect. The Illinois legislature had 
already placed on the government the burden of proof for denying a carry 
permit application. The issue was only about how much evidence was 
necessary: preponderance, or clear and convincing? To resolve the question, 
the court could have looked at licensing systems for other constitutional rights 
(e.g., parade permits) and at the carry licensing systems of other states. These 
would offer guidance as to whether the preponderance standard is considered 
appropriate in the context of constitutional licensing. 
B. Unable to Decide Whether Right Exists 
1. Fourth Circuit 
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the right to bear arms in United States v. 
Masciandaro in 2011.387 The defendant had parked his car and slept in it 
overnight in a parking lot at a National Park. He had a defensive gun in his car, 
which violated a then-existing federal regulation.388 
The court could not agree on whether the Second Amendment applies 
outside the home, but the court determined that the law would satisfy the 
appropriate standard of review even if there is a right to bear arms. 
Writing for the court, Judge Harvie Wilkinson warned that judicial 
application of Heller beyond handguns in the home would make the judges 
responsible for any gun misuse that resulted: “On the question of Heller’s 
applicability outside the home environment, we think it prudent to await 
direction from the Court itself.”389 Judge Wilkinson, like Judge Posner, is an 
outspoken critic of the Heller decision.390 Uniquely among the federal circuits, 
 
Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“All legislation requires a rational basis; if the 
Second Amendment imposed only a rational basis requirement, it wouldn’t do anything.”). 
 386. Berron v. Illinois Concealed Carry Licensing Review Bd., 825 F.3d. 843, 847–48 (7th 
Cir. 2016); As explained supra note 19, Judge Easterbrook has earned a reputation among some 
in the legal profession for ignoring or disingenuously applying controlling precedent to reach the 
result he wants. 
 387. 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 388. 36 C.F.R. § 2.4(b) (2010). Subsequently, Congress enacted a statute to allow carrying in 
National Parks by anyone in compliance with the laws of the host state. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1a–7b 
(2010); 123 STAT. 1764–65, § 512 (2009). For example, carrying with a concealed handgun carry 
permit in states that require permits or by any lawful carrier in states that do not require permits. 
 389. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (Wilkinson, J., joined 
by Duffy, J., writing for the court). 
 390. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. 
REV. 253, 254 (2009). For a reply, see Nelson Lund & David B. Kopel, Unraveling Judicial 
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the Masciandaro majority asserted that the Supreme Court had left the lower 
courts with absolutely no guidance about the scope of the right to bear arms 
beyond the home.391 
Writing separately, Judge Niemeyer found it “sufficiently clear that, in this 
case, Masciandaro’s claim to self-defense—asserted by him as a law-abiding 
citizen sleeping in his automobile in a public parking area—does implicate the 
Second Amendment.”392 He reasoned that “[Heller] found that the right 
included the right to ‘protect[ ] [oneself] against both public and private 
violence,’ thus extending the right in some form to wherever a person could 
become exposed to public or private violence.”393 Judge Niemeyer pointed out 
that “the right to keep and bear arms was found to have been understood to 
exist not only for self-defense, but also for membership in a militia and for 
hunting, neither of which is a home-bound activity.”394 
Without deciding whether the right to keep and bear arms applies outside 
the home, the majority proceeded to Step Two and decided that intermediate 
scrutiny would be appropriate, since “as we move outside the home, firearm 
rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often 
outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”395 The court upheld the law, 
finding that “reasonable measures to secure public safety” are justified “where 
large numbers of people, including children, congregate for recreation.”396 
The Fourth Circuit returned to the right to bear arms in Woollard v. 
Gallagher.397 Like many states, Maryland requires a permit to carry a handgun 
for protection. The applicant must demonstrate a “good-and-substantial-
reason” for receiving the permit.398 As interpreted by Maryland courts, the 
exercise of an enumerated constitutional right is considered neither “good” nor 
“substantial.”399 Instead, the applicant must demonstrate a unique and 
 
Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, 25 J.L. & 
POLITICS 1, 1–2 (2009). 
 391. “There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, 
but we have no idea what those places are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what 
sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other questions.” 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475. 
 392. Id. at 468 (Niemeyer, J. writing separately). 
 393. Id. at 467 (internal citation omitted) (brackets in original). 
 394. Id. at 468. 
 395. Id. at 470. 
 396. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 473. For a critique of the decision, see Stephen P. Halbrook, 
No Right to “Bear Arms”? A Critical Analysis of United States v. Masciandaro, 1 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. ONLINE 116 (2011). 
 397. 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 398. Id. at 876. 
 399. Id. 
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particularized threat—such as a particular criminal who has made a credible 
threat to murder the particular applicant.400 
The Fourth Circuit did not decide whether there is a right to bear arms, but 
proceeded to Step Two of the Two-Part Test under the assumption that the 
Second Amendment right applies outside the home.401 The court then 
subjected the law to intermediate scrutiny, following Masciandaro, where the 
court had “announced that intermediate scrutiny applies ‘to laws that burden 
[any] right to keep and bear arms outside of the home.’”402 
The Fourth Circuit found that “[t]he State has clearly demonstrated that the 
good-and-substantial-reason requirement advances the objectives of protecting 
public safety and preventing crime because it reduces the number of handguns 
in public.”403 Constricting lawful carry had many benefits: 
• “Decreasing the availability of handguns to criminals via theft”; 
• “Lessening ‘the likelihood that basic confrontations between individuals 
would turn deadly’”; 
• “Averting the confusion, along with the ‘potentially tragic 
consequences’ thereof, that can result from the presence of a third 
person with a handgun during a confrontation between a police officer 
and a criminal suspect”; 
• “Curtailing the presence of handguns during routine police-citizen 
encounters”; 
• “Reducing the number of ‘handgun sightings’ that must be 
investigated”; and 
• “Facilitating the identification of those persons carrying handguns who 
pose a menace.”404 
 
 400. Id. 
 401. “We hew to a judicious course today, refraining from any assessment of whether 
Maryland’s good-and-substantial-reason requirement for obtaining a handgun permit implicates 
Second Amendment protections. That is, we merely assume that the Heller right exists outside the 
home and that such right of Appellee Woollard has been infringed. We are free to make that 
assumption because the good-and-substantial-reason requirement passes constitutional muster 
under what we have deemed to be the applicable standard—intermediate scrutiny.” Id. at 876. 
 402. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876 (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470–71 
(4th Cir. 2011)). “The Appellees would have us place the right to arm oneself in public on equal 
footing with the right to arm oneself at home, necessitating that we apply strict scrutiny in our 
review of the good-and-substantial-reason requirement. Unfortunately for the Appellees, their 
argument is foreclosed by our precedent.” Id. at 878. Cf. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 
F.3d 406, 419 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Insofar as Highland Park’s ordinance implicates the right to carry 
or use these weapons outside of one’s property, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 403. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 879. 
 404. Id. at 879–80. 
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2. Third Circuit 
On paper, New Jersey’s statutory system for carry permits looks roughly 
similar to Maryland. Yet while permits are rare in Maryland, they hardly exist 
in New Jersey.405 In Drake v. Filko,406 the Third Circuit declared itself 
agnostic as to whether the Second Amendment exists outside the home.407 
The majority then applied intermediate scrutiny to the New Jersey system, 
assuming for the sake of argument that the right might “extend beyond the 
home.”408 Like Woollard, the Drake majority said that there could be some 
benefits from a near-prohibition of carrying defensive arms in public, and these 
potential benefits were sufficient to pass intermediate scrutiny.409 
In dissent, Judge Hardiman pointed out that the Filko majority was reading 
Heller much more narrowly than the Supreme Court does: 
Most importantly, the McDonald Court described the holding in Heller as 
encompassing a general right to self-defense. The very first sentence of 
McDonald states: “Two years ago, in District of Columbia v. Heller, we held 
that the Second Amendment protects the right to keep and bear arms for the 
purpose of self-defense, and we struck down a District of Columbia law that 
banned the possession of handguns in the home.” Describing the holding this 
way—first establishing the legal principle embodied in the Second 
Amendment and then explaining how it was applied—demonstrates that the 
legal principle enunciated in Heller is not confined to the facts presented in 
that case.410 
Further, the Heller Court had “consistently employed language referring to 
a more general right to self-defense than one confined to the home.”411 The 
Court had described the Second Amendment as guaranteeing “the individual 
right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”412 “The Court 
also defined ‘bear arms’ to include being ‘armed and ready for offensive or 
 
 405. The same is even more so in Hawaii, where permits are never issued, except to security 
guards. As of 2015, there were 221 carry permits issued to security guards, and no licenses issued 
to private citizens. Paul Perrone, Dep’t of the Att’y Gen., Firearms Registrations in Hawaii, 
2015, 9 (Mar. 2015), http://ag.hawaii.gov/cpja/files/2016/03/Firearm-Registrations-in-Hawaii-
2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/A2DV-XZR7]. 
 406. 724 F.3d 426, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 407. Id. at 430–31. 
 408. Id. at 430 n.5. 
 409. Id. at 430. 
 410. Id. at 445 (Hardiman, J., dissenting). 
 411. Drake, 724 F.3d at 444 (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 749 
(2010)). 
 412. Id. at 444 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
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defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.’”413 “Obviously, 
confrontations and conflicts ‘are not limited to the home.’”414 
3. First Circuit 
The First Circuit does not use the Two-Part Test. Instead, it simply looks at 
text, history, precedent, and policy. (Of course these considerations are also 
relevant in the Two-Part Test.) In the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent 
in Heller II argued that a similar methodology was the one used by the 
Supreme Court in Heller, and thus should be used by lower courts.415 Some 
district courts have also used this methodology.416 
In Hightower v. City of Boston,417 the First Circuit upheld the denial of a 
carry permit to an individual who had falsified her application. In dicta, the 
court echoed Judge Wilkinson’s hesitancy to enforce the right to bear arms. 
Under the Massachusetts licensing scheme, if an applicant is statutorily 
eligible for a license, the licensing authority may issue the license if it appears 
that the applicant is a suitable person to be issued such license.418 Hightower’s 
license had been revoked for untruthful answers on her application. 
“Hightower argue[d] that she is entitled to a declaration that the Second 
Amendment secures the right to publicly carry a handgun outside of her home 
for self-defense, and that this right cannot be made to depend on a suitability 
determination by licensing officials.”419 The court disagreed, finding that “the 
government may regulate the carrying of concealed weapons outside of the 
home”420 because “[i]t is plain that the interest Hightower advances in carrying 
concealed weapons outside the home is distinct from this core interest 
emphasized in Heller.”421 
 
 413. Id. at 444. 
 414. Id. (quoting Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 415. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (text, history, tradition). 
 416. See, e.g., Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117–19 (N.D. Ill. 2012) 
(striking ban on issuing gun permits to people who had been convicted of violating a carrying ban 
which was later held to be unconstitutional); cf. Rocky Mountain Gun Owners v. Hickenlooper, 
371 P.3d 768, 783 (Colo. App. 2016) (Graham, J., dissenting) (interpreting Colorado 
Constitution). 
 417. 693 F.3d 61, 74 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 418. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131(d) (2015). This statute was successfully challenged in 
Richmond v. Peraino, 128 F. Supp. 3d 415, 419–20 (D. Mass. 2015). In an as-applied challenge, 
the state failed to demonstrate that the revocation of a license based on a 40-year-old marijuana 
conviction was “supported by some form of ‘strong showing,’ necessitating a substantial 
relationship between the restriction and an important governmental objective.” Id. at 19 (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 419. Hightower, 693 F.3d at 71. 
 420. Id. at 73. 
 421. Id. at 72. 
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The court declined to define the scope of the Second Amendment beyond 
the home: 
We agree with Judge Wilkinson’s cautionary holding in United States v. 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, [565] U.S. [1058], 
132 S. Ct. 756 (2011), that we should not engage in answering the question of 
how Heller applies to possession of firearms outside of the home, including as 
to “what sliding scales of scrutiny might apply.” Id. at 475. As he said, the 
whole matter is a “vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon 
necessity and only then by small degree.” Id.422 
Hightower’s as-applied challenge failed because a “requirement that 
firearms license applicants provide truthful information, enforced by the 
revocation of licenses if the applicant provides false information, serves a 
variety of important purposes.”423 In fact, “[t]he prohibition of the inclusion of 
false information in a license application is necessary to the functioning of the 
licensing scheme.”424 Hightower’s facial challenge, which focused on the 
amount of discretion conferred by the suitability requirement, failed because 
Hightower failed to show “that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep” 
and because her as-applied claim demonstrated a constitutional application of 
the scheme: “where false information is provided on an application form.”425 
C. Right Exists Outside the Home, But in a Very Weak Form 
New York State’s carry licensing system is highly arbitrary and 
discretionary. In most counties, permits are issued by trial court judges.426 
Issuing practices vary widely by county. Some issuing authorities consider 
self-defense not to be a “proper cause.” 
Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit also thought the question of a 
right to arms outside the home was confusing. The Second Circuit concluded 
that “the Amendment must have some application in the very different context 
of the public possession of firearms.”427 The Second Circuit said that home 
defense was the core of the Second Amendment; and because restrictions on 
carrying arms in public did not affect the core right, and because there was a 
historic tradition of greater regulation for arms outside the home than inside, 
the Circuit adopted intermediate scrutiny.428 
 
 422. Id. at 74. But see Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (“that ‘vast terra 
incognita’ has been opened to judicial exploration by Heller and McDonald. There is no turning 
back by the lower federal courts”). 
 423. Hightower, 693 F.3d at 74. 
 424. Id. at 75. 
 425. Id. at 78. 
 426. N.Y. PENAL L. § 400.000. In New York, “Supreme Court” refers to trial courts of 
general jurisdiction. N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS §§ 140 to 140–B. 
 427. Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). 
 428. Id. at 93–95. 
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The Second Circuit tested and upheld the near-prohibitory application 
under the weakest possible formulation of intermediate scrutiny: “if it is 
substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental 
interest.”429 As will be detailed in Part VIII.E infra, the Second Circuit has 
created its own eccentric and feeble version of heightened scrutiny for the 
Second Amendment. 
D. No Right to Concealed Carry Outside the Home 
In Peruta v. County of San Diego,430 an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit 
held that “there is no Second Amendment right for members of the general 
public to carry concealed firearms in public.”431 While longstanding precedent 
surely supports the court’s holding that a concealed carry ban in complete 
isolation is constitutional, the court clumsily mischaracterized the issue in the 
case to reach this holding. 
The court ignored the fact that the open carrying of firearms is also 
prohibited in California. Thus, by upholding the concealed carry ban, the court 
allowed typical law-abiding citizens to be entirely prohibited from carrying 
firearms in public. The court’s refusal to acknowledge this complete bar on 
bearing arms is especially peculiar for two reasons: First, all four lower court 
decisions leading up to the en banc panel’s decision were based on the 
availability of open carry.432 Second, of all the authorities the court cited in its 
extensive historical analysis, precisely none support the outcome of the case (a 
complete ban on bearing arms).433 Not a single case, statute, or constitutional 
provision cited by the court supports a complete ban on bearing arms.434 In 
 
 429. Id. at 96. 
 430. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 431. Id. at 924, 927. 
 432. The district courts and Ninth Circuit panels all based their holdings on the availability of 
open carry; the district courts upheld the concealed carry restrictions based on the then-
availability of open carry, while the Ninth Circuit panels struck down the restrictions based on the 
then-unavailability of open carry. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114 (S.D. 
Cal. 2010); Richards v. Cty. of Yolo, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1178 (E.D. Cal. 2011); Peruta v. Cty. 
of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1178–79 (9th Cir. 2014); Richards v. Prieto, 560 F. App’x 681, 682 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
 433. Every case cited by the court either upheld a concealed carry ban when open carry 
remained available, struck down a concealed carry ban, assumed the right to bear arms applies 
outside the home, or relied on an erroneous pre-Heller collective right interpretation of the 
Second Amendment. Every American statute and constitutional provision cited by the court either 
left open carry available or granted the legislature the ability to prescribe the manner in which 
arms could be borne. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 933–39. 
 434. Judge Graber’s concurrence, endorsed by the majority, argued that “even if we assume 
that the Second Amendment applied to the carrying of concealed weapons in public, the 
provisions at issue would be constitutional” under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 942 (Graber, J., 
concurring). This concurrence is similarly based on the concealed carry ban being considered in 
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fact, the precedent the court relied on to hold concealed carry bans 
constitutional overwhelmingly and undeniably support the dissent’s conclusion 
that “[s]tates may choose between different manners of bearing arms for self-
defense so long as the right to bear arms for self-defense is accommodated.”435 
It cannot be said for certain why the court framed the issue in a way that 
failed to even address the plaintiffs’ true burden, or why the court ignored the 
fact that the precedent it relied on just as strongly supported the dissent’s 
conclusion; but it would not be unreasonable to speculate that the court was 
unable to justify a complete ban on bearing arms, and hoped instead to open 
the door for concealed carry and open carry bans to be justified separately but 
implemented simultaneously.436 
E. Right to Carry on Government Property 
In United States v. Dorosan,437 an unpublished opinion from the Fifth 
Circuit, the court upheld a handgun ban on United States Postal Service 
property (including the parking lot), even “[a]ssuming Dorosan’s Second 
Amendment right to keep and bear arms extends to carrying a handgun in his 
car.”438 The court determined that the Postal Service had constitutional 
authority to restrict guns on its own property; that the parking lot where postal 
trucks were loaded was a “sensitive place” under Heller;439 and that Dorosan 
could have parked off Postal Service property and kept his gun in his car.440 
The court would have upheld the law “under any applicable level of 
scrutiny.”441 
 
isolation. If it were considered in conjunction with the open carry ban, it would strike at the core 
of the Second Amendment (that being self-defense) and could not even be subjected to the 
intermediate scrutiny interest-balancing test. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
634–35 (2008). 
 435. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 945, 948 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
 436. By considering the concealed carry ban in isolation, the court created the opportunity for 
a future court to use the same approach to uphold an open carry ban in isolation. This willfully 
blind approach could eviscerate the right to bear arms. In dissent, Judge Callahan recognized that 
“Constitutional rights would become meaningless if states could obliterate them by enacting 
incrementally more burdensome restrictions while arguing that a reviewing court must evaluate 
each restriction by itself when determining its constitutionality.” Id. at 953 (Callahan, J., 
dissenting). Based on the majority’s handling of Peruta, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest 
that the court intended to open the door for an approach that could make the right to bear arms 
meaningless. 
 437. 350 F. App’x 874, 874 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 438. Id. at 875. 
 439. “Moreover, the Postal Service used the parking lot for loading mail and staging its mail 
trucks. Given this usage of the parking lot by the Postal Service as a place of regular government 
business, it falls under the ‘sensitive places’ exception recognized by Heller.” Id. at 875–76. 
 440. Id. at 876. 
 441. Id. 
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In the Tenth Circuit’s Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Service,442 the postal issue 
received a more thorough analysis. The majority opinion was written by Judge 
David Ebel.443 Judge Ebel upheld a regulation prohibiting “the storage and 
carriage of firearms on USPS property,” including the postal service parking 
lot.444 The ban on concealed carry was valid under Tenth Circuit precedent, 
which, following Heller, had found that concealed carry is not part of the 
Second Amendment right.445 
As for open carry, the post office was a “government building” and was 
therefore a “sensitive place.” Thus, Heller allowed a ban on gun carrying. The 
post office parking lot (which was only for customers, not for truck loading) 
was sufficiently related to the post office building that the parking lot too was a 
sensitive place.446 
In an alternative holding, the Bonidy court considered the possibility that 
the parking lot might not be a “sensitive place.”447 And further, that Moore 
might be correct that there is a right to bear arms. After all, “‘bear’ certainly 
implies the possibility and even the likelihood that the arms will be carried 
outside the home.”448 And “the need for self-defense, albeit less acute, 
certainly exists outside the home as well.”449 Without deciding whether there is 
a right to bear arms, the Bonidy majority assumed that there was.450 
The court explained, “[i]f Second Amendment rights apply outside the 
home, we believe they would be measured by the traditional test of 
intermediate scrutiny.”451 This was because: 
[t]he right to carry weapons in public for self-defense poses inherent risks to 
others. Firearms may create or exacerbate accidents or deadly encounters . . . 
[t]he risk . . . distinguishes the Second Amendment right from other 
fundamental rights that have been held to be evaluated under a strict scrutiny 
 
 442. 790 F.3d 1121, 1121 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 443. Id. at 1122. Before and after Heller, Judge Ebel has been the Tenth Circuit’s most ardent 
opponent of Second Amendment rights. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Tenth 
Circuit: Three Decades of (Mostly) Harmless Error, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 901, 930–32, 949, 953 
(2009). 
 444. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1123. 
 445. Id. at 1124 (citing Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2013)). 
 446. Id. at 1125. (“We conclude, on the facts of this case, that the parking lot should be 
considered as a single unit with the postal building itself to whichf it is attached and which it 
exclusively serves. There is, in fact, a drop-off box for the post office in the parking lot, meaning 
that postal transactions take place in the parking lot as well as in the building. Thus, the 
previously quoted language in Heller applies with the same force to the parking lot as to the 
building itself.”). 
 447. Id. at 1124. 
 448. Id. at 1125. 
 449. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1125. 
 450. Id. at 1125–26. 
 451. Id. at 1126. 
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test, such as the right to marry and the right to be free from viewpoint 
discrimination, which can be exercised without creating a direct risk to 
others.452 
The court upheld the ban because it was “substantially related to the 
USPS’s important interest in creating a safe environment for its patrons and 
employees.”453 The Bonidy court emphasized two special factors. First, this 
was a case of government “as a proprietor of a state-owned business rather 
than regulating private activity.”454 In addition, “the regulation applies only to 
a very limited spatial area (that is, USPS facilities) and affects private citizens 
only insofar as they are doing business with the USPS on USPS property.”455 
Judge Tymkovich concurred in part and dissented in part; he agreed that 
the ban inside the post office was constitutional.456 For the parking lot, he 
agreed that intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard.457 On the facts, his 
disagreement with the majority was whether a less restrictive alternative was 
available.458 Less restrictive alternatives are discussed infra. 
On the law, Judge Tymkovich chastised the majority for refusing to decide 
that the Second Amendment does guarantee a right to arms outside the 
home.459 To Judge Tymkovich, it was “incontestable that the Second 
Amendment applies outside of home self-defense.”460 The Supreme Court had 
been clear, he wrote. 
Heller had said that the Second Amendment included the right to “possess 
and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” including for “self-defense and 
hunting.”461 According to Heller, “‘bear arms’ means to ‘wear, bear, or carry 
. . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of 
being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict 
with another person.’”462 The Heller “presumptively lawful” carry ban for 
“sensitive places” implies that “restrictions on free carry in other locations 
would be granted no such presumption.”463 
 
 452. Id. This implies that restrictions on the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding 
citizens inside the home should be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
 453. Id. at 1127. 
 454. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1127. 
 455. Id. 
 456. Id. at 1129. 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. 
 459. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1136. 
 460. Id. at 1130. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id. 1131 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 463. Id. at 1130. 
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Moreover, “[v]iolence occurs outside the home, and to call the need for 
self-defense most acute in the home is to acknowledge it exists elsewhere. 
Confrontations do not just occur in the home, and hunting never does.”464 
In sum, “[o]nly an unrealistic reading of that language could restrict the 
right to the home, and it is hard to believe a founding generation who routinely 
carried weapons for protection outside the home and traveling would agree.”465 
One other case about government property has been decided by a circuit 
court: GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.466 The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers bans loaded firearms, bows, and “other weapons” on 
some of its Georgia property.467 According to the court’s tendentious 
characterization of the plaintiffs’ claims, “[T]he plaintiffs [hung] their hats on 
a single, sweeping argument: that the regulation completely destroys their 
Second Amendment rights, thereby obviating the need for a traditional scrutiny 
analysis.”468 
The court rejected that argument: 
The Corps’ firearms regulation . . . applies only to Corps property: it is 
narrowly cabined to a specific area, and in this case that area is specifically 
designated for recreation. The plaintiffs can freely exercise their right to bear 
arms for self-defense elsewhere, whether in the home or on the streets, without 
running afoul of this regulation.469 
“[S]o narrow a restriction on so limited a geographic expanse cannot fairly 
be said to destroy the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights altogether.”470 
Because the plaintiffs had (according to the court) presented no other 
argument, the court had “no reason to and [did not] address whether the Corps’ 
firearms regulation would pass muster under any form of elevated scrutiny.”471 
F. Carrying on Private Property Against the Wishes of the Owner 
In GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia,472 the plaintiffs challenged a statute 
against carrying guns (even with a carry license) in “a place of worship, unless 
 
 464. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1130. 
 465. Id. 
 466. 788 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 467. See 36 C.F.R. § 327.13(a) (2002). There are exceptions for law enforcement officers, 
hunting or fishing, and authorized shooting ranges. Shortly before the Ninth Circuit was to hear 
oral argument on another challenge to the Corps’ gun ban, the Corps announced that it will be 
revising the regulation, to allow firearms possession. See David Kopel, Second Amendment May 
Be Restored on Army Corps of Engineers Land, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.wash 
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/03/10/second-amendment-may-be-restored-on-
army-corps-of-engineers-land/ [http://perma.cc/4MHA-5Z2J]. 
 468. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 788 F.3d at 1320. 
 469. Id. at 1326. 
 470. Id 
 471. Id. at 1324. 
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the governing body or authority of the place of worship permits the carrying of 
weapons or long guns by license holders.”473 The court aggressively construed 
the pleadings, and asserted that the Plaintiffs failed to plead an as-applied 
challenge, even though the plaintiffs included a church that wanted to allow 
carry on its property. So the court ruled only on the strawman issue of a facial 
challenge.474 
To state a facial challenge . . . Plaintiffs must take the position that the Second 
Amendment protects a right to bring a firearm on the private property of 
another against the wishes of the owner. Put another way, Plaintiffs must argue 
that the individual right protected by the Second Amendment, in light of Heller 
and McDonald, trumps a private property owner’s right to exclusively control 
who, and under what circumstances, is allowed on his or her own premises.475 
 . . . [P]roperty law, tort law, and criminal law provide the canvas on which our 
Founding Fathers drafted the Second Amendment. A clear grasp of this 
background illustrates that the pre-existing right codified in the Second 
Amendment does not include protection for a right to carry a firearm in a place 
of worship against the owner’s wishes. Quite simply, there is no constitutional 
infirmity when a private property owner exercises his, her, or its—in the case 
of a place of worship—right to control who may enter, and whether that 
invited guest can be armed, and the State vindicates that right.476 
G. Qualified Immunity and Right to Carry 
In Gonzalez v. West Milwaukee, the defendant was twice arrested for 
disorderly conduct for openly carrying a holstered handgun into retail stores.477 
Both times, Gonzalez’s handgun was temporarily confiscated, and later 
 
 472. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 473. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b)(4) (2016). 
 474. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 687 F.3d at 1260. The subtest that the Eleventh Circuit used for 
the facial challenge was from United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). The Salerno 
case said that in a facial challenge, a plaintiff must prove that “no set of circumstances exists 
under which the [statute] would be valid.” The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[w]hile Salerno is 
often criticized, its holding remains binding precedent, which we faithfully apply here.” 
GeorgiaCarry.Org., Inc., 687 F.3d at 1255, n.19. More recently, the oft-criticized Salerno has 
been called into doubt by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2551 (2015). Johnson held a 
statute unconstitutionally vague, even though it was capable of valid application. The Johnson 
Court explained, “although statements in some of our opinions could be read to suggest 
otherwise, our holdings squarely contradict the theory that a vague provision is constitutional 
merely because there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.” Id. at 2560–
61. Thus, “[i]t seems to us that the dissent’s supposed requirement of vagueness in all 
applications is not a requirement at all. . .” Id. at 2561. 
 475. GeorgiaCarry.Org. Inc., 687 F.3d at 1261. 
 476. Id. at 1264. 
 477. 671 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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returned. Gonzalez brought a § 1983 action against the arresting officers, but 
the Seventh Circuit ruled against him. 
Police officers are entitled to “qualified immunity” against civil rights 
lawsuits, unless their actions violate clearly established law. “At the time of the 
arrests, the state constitutional right to bear arms was relatively new, and 
Wisconsin law was unclear about the effect of the right on the scope of the 
disorderly conduct statute. Moreover, the Supreme Court had not yet decided 
McDonald v. City of Chicago.”478 Since the law was in flux, nothing about 
open carry was “clearly established,” so the officer was entitled to qualified 
immunity.479 
The Second Circuit took a similar approach in Burgess v. Town of 
Wallingford,480 an unpublished opinion involving open carry in a crowded pool 
hall. McDonald post-dated the time of the incident.481 
VIII. WHAT LEVEL OF SCRUTINY APPLIES? 
In this Part VIII, we examine how the circuits choose which level of 
heightened scrutiny to apply in Step Two. Then in Part IX, we will examine 
how courts have applied various forms of heightened scrutiny. However, to 
avoid discussing one case twice, the methodological division is not quite strict. 
For example, Part VIII discusses the Second Circuit’s New York State Rifle & 
Pistol Association v. Cuomo (“NYSRPA”),482 “a casebook guide to 
eviscerating”483 Second Amendment rights; the discussion includes the 
selection of an intermediate scrutiny standard of review, and the fabrication of 
a novel and feeble version of that standard. The Second Circuit has violated 
McDonald by treating the Second Amendment as a “second-class” right,484 
“singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment.”485 
A. How to Choose Between Strict and Intermediate Scrutiny 
Almost all circuit cases agree that any law which burdens Second 
Amendment rights must receive something stricter than rational basis 
review.486 The Second Circuit, however, says that only laws which impose a 
 
 478. Id. at 652. 
 479. Id. at 659–60. 
 480. 569 F. App’x 21, 21 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 481. Id. at 23. 
 482. 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 483. Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1685 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 484. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
 485. Id. at 745. 
 486. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The Court made plain in 
Heller that a rational basis alone would be insufficient to justify laws burdening the Second 
Amendment.”); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Heller makes clear that we 
may not apply rational basis review to a law that burdens protected Second Amendment 
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conduct.”); United States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Although the Court did not 
decide on a level of scrutiny to be applied in cases involving Second Amendment challenges, it 
rejected rational basis review.”); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“The Government argues a rational basis test should apply to § 922(k), but Heller rejects that 
standard for laws burdening Second Amendment rights.”); NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 195 
(5th Cir. 2012) (“rational basis review, which Heller held ‘could not be used to evaluate the 
extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right’ such as ‘the right to keep 
and bear arms.’”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Heller left open 
the issue of the standard of review, rejecting only rational-basis review.”); United States v. 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 469 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The Court did, however, rule out a rational 
basis review, because that level of review ‘would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws.’”) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 
(2008)); United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 415 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Court did not 
say which form of scrutiny should apply, but it did rule out rational basis scrutiny . . .”); United 
States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 225 n.2 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Rational-basis review, which is the 
most lenient level of means-end scrutiny, is inapplicable to review a law that burdens conduct 
protected under the Second Amendment.”); BATFE, 700 F.3d at 194 (If the law falls within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee, “the second step is to determine whether to apply 
intermediate or strict scrutiny to the law . . .”); Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436, 446–47 (5th Cir. 
2016) (“[If a] law impinges upon a right protected by the Second Amendment . . . we proceed to 
the second step, which is to determine whether to apply intermediate or strict scrutiny to the 
law.”) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“If a rational basis were enough, the Second Amendment would not do anything—
because a rational basis is essential for legislation in general.”) (citations omitted); United States 
v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010) (“But though Congress may exclude certain 
categories of persons from firearm possession, the exclusion must be more than merely ‘rational,’ 
and must withstand ‘some form of strong showing.’”) (citations omitted); Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011) (“For our purposes, however, we know that Heller’s 
reference to ‘any standard of scrutiny’ means any heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court 
specifically excluded rational-basis review.”) (emphasis in original); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 
933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] ban as broad as Illinois’s can’t be upheld merely on the ground 
that it’s not irrational.”); United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(“The Supreme Court has steered away from prescribing a particular level of scrutiny that courts 
should apply to categorical bans on the possession of firearms by specified groups of people, 
though it has said that rational-basis review would be too lenient.”); Friedman v. City of Highland 
Park, 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015) (“All legislation requires a rational basis; if the Second 
Amendment imposed only a rational basis requirement, it wouldn’t do anything.”); United States 
v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In Heller, the Supreme Court did not specify 
what level of scrutiny courts must apply to a statute challenged under the Second Amendment. 
The Heller Court did, however, indicate that rational basis review is not appropriate.”); Jackson v. 
City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While Heller did not specify 
the appropriate level of scrutiny for Second Amendment claims, it nevertheless confirmed that 
rational basis review is not appropriate.”); Van Der Hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 
2014) (“Second Amendment questions are reviewed under heightened scrutiny . . .”); Teixeira v. 
Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Ordinance must be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny—something beyond mere rational basis review . . .”); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1141 (10th Cir. 2015) (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“[W]hile the government’s justifications might suffice to uphold this regulation on rational-
basis review, Heller demands more.”); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 
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“substantial” burden receive more than rational basis. Even then, they receive 
only the weakest form of intermediate scrutiny. 
The more common view agrees with the D.C. Circuit: “As with the First 
Amendment, the level of scrutiny applicable under the Second Amendment 
surely ‘depends on the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to 
which the challenged law burdens the right.’”487 Similarly, in the Tenth 
Circuit, “‘the Second Amendment can trigger more than one particular 
standard of scrutiny,’ depending, at least in part, upon the ‘type of law 
challenged and the type of [Second Amendment restriction] at issue.’”488 Other 
circuits agree that scrutiny should be stricter in some circumstances, and less 
strict in others. 
The Seventh Circuit’s Ezell explained that there is a sliding scale, 
depending on how close a restriction comes to the core of the right: 
[W]e can distill this First Amendment doctrine and extrapolate a few general 
principles to the Second Amendment context. First, a severe burden on the 
core Second Amendment right of armed self-defense will require an extremely 
strong public-interest justification and a close fit between the government’s 
means and its end. Second, laws restricting activity lying closer to the margins 
of the Second Amendment right, laws that merely regulate rather than restrict, 
and modest burdens on the right may be more easily justified. How much more 
easily depends on the relative severity of the burden and its proximity to the 
core of the right.489 
In the Seventh Circuit, the firearms ban for persons convicted of 
misdemeanor domestic violence required a “strong showing.”490 In Skoien, that 
showing was made; the court found the ban to be “vital to the safety of their 
relatives.”491 If a law affected “the gun rights of the entire law-abiding adult 
population of Illinois,” the government “would have to make a stronger 
showing,” according to Madigan.492 As Ezell wrote, “a severe burden on the 
 
1256 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Heller clearly does reject any kind of ‘rational basis’ or reasonableness 
test . . .”). 
 487. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257 (citing Chester, 628 F.3d at 682) “[W]e determine the 
appropriate standard of review by assessing how severely the prohibitions burden the Second 
Amendment right.” Id. at 1261. “[A] regulation that imposes a substantial burden upon the core 
right of self-defense protected by the Second Amendment must have a strong justification, 
whereas a regulation that imposes a less substantial burden should be proportionately easier to 
justify.” Id. at 1257. Strict scrutiny is sometimes considered to be an impossible standard for the 
government to meet, but precedent shows otherwise. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and 
Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
793, 795 (2006). 
 488. United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 489. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
 490. Skoien, 614 F.3d. at 641. 
 491. Id. at 643. 
 492. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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core Second Amendment right . . . will require an extremely strong public-
interest justification and a close fit between the government’s means and its 
end.”493 
Thus, Chicago’s ban on target ranges received “not quite ‘strict 
scrutiny.’”494 Chicago’s ban on almost all gun sales and transfers also received 
“‘not quite strict scrutiny.’”495 Strict scrutiny was appropriate for a lifetime 
gun ban for non-violent misdemeanants.496 
In the Fifth Circuit, “[A] law impinging upon the Second Amendment right 
must be reviewed under a properly tuned level of scrutiny—i.e., a level that is 
proportionate to the severity of the burden that the law imposes on the 
right.”497 “A regulation that threatens a right at the core of the Second 
Amendment—for example, the right of a law-abiding, responsible adult to . . . 
use a handgun to defend his or her home and family . . . triggers strict scrutiny. 
A less severe regulation—a regulation that does not encroach on the core of the 
Second Amendment—requires a less demanding means-ends showing.”498 
This standard required strict scrutiny for a federal statute barring persons 
from buying handguns outside their state of residence.499 Strict scrutiny was 
also applied to a ban on firearms in parking lots of businesses where alcohol is 
sold or served.500 
The Fourth Circuit standard is: “[A]ny law that would burden the 
‘fundamental,’ core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen 
would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm 
rights have always been more limited,” so intermediate scrutiny applies.501 Or 
according to another panel, a “severe burden on the core Second Amendment 
right of armed self-defense should require a strong justification,” but “less 
severe burdens on the right” and “laws that do not implicate the central self-
defense concern of the Second Amendment[ ] may be more easily justified.”502 
The analysis turns on “the nature of a person’s Second Amendment interest 
 
 493. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
 494. Id. 
 495. Illinois Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 939 (N.D. 
Ill. 2014). 
 496. Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 497. NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 198 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 498. Id. at 195. 
 499. Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2015). The decision has been 
appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 
 500. Taylor v. City of Baton Rouge, 39 F. Supp. 3d 807, 816 (M.D. La. 2014). 
 501. United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 502. United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation 
omitted). 
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[and] the extent to which those interests are burdened by government 
regulation.”503 
The Fourth Circuit’s Woollard decision again drew the line for the law-
abiding between home (strict scrutiny) and outside (intermediate scrutiny): 
“The Appellees would have us place the right to arm oneself in public on equal 
footing with the right to arm oneself at home, necessitating that we apply strict 
scrutiny in our review of the good-and-substantial-reason requirement. 
Unfortunately for the Appellees, their argument is foreclosed by our 
precedent.”504 
Under Fourth Circuit precedent, strict scrutiny applied to a statute banning 
the possession, sale, or carrying of guns during declared emergencies, such as 
snow storms.505 
In the Ninth Circuit, “[I]f a challenged law does not implicate a core 
Second Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second 
Amendment right, we may apply intermediate scrutiny.”506 So a regulatory ban 
on firearms while camping or hiking on Army Engineers property “poses a 
substantial burden on a core Second Amendment right and is therefore subject 
to strict scrutiny.”507 
In the rest of this Part, we examine how the intermediate scrutiny standard 
has been applied. 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny for Prohibited Persons: Drug Users, Domestic 
Violence Offenders, Illegal Aliens, and Common-Law Misdemeanants 
The Seventh Circuit required bans on domestic violence misdemeanants 
(Skoien),508 felons (Williams),509 and drug users (Yancey)510 to satisfy “some 
form of strong showing.”511 The First Circuit required the same “strong 
showing” in Booker for domestic violence misdemeanants.512 
In Reese, the Tenth Circuit, citing Marzzarella and Skoien, used 
intermediate scrutiny for the firearms ban for persons subject to domestic 
violence protective orders. The statute only “prohibit[s] the possession of 
 
 503. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470. 
 504. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 505. Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714–16 (E.D.N.C. 2012). 
 506. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 507. Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014). 
 508. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) 
(2012). 
 509. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2010); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 
 510. United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2010); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). 
 511. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641; Williams, 616 F.3d at 691; Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683. 
 512. United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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firearms by narrow classes of persons who, based on their past behavior, are 
more likely to engage in domestic violence.”513 
Reese was followed by the Fourth Circuit in Chapman. The court 
explained why Mr. Chapman only deserved intermediate scrutiny: 
(1) a judicial finding that he likely committed domestic abuse; (2) his engaging 
in behavior causing him to be judicially prohibited for 180 days from using, 
attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against his intimate 
partner that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; (3) his 
serious attempts at suicide using firearms in the very home in which he claims 
to have possessed such firearms for self-defense and his endangering the life of 
his ex-wife in the process; and (4) his discharge of a firearm out of the 
bedroom window in the direction of his ex-wife. Accordingly, we conclude 
that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for Chapman 
and similarly situated persons.514 
Thus, “Chapman’s claim is not within the core right identified in Heller—the 
right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for 
self-defense.”515 This point was reiterated in Mahin.516 
In United States v. Chester the Fourth Circuit rejected strict scrutiny for 
domestic violence misdemeanants. They are “not within the core right 
identified in Heller—the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess 
and carry a weapon for self-defense.”517 The Fourth Circuit did the same for 
the subjects of domestic violence protective orders in U.S. v. Staten.518 
Intermediate scrutiny also applied to drug users in Carter I and Carter II.519 
 
 513. United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010). The court noted domestic 
assaults involving firearms are substantially more deadly than those that do not and that there is a 
high recidivism rate for domestic abusers. Although the Reese court only required intermediate 
scrutiny, it explained that the law would have passed strict scrutiny. Id. at 804 n.4. 
 514. United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 515. Id. at 225–26 (emphasis in original). 
 516. United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he courts of appeals have 
generally applied intermediate scrutiny to uphold Congress’ effort under § 922(g) to ban firearm 
possession by certain classes of non-law-abiding, non-responsible persons who fall outside the 
Second Amendment’s core protections. . . We join the growing consensus in holding that Mahin’s 
conviction under § 922(g)(8) is constitutionally sound.”). 
 517. 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 518. 666 F.3d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 519. United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 416 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he government adequately 
demonstrated a reasonable fit between its important interest in protecting the community from 
gun violence and § 922(g)(3), which disarms unlawful drug users and addicts” because “the 
empirical evidence and common sense support the government’s contention that drug use, 
including marijuana use, frequently coincides with violence.”). 
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In Huitron-Guizar, the Tenth Circuit used intermediate scrutiny for a 
Second Amendment challenge by an illegal alien.520 The Seventh Circuit also 
applied intermediate scrutiny to a challenge by an illegal alien in Meza-
Rodriguez.521 
Like other circuits, the Ninth Circuit used intermediate scrutiny for 
domestic violence misdemeanants, in Chovan.522 Judge Bea dissented: 
[S]electing intermediate scrutiny as the correct level at which to review a 
categorical, status-based disqualification from the core right of the Second 
Amendment also does not make sense.523 
[I]n the Founding period, felonies historically resulted in disqualification from 
certain rights, but misdemeanors did not, nor did infractions, nor restraining 
orders. I therefore conclude that domestic violence misdemeanants are not 
disqualified from the core protection of the Second Amendment, and that § 
922(g)(9) accordingly should be analyzed, not under intermediate scrutiny, but 
under strict scrutiny.524 
Likewise, Justice Thomas in Voisine v. United States pointed out that there 
are no other examples of a lifetime ban on the exercise of a constitutional right 
because of a misdemeanor conviction.525 
In Schrader v. Holder,526 the D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to 
a challenge by a common-law assault and battery misdemeanant. Without 
deciding whether common-law misdemeanants fall within the scope of the 
Second Amendment, the court upheld the ban under intermediate scrutiny 
 
 520. United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that, 
assuming without deciding that illegal aliens have Second Amendment rights, the prohibition 
withstands intermediate scrutiny because “courts must defer to Congress as it lawfully exercises 
its constitutional power to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, or between lawful and 
unlawful aliens, and to ensure safety and order.”). 
 521. United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2015). “Congress’s 
interest in prohibiting persons who are difficult to track and who have an interest in eluding law 
enforcement is strong enough to support the conclusion that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) does not 
impermissibly restrict [an illegal alien’s] Second Amendment right to bear arms.” Id. at 673. 
 522. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In sum, § 922(g)(9) does 
not implicate the core Second Amendment right, but it does place a substantial burden on the 
right. Accordingly, we conclude that intermediate rather than strict scrutiny is the proper standard 
to apply.”). The Chovan court upheld § 922(g)(9) under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1140–41. 
 523. Id. at 1145. 
 524. Id. at 1149. State courts have also recognized the potential problem of a lifetime 
prohibition for a misdemeanor. See, e.g., Odle v. Dep’t of State Police, 43 N.E.3d 1223, 1233 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2015). 
 525. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2291–92 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 526. 704 F.3d 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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since “common-law misdemeanants as a class cannot be considered law-
abiding and responsible.”527 
C. Fifth Circuit: Intermediate Scrutiny for 18–20-Year-Olds 
In NRA v. BATFE,528 the Fifth Circuit only required intermediate scrutiny 
to uphold a statute prohibiting licensed firearms dealers from selling handguns 
to persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty. “Like the federal bans 
targeting felons and the mentally ill, the federal laws targeting minors under 21 
are an outgrowth of an American tradition of regulating certain groups’ access 
to arms for the sake of public safety.”529 So, “[t]o the extent that the ban on 
handgun sales to minors under 21 is analogous to longstanding, presumptively 
lawful bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill . . . the ban at bar 
should trigger an ‘intermediate’ level of scrutiny.”530 
The court also compared the ban to Heller’s presumptively lawful laws 
imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.531 The 
court further explained that “unlike the D.C. ban in Heller, this ban does not 
disarm an entire community, but instead prohibits commercial handgun sales to 
18–to–20–year–olds—a discrete category. The narrow ambit of the ban’s 
target militates against strict scrutiny.”532 The court was also persuaded by the 
alternative methods through which adults under twenty-one could still acquire 
handguns, and by the temporary effect of the ban.533 Accordingly: 
 
 527. Id. The federal prohibition for felons (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012)) does not actually 
say “felonies.” Rather it applies to any crime punishable by more than one year in prison. This 
was relevant in Dutton v. Commonwealth, where the Third Circuit found that Dutton was 
prohibited from gun possession because the (non-domestic) misdemeanor of which he had been 
convicted carried a maximum sentence of up to five years. Dutton v. Commonwealth, 503 F. 
App’x 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 528. 700 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 529. Id. at 205. 
 530. Id. at 206. “We further state that a longstanding measure that harmonizes with the 
history and tradition of arms regulation in this country would not threaten the core of the Second 
Amendment guarantee. Thus, even if such a measure advanced to step two of our framework, it 
would trigger our version of ‘intermediate’ scrutiny.” Id. at 196. 
 531. Id. (“Far from a total prohibition on handgun possession and use, these laws resemble 
‘laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,’ which Heller 
deemed ‘presumptively lawful.’”). 
 532. Id. at 205. 
 533. BATFE, 700 F.3d at 206 (“[T]hese laws do not strike the core of the Second Amendment 
because they do not prevent 18–to–20–year–olds from possessing and using handguns ‘in defense 
of hearth and home.’”). Of course it is not always easy or even possible to find a private seller. 
Nor does every young adult have a parent willing to gift a handgun. Although young adults may 
purchase long guns from gun stores, in many situations a long gun is an insufficient alternative to 
a handgun. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (explaining why many 
Americans find handguns preferable for self-defense). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
282 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 61:193 
[T]hese laws demand only an “intermediate” level of scrutiny because they 
regulate commercial sales through an age qualification with temporary effect. 
Any 18–to–20–year–old subject to the ban will soon grow up and out of its 
reach. It is useful to compare this case with United States v. Yancey, in which 
the Seventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the illegal-drug-user 
firearm possession ban, was “far less onerous” than the firearm-possession 
bans on felons and the mentally ill because “unlike those who have been 
convicted of a felony or committed to a mental institution and so face a 
lifetime ban, an unlawful drug user like [the defendant] could regain his right 
to possess a firearm simply by ending his drug abuse.” Similar logic applies 
here. The temporary nature of the burden reduces its severity. Consequently, 
we hold that these laws deserve what we have dubbed an “intermediate” level 
of scrutiny.534 
The reasoning is flawed. First, that a severe burden will be lifted in a few 
years does not change the present severity of the burden. That a person will be 
able to protect herself with a handgun three years from now is cold comfort 
when she cannot protect herself with a handgun from an imminent threat today. 
Similarly, the fact that a now-pregnant woman would be eligible to get an 
abortion in three years would not bolster the constitutionality of a law 
preventing her from getting an abortion today. Second, the court’s comparison 
to unlawful drug users is misguided. As the court explained, the unlawful drug 
user can end the prohibition by simply ending his drug use—it is completely 
within the prohibited person’s control.535 In contrast, an age limitation is 
completely beyond the prohibited person’s control. 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit adopted the same approach in NRA v. 
McCraw,536 a challenge to the Texas statutes for issuing handgun carry permits 
only to persons twenty-one or older:537 
The BATF court’s rationales for why an age-based restriction on gun 
possession and use does not burden the core of the Second Amendment right 
apply equally to the state’s age-based restriction here. Moreover, we cannot 
 
 534. BATFE, 700 F.3d at 207 (citation omitted). “Congress, in turn, reasonably tailored a 
solution to the particular problem: Congress restricted the ability of persons under 21 to purchase 
handguns from FFLs, while allowing (i) 18–to–20–year–old persons to purchase long-guns, (ii) 
persons under 21 to acquire handguns from parents or guardians, and (iii) persons under 21 to 
possess handguns and long-guns.” Id. at 209. 
 535. United States v. Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 419 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t is significant 
that § 922(g)(3) enables a drug user who places a high value on the right to bear arms to regain 
that right by parting ways with illicit drug use.”); see also United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 
687 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he gun ban extends only so long as Yancey abuses drugs. In that way, 
Yancey himself controls his right to possess a gun.”). 
 536. NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 537. Young adults may obtain carry permits if they are serving in the Armed Forces 
(including the National Guard or the Reserve) or have been honorably discharged therefrom. See 
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 411.172(g) (2015); H.B. 322, 79th Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005). 
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say that, even if 18-20-year-olds’ gun rights are at the core of the Second 
Amendment, the Texas scheme burdens those rights to any greater degree than 
the federal law challenged in BATF. As in BATF, the restriction here has only a 
temporary effect. And, because it restricts only the ability to carry handguns in 
public, it does not prevent those under 21 from using guns in defense of hearth 
and home. Finally, it is not a complete ban on handgun use; it bans such use 
only outside a home or vehicle. Therefore, we must follow our decision in 
BATF and apply intermediate scrutiny to the Texas laws.538 
The McCraw court then upheld the law. It determined that “[t]he Texas 
laws advance the same important government objective as the one upheld in 
BATF . . . namely, advancing public safety by curbing violent crime.”539 The 
court elaborated: 
First, the Texas laws have a similarly “narrow ambit” as the federal law in 
BATF. Both the state scheme and the federal laws target the “discrete 
category” of 18–20-year-olds. Second, the state scheme is in some ways more 
related to Texas’s public safety objective tha[n] the law in BATF, because the 
state laws only regulate those persons who carry guns in public. Third, the 
Texas scheme restricts only the carrying of one type of gun—handguns. It is 
true, as plaintiffs claim, that Texas could have taken other, less restrictive 
approaches, such as allowing 18–20-year-olds to get a license if they 
demonstrate a particularly high level of proficiency and responsibility with 
guns. But the state scheme must merely be reasonably adapted to its public 
safety objective to pass constitutional muster under an intermediate scrutiny 
standard. Texas need not employ the least restrictive means to achieve its goal. 
Given the substantial tailoring of the Texas scheme, plaintiffs overbreadth 
argument is unpersuasive.540 
McCraw was correct that the least restrictive alternative requirement is used 
for strict scrutiny, not intermediate scrutiny. However, McCraw erred by not 
considering the milder version of this test, which does apply in intermediate 
scrutiny: whether there is a substantially less burdensome alternative. The issue 
will be discussed further in Part IX.F., infra. 
D. Third Circuit: Obliterated Serial Numbers 
In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit held that a law banning possession of a 
firearm with an obliterated serial number541 merited intermediate scrutiny, 
 
 538. McCraw, 719 F.3d at 348. The history of the right to arms in Texas is detailed in 
Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas, 41 BAYLOR L. REV. 629 (1989). 
 539. McCraw, 719 F.3d at 348. 
 540. Id. at 349 (citations omitted). The court also found it persuasive that 18–20-year-olds 
were not prevented from defending themselves in their residences. Id. 
 541. 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2012). 
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although the question was “not free from doubt.”542 The serial number law 
“was neither designed to nor has the effect of prohibiting the possession of any 
class of firearms,” so it was “a regulation of the manner in which persons may 
lawfully exercise their Second Amendment rights.”543 By analogy to the First 
Amendment, an arms ban is like content discrimination on free speech, which 
is subject to the most exacting scrutiny. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). Regulations of the manner in which that speech 
takes place, however, receive intermediate scrutiny, under the time, place, and 
manner doctrine. See Ward [v. Rock Against Racism], 491 U.S. [781,] 791 
[1989]. Accordingly, we think § 922(k) also should merit intermediate, rather 
than strict, scrutiny.544 
The serial number law “constitutes a substantial or important interest” by 
“preserving the ability of law enforcement to conduct serial number tracing;” 
and the law fits closely with that interest by almost always burdening only 
“those intending to engage in illicit behavior.”545 The court further noted that 
the law would pass even strict scrutiny, because the interest was compelling 
and the law was the least-restrictive method of serving that interest, and did not 
burden more firearms possession than necessary.546 
E. D.C. Circuit: Intermediate Scrutiny for Registration, Semi-Autos, and 
Magazines 
In Heller II,547 the D.C. Circuit upheld a handgun registration requirement 
and prohibitions on many semi-automatic rifles and on so-called “large-
capacity magazines”548 under intermediate scrutiny. The court compared the 
minimal requirements of the handgun registration law to the serial number 
requirement in Marzzarella. Neither the registration nor serial number 
requirement prevented anyone from possessing any firearm for any purpose.549 
 
 542. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010). “[I]t is not the case that 
[strict scrutiny] must be applied to all Second Amendment challenges. Strict Scrutiny does not 
apply automatically any time an enumerated right is involved.” Id. at 96. 
 543. Id. at 97. 
 544. Id. 
 545. Id. at 98–99. 
 546. Id. at 100. 
 547. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 548. Id. at 1247–48. The term “large-capacity magazines” is an epithet invented by gun 
prohibition organizations. Supposedly, any magazine with a capacity of greater than seven rounds 
(or ten, or fifteen, depending on local politics) is “large.” In D.C., any magazine over ten rounds 
was said to be “high” capacity. In fact, magazines over ten rounds are the standard magazines 
supplied by manufacturers for many popular handguns and rifles, and have been so for a century 
and a half. See David B. Kopel, The History of Firearms Magazines, 78 ALBANY L. REV. 849, 
853–62 (2015). 
 549. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257–58; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97. 
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Surprisingly, the court also compared the semi-automatic rifle and 
magazine prohibitions to Marzzarella’s serial number requirement to justify 
applying intermediate scrutiny to those laws.550 This was inappropriate. The 
D.C. court explained that, like the serial number requirement, “the prohibition 
of semi-automatic rifles and large-capacity magazines does not effectively 
disarm individuals or substantially affect their ability to defend themselves.”551 
Why not? Because in the words of Marzzarella, as quoted by the D.C. Circuit, 
the law “left a person ‘free to possess any otherwise lawful firearm.’”552 
This was disingenuous. When Marzzarella explained that the serial 
number requirement leaves a person “free to possess any otherwise lawful 
firearm” it simply meant that any lawful firearm remained lawful under the law 
so long as it was labeled with a serial number. The Heller II court quoted the 
language for an entirely different point: as long as some other firearms remain 
lawful, even an entire class of firearms can be banned. 
Not only is such reasoning unsupported by Marzzarella, but it was 
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Heller.553 Because the D.C. 
prohibitions on arms in common use and typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens extended to the home, the laws should have been held categorically 
unconstitutional under Heller.554 At the very least, since the prohibitions 
applied in the home and therefore struck at the core of the Second Amendment, 
strict scrutiny should have applied rather than intermediate. 
The Heller II court further erred by settling on intermediate scrutiny 
because “[u]nlike the law held unconstitutional in Heller, the laws at issue here 
do not prohibit the possession of ‘the quintessential self-defense weapon,’ to 
wit, the handgun.”555 So-called “large-capacity” magazines and semiautomatic 
rifles had not been shown to be “preferred” or “well-suited” for sport or self-
defense.556 There were alternative arms available.557 But none of that matters. 
The court misinterpreted Heller. 
 
 550. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1257. 
 551. Id. at 1262. 
 552. Id. (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97). 
 553. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008) (“It is no answer to say, as 
petitioners do, that it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of 
other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”). 
 554. See supra note 5. 
 555. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261–62. 
 556. Id. at 1262 (“[T]he plaintiffs present hardly any evidence that semi-automatic rifles and 
magazines holding more than ten rounds are well-suited to or preferred for the purpose of self-
defense or sport.”). 
 557. Id. (“Nor does the ban on certain semi-automatic rifles prevent a person from keeping a 
suitable and commonly used weapon for protection in the home or for hunting, whether a 
handgun or a non-automatic long gun.”). 
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First, a law does not have to prohibit the possession of handguns, nor be 
equally burdensome as a handgun ban, in order to trigger strict scrutiny. 
“[H]andguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-
defense in the home,” said the Supreme Court.558 According to the logic of the 
D.C. Circuit, since handguns are the most preferred self-defense arms, for 
anything other than a handgun ban, strict scrutiny would never exist. However, 
nothing in Heller or McDonald can be read to set the handgun ban as the 
minimal requirement that must be reached in order to trigger strict scrutiny. 
Rejecting Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny-like balancing test, the 
Heller Court wrote: “Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have 
applied to enumerated constitutional rights [the handgun ban] would fail 
constitutional muster.”559 Thus, the handgun ban was so outrageous that it did 
not even deserve a strict scrutiny analysis. The Court held the handgun ban, the 
functional firearm ban, and the carry ban to be unconstitutional, and did not 
even bother walking through the steps of strict scrutiny. 
In a dissent from the denial of certiorari in a different case, Justice Thomas 
similarly criticized Heller II: 
In [Heller II], the Court of Appeals recognized that the law “burdens the core 
of the Second Amendment right,” yet concluded that, because the law’s burden 
was not as “severe” as the one at issue in Heller, it was “not a substantial 
burden on the Second Amendment right itself.” But nothing in our decision in 
Heller suggested that a law must rise to the level of the absolute prohibition at 
issue in that case to constitute a “substantial burden” on the core of the Second 
Amendment right.560 
Second, the D.C. Circuit’s emphasis on the availability of other arms 
contradicted the Supreme Court: “It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that 
it is permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of 
other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”561 
Heller II had remanded several issues involving D.C.’s gun registration 
law; these involved “novel” registration requirements, rather than the 
 
 558. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 559. Id. at 628–29. 
 560. Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2801 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (citation omitted). This dissent was joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2799. 
 561. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. The decision which the Supreme Court affirmed said the same 
thing: 
The District contends that since it only bans one type of firearm, “residents still have 
access to hundreds more,” and thus its prohibition does not implicate the Second 
Amendment because it does not threaten total disarmament. We think that argument 
frivolous. It could be similarly contended that all firearms may be banned so long as 
sabers were permitted. 
Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570. 
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traditional, de minimis handgun registration which had been upheld by Heller 
II.562 The case later returned to the D.C. Circuit as Heller III.563 There, the 
D.C. Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to each of the novel registration 
requirements.564 The Circuit upheld in-person fingerprinting and 
photographing for applicants;565 registration fees of $13.00 per firearm and 
$35.00 for fingerprinting;566 and a requirement for each registrant to complete 
a one-hour, safety-training course.567 
Heller III found that several other provisions failed intermediate scrutiny: 
requiring registered guns to be brought to the police headquarters;568 re-
registration every three years;569 a test about knowledge of local gun laws;570 
and a prohibition on registering more than one pistol in a thirty-day period.571 
 
 562. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1254–55, 1260. 
 563. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 564. Id. at 297. 
 565. Id. at 275. 
The District has presented substantial evidence from which it could conclude that 
fingerprinting and photographing each person registering a gun promotes public safety by 
facilitating identification of a gun’s owner, both at the time of registration and upon any 
subsequent police check of the gun’s registration. The requirement that registrants appear 
in person is necessary in order for a photograph and fingerprints to be taken. 
Id. 
 566. Id. at 278 (“As we already said in Heller II, ‘administrative . . . provisions incidental to 
the underlying regime’—which include reasonable fees associated with registration—are lawful 
insofar as the underlying regime is lawful.”). 
 567. Id. at 278–79 (“The District has presented substantial evidence from which it could 
conclude that training in the safe use of firearms promotes public safety by reducing accidents 
involving firearms . . . .”). 
 568. Heller III, 801 F.3d at 277. 
The District, however, has offered no evidence—let alone substantial evidence—from 
which it can be inferred that verification will promote public safety. . . . The district court 
nonetheless deemed it a “common-sense inference” that “if in-person appearance is 
necessary to verify the identity of the registrant, then physically bringing the gun is 
similarly necessary to verify the character of the registered weapon.” Yet common sense 
suggests a person would not go to the trouble of obtaining a registration certificate for a 
weapon other than a weapon in his possession. On the contrary, common sense suggests 
that bringing firearms to the [Metropolitan Police Department] would more likely be a 
threat to public safety; as Heller maintains, there is a “risk that the gun may be stolen en 
route or that the [would-be registrant] may be arrested or even shot by a police officer 
seeing a ‘man with a gun’ (or a gun case).” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 569. Id. at 277 (“The District has offered three justifications for the requirement that a gun 
owner re-register his firearm every three years. None is supported by substantial evidence from 
which the District could reasonably have concluded that requiring re-registration would advance 
an important governmental interest.”). 
 570. Id. at 279. 
None of the District’s experts . . . offers any reason to believe that knowledge of the 
District’s gun laws will promote public safety. Indeed, the closest the District’s experts 
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F. Second Circuit: Only “Substantial” Burdens Get Heightened Scrutiny 
The Second Circuit only requires heightened scrutiny if the challenged law 
“substantially burdens” the Second Amendment right. Laws which are 
burdensome, but not “substantially” so, receive only rational basis review. This 
approach is contrary to other circuits, which have held that strict scrutiny is 
appropriate for some burdens, and intermediate scrutiny for other burdens. The 
Second Circuit is violating McDonald’s instruction that the Second 
Amendment is not a “second-class” right,572 to be “singled out for special—
and specially unfavorable—treatment.”573 
The Second Circuit first announced its specially unfavorable rule in U.S. v. 
Decastro: 
Given Heller’s emphasis on the weight of the burden imposed by the D.C. gun 
laws, we do not read the case to mandate that any marginal, incremental or 
even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and bear arms be subject to 
heightened scrutiny. Rather, heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those 
restrictions that (like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in 
Heller) operate as a substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to 
possess and use a firearm for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes).574 
The Second Circuit confirmed this approach in Kachalsky v. City of 
Westchester.575 The Kachalsky court found that a statute requiring an applicant 
to show “proper cause” in order to obtain a handgun carry license “places 
substantial limits on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for 
self-defense in public.”576 Thus, “some form of heightened scrutiny would be 
appropriate.”577 As discussed supra, some New York officials refuse to issue 
permits to law-abiding, trained adult applicants, simply because issuing 
 
came to addressing the subject was the statement by Chief Lanier that “in order to make 
registrants more clearly accountable under the law, it is important to be able to 
demonstrate that they were taught and aware of the requirements.” This assertion, 
however, does not tie knowledge of the law to the District’s interest in public safety. 
Id. 
 571. Id. at 279–80 (“The District has not presented substantial evidence to support the 
conclusion that its prohibition on the registration of ‘more than one pistol per registrant during 
any 30-day period,’ D.C. CODE § 7-2502.03(e), ‘promotes a substantial governmental interest that 
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.’ It is therefore unconstitutional.”) 
(citation omitted). 
 572. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010). 
 573. Id. at 778–79. 
 574. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 575. 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 576. Id. 
 577. Id. The Second Circuit stated, “The proper cause requirement falls outside the core 
Second Amendment protections identified in Heller,” since it applies outside the home. Id. at 94. 
Importantly though, in Kachalsky, “unlike Decastro, there are no alternative options for obtaining 
a license to carry a handgun.” Id. at 93. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINES 289 
officials oppose ordinary citizens carrying arms for protection.578 The Second 
Circuit upheld those near-prohibitory policies, by applying an unusually weak 
form of intermediate scrutiny.579 
Later, in Kwong v. Bloomberg, the Second Circuit upheld a handgun-
licensing fee without determining whether it imposed a “substantial” 
burden.”580 “[W]e find it difficult to say that the licensing fee, which amounts 
to just over $100 per year, is anything more than a ‘marginal, incremental or 
even appreciable restraint’ on one’s Second Amendment rights. . . .”581 
Regardless, the court determined the fee requirement passed “intermediate 
scrutiny.”582 
The Second Circuit reinforced its specially unfavorable rule in New York 
State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo (“NYSRPA”): 
Though Heller did not specify the precise level of scrutiny applicable to 
firearms regulations, it rejected mere rational basis review as insufficient for 
the type of regulation challenged there. At the same time, this Court and our 
sister Circuits have suggested that heightened scrutiny is not always 
appropriate. In determining whether heightened scrutiny applies, we consider 
two factors: (1) “how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right” and (2) “the severity of the law’s burden on the right.” 
Laws that neither implicate the core protections of the Second Amendment nor 
substantially burden their exercise do not receive heightened scrutiny.583 
The court made two critical errors in its analysis. First, Heller did not just 
“reject[] mere rational basis review as insufficient for the type of regulation 
challenged there.”584 Heller very explicitly rejected mere rational basis review 
for all regulations that burden the Second Amendment, to any degree: 
Obviously, [rational-basis scrutiny] could not be used to evaluate the extent to 
which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom 
of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the 
right to keep and bear arms. If all that was required to overcome the right to 
keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be 
redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and 
would have no effect.585 
 
 578. See supra note 426. 
 579. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96. 
 580. Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d 160, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 581. Id. at 167. 
 582. Id. at 168 (finding the government has a compelling interest in a gun licensing system, so 
fees to support the cost of administration pass intermediate scrutiny). 
 583. 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 
(7th Cir. 2011)). For analysis of the statute at issue, see Stephen P. Halbrook, N.Y.’s Not So 
“SAFE” Act, 78 ALB. L. REV. 789, 791 (2015) (lead attorney for plaintiffs). 
 584. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 258. 
 585. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008) (citation omitted). 
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As noted supra, the other Circuits have followed Heller by stating that rational 
basis is off the table for any government action which burdens Second 
Amendment rights.586 
Second, the Second Circuit erroneously cited Ezell for support. The quoted 
language from Ezell was the test the Seventh Circuit used to decide which level 
of heightened scrutiny should apply.587 The Seventh Circuit had already 
rejected rational basis review, recognizing that Heller prohibits it.588 “For our 
purposes, however, we know that Heller’s reference to ‘any standard of 
scrutiny’ means any heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court specifically 
excluded rational-basis review.”589 Ezell reiterated: “Both Heller and 
McDonald suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second 
Amendment right . . . are categorically unconstitutional. . . . For all other cases, 
however, we are left to choose an appropriate standard of review from among 
the heightened standards of scrutiny the Court applies to governmental actions 
alleged to infringe [on] enumerated constitutional rights.”590 
Therefore, the Second Circuit’s application of rational basis review not 
only contradicts Heller, but also the Seventh Circuit authority that the Second 
Circuit cited as support.591 
Building on the aggressive misreading of Heller and the appropriate 
standards of scrutiny, the Second Circuit made another egregious error in 
NYSRPA.592 The court began by acknowledging that the core of the Second 
Amendment was at issue: that “Semiautomatic assault weapons and large-
capacity magazines are commonly owned by many law-abiding Americans, 
and their complete prohibition, including within the home, requires us to 
consider the scope of Second Amendment guarantees ‘at their zenith.’”593 And 
“the statutes at issue implicate the core of the Second Amendment’s 
protections by extending into the home, ‘where the need for defense of self, 
family and property is most acute.’”594 
 
 586. See supra Section VIII.A. and note 486. 
 587. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706. 
 588. Id. 
 589. Id. at 701. 
 590. Id. at 703 (citations omitted). 
 591. United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166 (2d Cir. 2012). The D.C. Circuit in Heller 
II said that “de minimis” burdens would receive only rational basis review. Heller v. District of 
Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This does not go nearly as far as the 
Second Circuit has. There are many burdens which could be more than “de mininis” but less than 
“substantial.” Id. at 1255, 1257. And unlike the Second Circuit, the D.C. Circuit did not take strict 
scrutiny off the table. Id. at 1256. 
 592. NYSRPA v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 253 (2d Cir. 2015) 
 593. Id. at 258. 
 594. Id. 
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Yet the court then applied only intermediate scrutiny, because “the 
regulated weapons are not nearly as popularly owned and used for self-defense 
as the handgun, that ‘quintessential self-defense weapon.’ Thus these statutes 
implicate Second Amendment rights, but not to the same extent as the laws at 
issue in Heller and McDonald.”595 As discussed supra,596 it is absurd to read 
Heller or McDonald to say that only laws as restrictive as a complete handgun 
ban (“the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home”)597 warrant strict scrutiny. Nothing in Heller or McDonald supports 
such a limited application. Indeed, the handgun ban was so egregious the 
Supreme Court did not even bother with a heightened scrutiny analysis.598 
NYSRPA upheld the “semiautomatic assault weapon” and “large-capacity 
magazine” bans because “numerous ‘alternatives remain for law-abiding 
citizens to acquire a firearm for self-defense.’”599 This squarely contradicts 
Heller’s determination that “[i]t is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it is 
permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of 
other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed.”600 
Thus, the Second Circuit skirted Heller’s precedent by using handgun bans 
as a baseline for strict scrutiny; by explaining that the weapons at issue were 
not as popular as handguns (although the court acknowledged that Americans 
own somewhere around seventy-five million of the prohibited magazines and 
seven million of the prohibited semiautomatic firearms),601 and by implying 
that some Second Amendment arms are less worthy of protection than 
others.602 The court accurately pointed out that “Heller explicitly endorsed 
prohibitions against any ‘weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding 
citizens for lawful purposes,’ including, for example, short-barreled 
 
 595. Id. 
 596. See supra Section VIII.E. 
 597. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
 598. Id. at 628–29 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the most preferred firearm in the nation 
to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 599. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 260–61. 
 600. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629. 
 601. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255. 
 602. Id. at 260 n.98: 
Plaintiffs’ related argument—that the availability of unbanned firearms “is irrelevant 
under Heller”—rests on a misapprehension of the Supreme Court’s logic. To be sure, 
Heller did indicate that “[i]t is no answer to say . . . that it is permissible to ban the 
possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is 
allowed.” But Heller went on to explain that handguns are protected as “the most popular 
weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home.” Of course, the same cannot 
be said of the weapons at issue here. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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shotguns.”603 But this tells us nothing about arms—such as the rifles, shotguns, 
and magazines at issue in NYSRPA—which are agreed to be very commonly 
owned and popular.604 
In determining whether the arms prohibition was substantially related to 
the government interest of controlling crime, the Second Circuit emphasized 
that the banned guns are effective: 
When used, [the banned guns] tend to result in more numerous wounds, more 
serious wounds, and more victims. These weapons are disproportionately used 
in crime, and particularly in criminal mass shootings like the attack in 
Newtown. They are also disproportionately used to kill law enforcement 
officers . . . . 
. . . Indeed, plaintiffs explicitly contend that these features improve a firearm’s 
“accuracy,” “comfort,” and “utility.” This circumlocution is, as Chief Judge 
Skretny observed, a milder way of saying that these features make the weapons 
more deadly.605 
Similarly, the court justified the magazine ban because “large-capacity 
magazines result in ‘more shots fired, persons wounded, and wounds per 
victim than do other gun attacks.’”606 
Assuming this is true, a firearm’s superiority for self-defense is no reason 
to accord it less protection under the Second Amendment. To the contrary, 
Heller recognized that: 
There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home defense: 
It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it 
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use 
for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be 
pointed at a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.607 
So handguns are better suited for self-defense—that is, better for shooting 
people. The Supreme Court was also unimpressed by the fact that handguns are 
used very disproportionately in violent crimes compared to long guns.608 
Rather, Heller stated that “[w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most 
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a 
complete prohibition of their use is invalid.”609 Misuse by criminals is no 
reason to deprive law-abiding citizens of common arms. “[T]he Supreme Court 
 
 603. Id. 
 604. Id. at 255. 
 605. Id. at 262. 
 606. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 263–64 (quoting Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 
F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 
 607. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
 608. Id. at 695, 702. 
 609. Id. at 629. 
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made clear in Heller that it wasn’t going to make the right to bear arms depend 
on casualty counts,” observed the Seventh Circuit’s Judge Posner.610 
The standard magazines and semiautomatic firearms at issue in NYSRPA 
were Second Amendment arms and therefore the broad prohibition of them 
should have been held categorically unconstitutional under Heller. State courts 
have readily applied Heller’s teaching that prohibitions on Second Amendment 
arms are flatly unconstitutional, without need to resort to ends/means 
testing.611 
Even if the interest-balancing approach expressly rejected by Heller in 
prohibition cases were proper,612 the New York prohibitions applied to law-
abiding citizens in their homes; therefore, strict scrutiny should have applied. 
Even under intermediate scrutiny, the court’s reasoning was flawed and 
invalid under Heller. Prohibiting citizens from having arms which are better-
suited for self-defense is not a legitimate government interest, let alone a 
“substantial” or “important” one. Guns which are more accurate, more 
comfortable, and easier to use are not the ones that can be singled out for 
prohibition. Prohibiting a gun because of superior accuracy is irrational, given 
 
 610. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that Heller would 
have been decided the other way had the possibility of higher crime or death rates been sufficient 
to justify a ban); see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 413 (7th Cir. 2015): 
To be sure, assault rifles and large capacity magazines are dangerous. But their ability to 
project large amounts of force accurately is exactly why they are an attractive means of 
self-defense. While most persons do not require extraordinary means to defend their 
homes, the fact remains that some do. Ultimately, it is up to the lawful gun owner and not 
the government to decide these matters. To limit self-defense to only those methods 
acceptable to the government is to effect an enormous transfer of authority from the 
citizens of this country to the government—a result directly contrary to our constitution 
and to our political tradition. The rights contained in the Second Amendment are 
“fundamental” and “necessary to our system of ordered liberty.” The government 
recognizes these rights; it does not confer them. 
Id. (Manion, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 611. See, e.g., People v. Yanna, 824 N.W.2d 241, 246 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding a 
total prohibition of Tasers or stun guns is unconstitutional); see also State v. Herrmann, 873 
N.W.2d 257, 258, 262, 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding a total prohibition of switchblade 
knives is unconstitutional). 
 612. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634; 
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been 
subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the 
right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the 
power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A 
constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no 
constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they 
were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures 
or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. 
Id. at 634–35. 
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that the Second Amendment right includes self-defense and hunting, two 
activities for which accuracy is very important. 
Further, the Second Circuit considered only the government’s evidence, 
rather than both sides’.613 The NYSRPA court held that if the government 
produced sufficient evidence to support its rationale, then the government 
wins.614 The court cited but did not follow the Supreme Court’s City of Los 
Angeles v. Alameda Books; that case set up a three-stage process for 
consideration of evidence from both sides.615 According to Alameda Books, 
although the government’s evidence might, in isolation, be considered 
persuasive, the government does not win “[i]f plaintiffs succeed in casting 
doubt on a municipality’s rationale” by “demonstrating that the municipality’s 
evidence does not support its rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes 
the municipality’s factual findings.”616 Then, “the burden shifts back to the 
municipality to supplement the record with evidence renewing support for a 
theory that justifies its ordinance.”617 
Under Alameda Books, the Second Circuit should have considered the 
plaintiffs’ evidence, which supported plaintiffs’ claims that the prohibitions did 
not advance public safety, and did endanger law-abiding citizens. 
 
 613. See NYSRPA, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 614. Id. 
 615. 535 U.S. 425, 433–34 (2002). NYSRPA contradicts Alameda Books in an additional 
manner. The above-quoted language is from the plurality opinion. Justice Kennedy’s concurring 
opinion is on narrower grounds, and thus is controlling for precedential purposes. Lower courts 
have so recognized, in applying Alameda Books. Joelner v. Vill. of Washington Park, 378 F.3d 
613, 624 n.7 (7th Cir. 2004); Ctr. for Fair Pub. Pol’y v. Maricopa Cty., 336 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th 
Cir. 2003). The Alameda Books case involved controls on adult bookstores. The government had 
a legitimate interest in reducing the non-speech secondary effects of the stores, such as attracting 
prostitution. The government had no legitimate interest in suppressing the content of the speech 
in the books that were being sold. Justice Kennedy explained if the government reduces speech 
by X amount, and thereby reduces the secondary effects by the same amount, the law is not 
narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny. It is impermissible to “reduce secondary effects by 
reducing speech in the same proportion.” Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 449 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). “It is no trick to reduce secondary effects by reducing speech or its audience; but a 
city may not attack secondary effects indirectly by attacking speech.” Id. at 450. “The rationale of 
the ordinance must be that it will suppress secondary effects—and not by suppressing speech.” Id. 
at 449–50. The New York statute in NYSRPA was purportedly aimed at secondary effects 
(criminal misuse of guns). But the statute in fact aimed at suppressing the exercise of a 
constitutional right (gun possession in the home by law-abiding citizens). A licensing or 
background statute might pass the Alameda Books test: without reducing the exercise of the right 
(law-abiding possession), the statute might reduce the secondary effect (criminal misuse). The 
New York SAFE Act is like a law that attempts to reduce prostitution by outlawing non-obscene 
adult bookstores. 
 616. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 426. 
 617. Id. at 439. 
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By the NYSRPA standard, the government will always win when it litigates 
competently. Gun rights cases often involve contested statistics, social science, 
and so on. Defending gun control laws, government lawyers marshal experts, 
studies, affidavits, and other evidence. The other side will do the same. As long 
as the government lawyers are thorough during litigation, they will almost 
always win. NYSRPA turns Second Amendment litigation into a game with 
only one possible winner in almost every situation. That is not a standard that 
applies to the rest of the Bill of Rights. 
According to the NYSRPA court, the D.C. handgun ban in Heller failed 
intermediate scrutiny.618 Yet under NYSRPA’s specially unfavorable version of 
Second Amendment intermediate scrutiny, the ban would have been upheld. 
Under NYSRPA, there are only two questions in evaluating an arms ban: 
• (1) Is there an important government interest? — Obviously yes, 
preventing violent criminals from shooting people.619 
• (2) Is there evidence to “fairly support” the inference that a handgun ban 
could advance the government interest? — Yes.620 
As detailed in Justice Stephen Breyer’s Heller dissent, there is extensive social 
science evidence about the harms of handgun misuse, disproportionate to other 
firearms. Further, there is (disputed) social science evidence that handgun bans 
are effective at reducing handgun crime.621 Under NYSRPA, that is all that is 
needed for the government to win under intermediate scrutiny. Plaintiffs’ 
evidence to the contrary would not even be considered. 
Although the Second Circuit purported to be deferring to the “fact-finding” 
and “predictive judgments” of “the legislature,” the court was in fact deferring 
to the New York attorney general.622 The New York ban was jammed through 
the legislature under an “emergency” procedure that prevented legislative 
hearings and fact-finding.623 The Second Circuit deferred not to the legislature 
but to the post-hoc litigation record created by the attorney general.624 
 
 618. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 269. 
 619. Id. at 261. 
 620. Id. 
 621. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 693–704 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(summarizing pro/con social science data and studies). 
 622. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 261–62. 
 623. On January 14, 2013, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo issued a “Message of 
Necessity” and unveiled his bill to ban many firearms and magazines, and to impose many other 
gun controls. The massive bill passed the Senate that evening and the Assembly the next day. 
There were no legislative hearings. No citizen had the opportunity to speak. Legislators did not 
have time to read the bill before they voted. Cuomo had made a secret “pact” with Republican 
Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos. Skelos ensured the passage of some key items on the 
Cuomo agenda. He offered no opposition to Cuomo’s reelection in 2014; in return, Cuomo 
invested no effort in trying to wrest control of the Senate from the Republicans. Fredric U. 
Dicker, Cuomo Had a Secret Re-election ‘Pact’ with Republicans, N.Y. POST, Nov. 10, 2014. 
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Evading the intermediate scrutiny requirement of considering substantially 
less burdensome alternatives (e.g., a strict licensing system, rather than 
prohibition), Judge Carbranes cited one of his prior opinions in which less 
burdensome alternatives had not been relevant, and accordingly were not 
discussed.625 
NYSRPA’s manipulation of intermediate scrutiny in order to uphold a ban 
on arms poses dangers beyond the Second Amendment. Intermediate scrutiny 
formulations adopted in one context are often later used in another. For 
example, Turner Broadcasting (First Amendment intermediate scrutiny for 
cable television regulations) relied on Rostker v. Goldberg (Equal Protection 
intermediate scrutiny for sex discrimination).626 First Amendment intermediate 
scrutiny includes a “time, place, and manner” test, and also has a separate four-
part test for commercial speech.627 Yet applications of the commercial speech 
test can incorporate time/place/manner precedent,628 or the two tests can be 
jumbled into one. 
Likewise, articulations of the Second Amendment standards of review and 
doctrine have been applied to other situations.629 Such cross-pollination is a 
 
Skelos is no longer in the Senate, and has been sentenced to five years in prison for federal 
corruption convictions. Benjamin Weister & Vivian Yee, Dean Skelos Is Sentenced to 5 Year in 
Prison in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2016. Governor Cuomo has been under 
investigation by the U.S. Attorney for corruption, but has not thus far been criminally charged. 
Jennifer Fermino, Kerry Burke & Denis Slattery, Preet Bharara Says de Blasio, Cuomo Should 
‘Stay Tuned’ as Executive Offices are ‘Far From Immune’ to his Corruption Cleanup, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 13, 2016. 
 624. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256–57. 
 625. In Ernest J. v. Stone, the government sought to commit Ernest J. because he had violated 
his conditions of release, after having pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease. 452 F.3d 
186, 191–93 (2d Cir. 2006). To revoke Ernest J.’s conditional release, the standard of proof was 
“preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 187. In contrast, involuntary commitments for persons 
who have never pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease must meet a higher standard: 
“clear and convincing evidence.” Id. Was this an Equal Protection violation? Applying 
intermediate scrutiny, Judge Cabranes held the law constitutional. Id. at 200, 202. The Ernest J. 
court faced a binary choice: Is it unconstitutionally discriminatory to have looser commitment 
standards for people who have pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease, than for people 
who have not? The issue of less restrictive alternatives was not relevant. 
 626. Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C. (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997); Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 82–83 (1981) (male-only military conscription is constitutional). 
 627. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 419, 424 (1993). 
 628. Id. at 421, 430–31, 436 (1993) (analyzing a commercial speech case on lottery 
advertising) (applying Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784, 798–99 (1989) 
(upholding sound limits on rock concerts in New York City’s Central Park as a 
time/place/manner regulation)); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 
522, 536–37, 537 n.16 (1987) (applying both tests together). 
 629. See Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 909, 918–19 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (reviewing abortion restrictions) (citing Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 
(7th Cir. 2011)); Johnson v. Whitehead, 647 F.3d 120, 122, 133 (4th Cir. 2011) (assessing habeas 
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legitimate part of the development of constitutional doctrine. But when courts 
disfavor the Second Amendment by fabricating novel and feeble versions of 
intermediate scrutiny in order to uphold gun controls, the weak version of 
intermediate scrutiny can then be imposed on other rights where intermediate 
scrutiny is used, including many First Amendment regulations, and Equal 
Protection against discrimination based on sex or illegitimacy. An intermediate 
scrutiny test under which the government always wins as long as it presents 
some credible evidence endangers much more than just the Second 
Amendment. 
Commendably, the Second Circuit did rule for the plaintiffs when the 
government had no evidence. The New York law prohibited owners of 10-
round magazines from putting more than seven rounds into a magazine.630 This 
regulation was rejected, because insufficient evidence was presented showing 
that a seven-round load limit “best protect[ed] public safety.”631 The 
government “failed to present evidence that the mere existence of this load 
limit will convince any would-be malefactors to load magazines capable of 
holding ten rounds with only the permissible seven.”632 
G. Ninth Circuit: Intermediate Scrutiny for Storage Mandates, Ammunition 
Sales Restrictions, and Magazine Bans 
In Jackson v. San Francisco,633 the Ninth Circuit explained that “laws 
which regulate only the ‘manner in which persons may exercise their Second 
Amendment rights’ are less burdensome than those which bar firearm 
possession completely.”634 And, “Similarly, firearm regulations which leave 
open alternative channels for self-defense are less likely to place a severe 
burden on the Second Amendment right than those which do not.”635 
A San Francisco ordinance requires handguns to be locked in a container 
or trigger locked if not being carried on the individual’s person.636 The court 
used intermediate scrutiny even though the court acknowledged that “[h]aving 
to retrieve handguns from locked containers or removing trigger locks makes it 
 
corpus attempt to block immigration removal) (citing intermediate scrutiny standard from United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 600 (4th Cir. 2010)); Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 957 F. 
Supp. 2d 564, 568, 590–591 (E.D. Pa. 2013), rev’d in part on other grounds, 787 F.3d 142 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (reviewing First Amendment challenge to regulations on pornography producers) 
(citing intermediate scrutiny standard from United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 
2010)). 
 630. NYSRPA, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 264 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 631. Id. 
 632. Id. 
 633. 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 634. Id. at 961. 
 635. Id. 
 636. Id. at 958. 
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more difficult ‘for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-
defense’ in the home [and] therefore burdens the core of the Second 
Amendment right.”637 
Unlike the challenged regulation in Heller, section 4512 does not substantially 
prevent law-abiding citizens from using firearms to defend themselves in the 
home. Rather, section 4512 regulates how San Franciscans must store their 
handguns when not carrying them on their persons. This indirectly burdens the 
ability to use a handgun, because it requires retrieving a weapon from a locked 
safe or removing a trigger lock. But because it burdens only the “manner in 
which persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights,” the regulation 
more closely resembles a content-neutral speech restriction that regulates only 
the time, place, or manner of speech. The record indicates that a modern gun 
safe may be opened quickly. Thus, even when a handgun is secured, it may be 
readily accessed in case of an emergency. Further, section 4512 leaves open 
alternative channels for self-defense in the home, because San Franciscans are 
not required to secure their handguns while carrying them on their person. 
Provided San Franciscans comply with the storage requirements, they are free 
to use handguns to defend their home while carrying them on their person.638 
Thus, Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden that requires the 
higher level of scrutiny applied by other courts in this context.639 
Accordingly, we conclude section 4512 is not a substantial burden on the 
Second Amendment right itself. Even though section 4512 implicates the core 
of the Second Amendment right, because it does not impose a substantial 
burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, we apply 
intermediate scrutiny.640 
The court agreed with the city that the “requirement that persons store 
handguns in a locked storage container or with a trigger lock when not carried 
on the person is substantially related to the important government interest of 
reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries.”641 
Jackson’s doctrinal methodology may, arguably, be defensible, but its 
willful obliviousness to the facts of the case is not. As Justice Thomas noted in 
his dissent from the denial of certiorari, the San Francisco law, like the law 
rejected in Heller, prohibits citizens “from keeping those handguns ‘operable 
for the purpose of immediate self-defense’ when not carried on their person. 
The law thus burdens their right to self-defense at the times they are most 
 
 637. Id. at 964. 
 638. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964–65 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chovan, 735 
F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 639. Id. 
 640. Id. at 965. 
 641. Id. at 966. 
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vulnerable—when they are sleeping, bathing, changing clothes, or otherwise 
indisposed.”642 
Further, it is difficult to see how the important government interest of 
reducing firearm-related deaths and injuries is advanced by requiring residents 
to carry firearms on their person if they want to have a firearm readily 
accessible for self-defense. Such a requirement would cause residents to carry 
firearms far more frequently and in impractical situations when they otherwise 
would not carry a firearm, perhaps resulting in more firearm accidents. 
Also in Jackson, the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to a ban 
on the sale of hollow-point ammunition within San Francisco; the law in no 
way restricted possession or use of such ammunition.643 The court found no 
substantial burden on Second Amendment rights because “[t]here is no 
evidence in the record indicating that ordinary bullets are ineffective for self-
defense.”644 “A ban on the sale of certain types of ammunition does not 
prevent the use of handguns or other weapons in self-defense.”645 The sales 
ban “limits only the manner in which a person may exercise Second 
Amendment rights by making it more difficult to purchase certain types of 
ammunition.”646 It “leaves open alternative channels for self-defense in the 
home. Jackson may either use fully-jacketed bullets for self-defense or obtain 
hollow-point bullets outside of San Francisco’s jurisdiction.”647 
Jackson adopted a schizophrenic view on the effectiveness of hollow 
points. On the one hand, they are more effective: “It is self-evident that San 
Francisco’s interest in reducing the fatality of shootings is substantial”648 and 
“San Francisco carried its burden of establishing that [the ban] is a reasonable 
fit to achieve its goal of reducing the lethality of ammunition, and [the ban] 
thus satisfies intermediate scrutiny.”649 
On the other hand, the ban was upheld because the inferior effectiveness of 
other ammunition would (supposedly) have no effect on self-defense by law-
abiding citizens.650 
 
 642. Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2801 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)). 
 643. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 968. 
 644. Id. 
 645. Id. 
 646. Id. 
 647. Id. 
 648. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 969. 
 649. Id. at 970. 
 650. Id. at 968. 
Jackson contends that hollow-point bullets are far better for self-defense than fully 
jacketed ammunition because they have greater stopping power and are less likely to 
overpenetrate or ricochet. Barring their sale, she argues, therefore imposes a substantial 
burden on the right of self-defense. We disagree. There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that ordinary bullets are ineffective for self-defense. 
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Heller and McDonald forbid the type of analysis used by the Ninth Circuit. 
As Justice Thomas wrote in dissenting from denial of certiorari in another case, 
it does not matter whether the government deems other arms sufficiently 
effective for self-defense: “all that is needed for citizens to have a right under 
the Second Amendment to keep” any Second Amendment arm is that “[t]he 
overwhelming majority of citizens who own and use [them] do so for lawful 
purposes.”651 
In Fyock,652 the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny to an ordinance 
banning “large-capacity magazines.”653 The court explained that 
“[i]ntermediate scrutiny is appropriate if the regulation at issue does not 
implicate the core Second Amendment right or does not place a substantial 
burden on that right.”654 The court admitted that the laws restricted “the ability 
of law-abiding citizens to possess large-capacity magazines within their homes 
for the purpose of self-defense.”655 However: 
Measure C is simply not as sweeping as the complete handgun ban at issue in 
Heller and does not warrant a finding that it cannot survive constitutional 
scrutiny of any level. Indeed, Measure C does not affect the ability of law-
abiding citizens to possess the “quintessential self-defense weapon”—the 
handgun. Rather, Measure C restricts possession of only a subset of magazines 
that are over a certain capacity. It does not restrict the possession of magazines 
in general such that it would render any lawfully possessed firearms 
inoperable, nor does it restrict the number of magazines that an individual may 
possess. To the extent that a lawfully possessed firearm could not function 
with a lower capacity magazine, Measure C contains an exception that would 
allow possession of a large-capacity magazine for use with that firearm.656 
The challenge to the ban failed, in part because the challenge was only an 
interlocutory appeal, which required the Ninth Circuit to “determine only 
 
Id. This switches the issue. Other ammunition may be effective, but hollow points are more 
effective. First, they are more likely to stop an assailant; this is why hollow-points are near-
universal for law enforcement handgun ammunition. Second, hollow-points are more effective for 
self-defense because they are safer for innocent bystanders; they are much less likely to exit the 
assailant’s body and strike a third person. Similarly, there is no evidence that long guns are 
ineffective for self-defense. But for many people, handguns are superior. The availability of a less 
effective alternative to handguns did not justify the D.C. handgun ban in Heller. 
 651. Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 449 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from the denial of certiorari) (citing McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68 (2010); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008)). 
 652. Fyock v. Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 653. Id. at 994, 998. 
 654. Id. at 998–99. 
 655. Id. at 999. 
 656. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 629). 
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whether the district court correctly distilled the applicable rules of law and 
exercised permissible discretion in applying those rules to the facts at hand.”657 
The problem with the reasoning in Fyock, and similar cases, was explained 
by Judge Kavanaugh in his Heller II dissent. Although D.C. had banned many, 
but not all, semi-automatic rifles, that still constituted “a ban on a class of 
arms”: 
A ban on a class of arms is not an “incidental” regulation. It is equivalent to a 
ban on a category of speech. Such restrictions on core enumerated 
constitutional protections are not subjected to mere intermediate scrutiny 
review. The majority opinion here is in uncharted territory in suggesting that 
intermediate scrutiny can apply to an outright ban on possession of a class of 
weapons that have not traditionally been banned.658 
IX.  HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY APPLIED 
This Part examines several model cases which applied strict scrutiny, “not 
quite” strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and categoricalism to gun control 
laws. Each of the cases provides a synthesis and illustration of the application 
of Step Two of the Two-Part Test. 
A. The Rules of Second Amendment Heightened Scrutiny 
Marzzarella, the creator of the Two-Part Test, described two levels of 
heightened scrutiny. In strict scrutiny, the law must be “narrowly tailored to 
serve a compelling state interest.”659 “Narrow tailoring requires that the 
regulation actually advance the compelling interest it is designed to serve. The 
law must be the least-restrictive method of serving that interest, and the 
burdening of a significant amount of protected conduct not implicating the 
interest is evidence the regulation is insufficiently tailored.”660 
Next, Marzzarella described Second Amendment intermediate scrutiny, 
based on First Amendment intermediate scrutiny. The governmental end must 
“be more than just legitimate, either ‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or 
‘important.’”661 
 
 657. Id. at 995. 
 658. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 659. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right 
to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 465 (2007)). 
 660. Id. at 100 (internal citations omitted); see also United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (finding strict scrutiny requires a law to be the least restrictive 
means of achieving a compelling state interest; strict scrutiny is not only for prohibitions, but also 
for some lesser burdens). 
 661. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–98; cf. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (“Although courts have used various terminology to describe the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, all forms of the standard require (1) the government’s stated objective to be significant, 
substantial, or important; and (2) a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the 
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As for “fit,” strict scrutiny requires “narrow tailoring.” For intermediate 
scrutiny, “the fit” needs to “be reasonable, not perfect.”662 This is satisfied if 
the law “fits closely” with the government interest.663 Or as the D.C. Circuit 
put it, “a tight fit.”664 
In strict scrutiny, the government’s means must be “the least restrictive 
alternative.” Intermediate scrutiny’s rule about alternatives is looser; the least 
restrictive means is not required.665 Instead, Marzzarella applied the rule from 
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny: the means “need not be the least 
restrictive means of serving the interest, but may not burden more speech than 
is reasonably necessary.”666 As reiterated in a subsequent Third Circuit case, 
although a law tested under intermediate scrutiny “need not be the least 
restrictive means of serving the interest, [the law] may not burden more 
[conduct] than is reasonably necessary.”667 In the words of the D.C. Circuit, 
the government must prove that “the means chosen are not substantially 
broader than necessary to achieve that interest.”668 
Strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny are the best-known forms of 
heightened scrutiny. But there are others. For racial preferences in higher 
education, “deferential strict scrutiny” is used. Because of the importance of 
academic freedom, courts defer to an institution’s determination of whether a 
 
asserted objective.”); NRA v. BATFE, 700 F.3d 185, 295 (5th Cir. 2012) (“requires the 
government to demonstrate a ‘reasonable fit’ between the challenged regulation and an 
‘important’ government objective.”). 
 662. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98; see also United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 127–28 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (“For intermediate scrutiny has never been held to require a perfect end-means fit.”); 
United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 228 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he fit needs to be reasonable, 
but not perfect.”); United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Carter (Carter I), 669 F.3d 411, 417 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98); 
United States v. Carter (Carter II), 750 F.3d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The government was 
required to show that the fit between § 922(g)(3) and the government’s important goal is 
‘reasonable, not perfect.’”); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1222 (10th Cir. 2013) (“The 
challenged statute must be substantially related to advancement of an important governmental 
objective, but it need not provide a perfect fit.”). 
 663. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99. 
 664. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 665. Staten, 666 F.3d at 162 (“[T]he government is not required to prove that § 922(g)(9) is 
the least intrusive means of reducing domestic gun violence.”); United States v. Masciandaro, 638 
F.3d 458, 474 (4th Cir. 2011); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878–79 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 666. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 (internal citations omitted); see also Heller II, 670 F.3d at 
1258 (“a fit ‘that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly 
tailored to achieve the desired objective.’”). 
 667. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 453 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting); see Jackson 
v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 969 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d at 98. 
 668. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782–
83 (1989)). 
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particular racial mix of students is a “compelling” interest.669 The deference is 
only for the “ends” test; the “means” testing of narrow tailoring is undiluted in 
its rigor.670 Somewhat analogously, the Tenth Circuit used a specially lenient 
form of intermediate scrutiny for a ban on guns in post office parking lots, 
because government property was involved, and the physical scope of the 
prohibition was so narrow.671 
For content-neutral laws which affect the First Amendment right of 
association, the Court has developed a means/end test of “exacting . . . 
scrutiny.”672 The ends rule is the same as in strict scrutiny: a compelling state 
interest. The means rule is weaker: the government interest “cannot be 
achieved though means significantly less restrictive of associational 
freedoms.”673 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has employed a “not quite strict 
scrutiny” standard for laws which come near the core of the Second 
Amendment but do not go inside the core. 
Some infringements of constitutional rights are categorically void, with no 
need to delve into the means/ends analysis of strict, not quite strict, exacting, 
or intermediate scrutiny. Heller is an obvious example: the handgun ban and 
the ban on having a home firearm in an operable status were declared void, 
without resort to means/ends testing.674 
Bright-line rules declaring certain government actions categorically 
unconstitutional, without the need for a means/ends test, are common in 
constitutional law. They are found in the First Amendment,675 Fifth 
Amendment,676 Sixth Amendment,677 Eighth Amendment,678 Tenth 
Amendment,679 and Fourteenth Amendment.680 
 
 669. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003). 
 670. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013). 
 671. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1122–23, 1127 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 672. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2639 (2014). 
 673. Id.; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). In other contexts, the 
Court sometimes uses “exacting scrutiny” as a synonym for strict or rigorous scrutiny. See 
Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639. 
 674. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 613 (2008). 
 675. Hosanna-Tabor Evang. Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 
(2012) (forbidding interference with “ecclesiastical decisions”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 
626 (1978) (plurality opinion) (categorically-prohibiting “government from regulating, 
prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such.”). Likewise, some Establishment Clause 
violations, such as excessive entanglement, are unconstitutional without further inquiry. See 
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 
338–39 (1987) (finding anything which creates excessive government entanglement with religion 
is invalid). 
 676. Loretto v. Telep. Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)  (finding 
“permanent physical occupation” is always a taking); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503 
(1978) (“[P]rotection against double jeopardy unequivocally prohibits a second trial following an 
acquittal.”). 
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In this Part, we will examine representative cases for Second Amendment 
application of intermediate scrutiny, for “not quite strict scrutiny,” and for 
categorical invalidation. 
B. The Burden of Proof 
Throughout U.S. constitutional law, heightened scrutiny places the burden 
of proof for all elements on the government. As Marzzarella said, the court 
“presume[s] the law is invalid, and the government bears the burden of 
rebutting that presumption.”681 
A typical formulation of the intermediate scrutiny burden of proof is: “To 
pass constitutional muster under intermediate scrutiny, the government has the 
burden of demonstrating that its objective is an important one and that its 
objective is advanced by means substantially related to that objective.”682 Of 
 
 677. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226, 244 (2005) (categorically holding that 
sentences may never exceed the maximum allowed by facts proven beyond a reasonable doubt to 
the jury or admitted by defendant). 
 678. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 412, 447 (2008) (barring no capital punishment for 
crimes against individuals not causing death). 
 679. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 154, 161 (1992) (finding Congress cannot 
commandeer state legislatures). 
 680. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837, 846 (1992)  (allowing regulation but 
not prohibition of pre-viability abortion). 
 681. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 99 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Under intermediate scrutiny, the government bears 
the burden of establishing a reasonable fit between the challenged statute and a substantial 
governmental objective.”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(“Significantly, intermediate scrutiny places the burden of establishing the required fit squarely 
upon the government.”); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he City 
bears the burden of justifying its action under some heightened standard of judicial review.”); 
Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Under heightened scrutiny, 
the County bears the burden of justifying its action.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 682. United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams, 616 F.3d at 692); United States v. 
Huitron-Guizar 678 F.3d 1164, 1169 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Under [intermediate scrutiny] a law is 
sustained if the government shows that it is substantially related to an important official end.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 348 (5th Cir. 2013) (“In order to 
withstand intermediate scrutiny, the Texas scheme must be reasonably adapted to achieve an 
important government interest. Furthermore ‘[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized 
or invented post hoc in response to litigation,’ or relying ‘on overbroad generalizations.’”) 
(quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)); Heller v. District of Columbia 
(Heller III), 801 F.3d 264, 272–73 (D.C. Cir. 2015): 
To meet the first requirement, the District must demonstrate that the harms to be 
prevented by the regulation “are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will 
in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.” We do not, however, review de 
novo the District’s evidence of the harm to be prevented and the likely efficacy of the 
regulation in preventing that harm. Rather, it is our remit to determine only whether the 
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course this formulation does not recapitulate every sub-rule for the ends/means 
test. Likewise, a sentence that summarizes strict scrutiny (e.g., “narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest”) usually does not list all the sub-
rules (such as least restrictive alternative, not underinclusive, not 
overinclusive). 
C. Why Domestic Violence Bans Pass Intermediate Scrutiny 
The Fourth Circuit’s Staten case provides a good example of the kind of 
facts that pass intermediate scrutiny. In this case, the gun ban was for 
convicted domestic violence misdemeanants: 
[T]he government has established that: (1) domestic violence is a serious 
problem in the United States; (2) the rate of recidivism among domestic 
violence misdemeanants is substantial; (3) the use of firearms in connection 
with domestic violence is all too common; (4) the use of firearms in 
connection with domestic violence increases the risk of injury or homicide 
during a domestic violence incident; and (5) the use of firearms in connection 
with domestic violence often leads to injury or homicide.683 
The Fourth Circuit’s Chapman addressed a similar statute, involving 
domestic violence restraining orders.684 The court admitted: 
[The statute] may be somewhat over-inclusive given that not every person who 
falls within in [sic] it would misuse a firearm against his own child, an intimate 
partner, or a child of such intimate partner, if permitted to possess one. This 
point does not undermine the constitutionality . . . however, because it merely 
suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a reasonable fit is all that is required 
under intermediate scrutiny.685 
Subsequently, Mahin elaborated why the restraining order statute is 
“narrowly tailored” and thus had a “reasonable fit.”686 Compared to the 
lifetime ban for domestic violence misdemeanants, the restraining order statute 
“is even more narrowly tailored.”687 First, the restraining order prohibition is 
 
District “has drawn reasonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” If it has done 
so, and if the means chosen are not overbroad, then “summary judgment . . . is appropriate 
regardless of whether the evidence is in conflict.” 
Id. (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 662–64, 666 (1994) and 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), (internal citations omitted) 520 U.S. 188, 185, 195–
96, 211 (1997). 
 683. United States v. Staten, 666 F.3d 154, 167 (4th Cir. 2011). As discussed supra in Part V, 
there is some controversy about the appropriateness of a lifetime ban of misdemeanants, which 
was not at issue in Staten. See supra Part V. 
 684. Chapman, 666 F.3d at 223. 
 685. Id. at 231 (citing Staten, 666 F.3d at 167–68). 
 686. United States v. Mahin, 668 F.3d 119, 125 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 687. Id. 
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“temporally limited.”688 Second, the prohibition only applies “to persons 
individually adjudged to pose a future threat of domestic abuse,” at a hearing 
with due process.689 
D. “Not Quite Strict Scrutiny” for a Firing Range Ban 
The Seventh Circuit’s Ezell established a sliding scale for the stringency of 
Second Amendment review. The closer to the core of the right, the stricter the 
scrutiny.690 
So in Skoien, for domestic violence misdemeanants, the Seventh Circuit 
had “required a ‘form of strong showing’—a/k/a ‘intermediate scrutiny’ . . . . 
Intermediate scrutiny was appropriate in Skoien because the claim was not 
made by a ‘law-abiding, responsible citizen’ as in Heller; nor did the case 
involve the central self-defense component of the right.”691 (Skoien said his 
gun was for hunting only.) 
When “the plaintiffs are the ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ whose 
Second Amendment rights are entitled to full solicitude under Heller, . . . their 
claim comes much closer to implicating the core of the Second Amendment 
right.”692 
The Chicago ban on firing ranges needed rigorous scrutiny: 
The City’s firing-range ban is not merely regulatory; it prohibits the “law-
abiding, responsible citizens” of Chicago from engaging in target practice in 
the controlled environment of a firing range. This is a serious encroachment on 
the right to maintain proficiency in firearm use, an important corollary to the 
meaningful exercise of the core right to possess firearms for self-defense.”693 
To make matters worse, the city required training at a range in order to 
obtain a firearms permit; yet the city banned all ranges. “All this suggests that 
a more rigorous showing than that applied in Skoien should be required, if not 
quite ‘strict scrutiny.’”694 
What does “not quite strict scrutiny” mean? 
[A] close fit between the range ban and the actual public interests it serves, and 
also that the public’s interests are strong enough to justify so substantial an 
encumbrance on individual Second Amendment rights. Stated differently, the 
City must demonstrate that civilian target practice at a firing range creates such 
 
 688. Id. 
 689. Id. (emphasis added). 
 690. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 691. Id. (citations omitted). 
 692. Id. 
 693. Id. 
 694. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINES 307 
genuine and serious risks to public safety that prohibiting range training 
throughout the city is justified.695 
The Chicago government had “not come close to satisfying this 
standard.”696 The government had failed to present any data or expert opinion 
to support the law and relied purely on “speculation.”697 
Speculation is one of the important differences between intermediate 
scrutiny and rational basis review. In rational basis, the government can win 
with post-hoc speculation. The canonical rational basis case, Williamson v. Lee 
Optical, involved legislative restrictions on eyeglass sales, with obvious 
economic benefit for optometrists, and harms to consumers and to eye glass 
providers.698 With no reliance on legislative history, the Supreme Court 
speculated that the legislature might have had legitimate concerns.699 
Heightened scrutiny is different. “Speculation” is forbidden.700 Nor can the 
government “get away with shoddy data or reasoning.”701 
 
 695. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708–09. 
 696. Id. at 709. 
 697. Id. at 690 (“the City’s claimed harm to the public interest is based entirely on 
speculation.”) “[The City’s] concerns are entirely speculative.” Id. at 709. “[T]he City produced 
no empirical evidence whatsoever and rested its entire defense of the range ban on speculation 
about accidents and theft.” Id. “The harms invoked by the City are entirely speculative.” Id. at 
710. 
 698. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). 
 699. Id. (“The legislature might have concluded . . . . But the legislature might have 
concluded . . . . Or the legislature may have concluded . . . . [I]t might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). In the modern articulation of 
rational basis review, the government “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993). “[C]ourts are 
compelled under rational-basis review to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is 
an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Id. There need only be “some footing in the realities of 
the subject addressed by the legislation.” Id. The classification may be “wholly irrelevant to the 
achievement of the State’s objective.” Id. at 324 (internal quotation marks omitted). A court 
“must disregard the existence of alternative methods of furthering the objective.” Id. at 330 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Although legislative “assumptions” might be “erroneous, the 
very fact that they are ‘arguable’ is sufficient, on rational-basis review, to ‘immunize’ the 
[legislative] choice from constitutional challenge.” Id. at 333 (brackets in original). 
 700. “The Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other 
constitutionally safeguarded forms of expression.” Grant v. Meyer, 828 F.2d 1446, 1456 (10th 
Cir. 1987). But even for commercial speech intermediate scrutiny, speculation is forbidden. The 
government’s “burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture.” Instead, it “must 
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them.” 
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 
761, 770–71 (1993) (“Speculation” and “conjecture” fail intermediate scrutiny). 
 701. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 709 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 
425, 438 (2002)). For a case misapplying Alameda Books, see the Second Circuit’s NYSRPA 
opinion, discussed supra. 
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Even if the Chicago government had presented extensive evidence about 
the dangers of public ranges, the range ban still was unconstitutional; “more 
closely tailored regulatory measures” were available.702 The legal issues about 
alternative, less burdensome measures are discussed in Part IX.F infra. 
E. Something More Exacting Than Intermediate Scrutiny for Ban on New 
Gun Retailers 
In Teixeira v. County of Alameda, prospective gun store operators 
challenged a county ordinance that prohibited them from opening a gun store 
in the county.703 The court first determined that the ordinance “comes close” to 
the core of the Second Amendment: 
Here, there is no question that an ordinance restricting the commercial sale of 
firearms would burden the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess 
and carry a weapon, because it would inhibit his ability to acquire weapons. 
We are therefore satisfied that such a regulation comes close to the core of the 
Second Amendment right.704 
The record was insufficient for the court to determine exactly how severe 
the burden of the ordinance was, but it provided guidance to the district court 
on remand: if the ordinance “merely regulates where gun stores can be located 
rather than banning them—it burdens only the manner in which persons may 
exercise their Second Amendment rights” and therefore requires only 
intermediate scrutiny.705 However, if “the Ordinance was ‘not merely 
regulatory,’ but rather functioned as a total ban on all new gun retailers, a 
‘more rigorous showing’ than even intermediate scrutiny, ‘if not quite ‘strict 
scrutiny,’ would have been warranted.”706 
F. Categorical Scrutiny for a Near-Prohibition on Bearing Arms 
In Madigan, the Seventh Circuit confronted a near-prohibition on bearing 
arms.707 The government “would have to make a stronger showing” than what 
 
 702. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 710. “Indeed, on this record those concerns are entirely speculative 
and, in any event, can be addressed through sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored 
regulations. That much is apparent from the testimony of the City’s own witnesses, particularly 
Sergeant Bartoli, who testified to several common-sense range safety measures that could be 
adopted short of a complete ban.” Id. at 709. 
 703. Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 822 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 704. Id. at 1059 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 705. Id. at 1060 (internal quotations omitted). 
 706. Id. (quoting Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708). The court later reiterated, “If on remand evidence 
does confirm that the Ordinance, as applied, completely bans new gun stores (rather than merely 
regulates their locations), something more exacting than intermediate scrutiny will be warranted.” 
Id. at 1063. 
 707. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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had been necessary in Skoien, regarding domestic violence convicts.708 The 
law about convicts was nothing like a law against “the gun rights of the entire 
law-abiding adult population of Illinois.”709 
Unlike Ezell, the government defending the carry ban had introduced 
plenty of social science evidence, as had the plaintiffs. When the social science 
evidence is contested, does that justify a prohibition for law-abiding citizens? 
No. “Illinois has not made that strong showing . . .”710 
A blanket prohibition on carrying gun [sic] in public prevents a person from 
defending himself anywhere except inside his home; and so substantial a 
curtailment of the right of armed self-defense requires a greater showing of 
justification than merely that the public might benefit on balance from such a 
curtailment, though there is no proof it would. In contrast, when a state bans 
guns merely in particular places, such as public schools, a person can preserve 
an undiminished right of self-defense by not entering those places; since that’s 
a lesser burden, the state doesn’t need to prove so strong a need. Similarly, the 
state can prevail with less evidence when, as in Skoien, guns are forbidden to a 
class of persons who present a higher than average risk of misusing a gun.711 
The “mere possibility” that a gun control law will save lives is not enough.712 
If it were, “Heller would have been decided the other way.”713 
As discussed supra, some state courts have employed categorical 
invalidation for prohibitions on types of Second Amendment arms.714 Justices 
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito have described this categorical approach to arms 
bans as the correct application of Heller and McDonald.715 
G. Substantially Less Burdensome Alternatives 
As noted in Part IX.A., intermediate scrutiny does not require that the 
government action be the least restrictive alternative. Rather, the court need 
only consider alternatives which would burden substantially less of the right. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent explication of the rule was in McCullen v. 
Coakley, a case involving intermediate scrutiny for time, place, and manner 
restrictions on demonstrations near abortion clinics.716 
 
 708. Id. at 940. 
 709. Id. 
 710. Id. 
 711. Id. 
 712. Madigan, 702 F.3d at 939. 
 713. Id. 
 714. See supra note 611. 
 715. See supra III.C. 
 716. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2525, 2530 (2014). 
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1. Cases Where Alternatives Were Found 
The D.C. Circuit straightforwardly followed and quoted McCullen, in 
Heller III. The court explained: “To meet the requirement of narrow tailoring, 
the government must demonstrate that alternative measures that burden 
substantially less speech would fail to achieve the government’s interests, not 
simply that the chosen route is easier.”717 Put another way, the means must not 
be “overbroad.”718 
The Heller III court held the requirement for triennial re-registration of 
guns to be unconstitutional, because there were less burdensome 
alternatives.719 It was true that during re-registration, the District could run a 
background check on the registered owner, and see if the owner had become a 
prohibited person (e.g., convicted of a felony) in the years subsequent to the 
original registration.720 But “‘District officials and experts conceded [that] 
background checks could be conducted at any time without causing the 
registrations to expire.’ The re-registration requirement cannot survive 
intermediate scrutiny on the (dubious) basis that it will make this task 
easier.”721 
The District also wanted re-registration “to maintain the accuracy of the 
registration database.”722 But a less burdensome alternative was already in 
 
 717. Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller III), 801 F.3d 264, 277–78 (D.C. Cir. 2015); 
McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2540. One case, the Fifth Circuit’s McCraw, was mixed-up about “least” 
versus “less.” NRA v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2013). The court thought that because 
intermediate scrutiny does not mandate the “least” restrictive alternative, the court had no 
obligation to consider anything about alternatives: 
It is true, as plaintiffs claim, that Texas could have taken other, less restrictive approaches, 
such as allowing 18–20-year-olds to get a license if they demonstrate a particularly high 
level of proficiency and responsibility with guns. But the state scheme must merely be 
reasonably adapted to its public safety objective to pass constitutional muster under an 
intermediate scrutiny standard. Texas need not employ the least restrictive means to 
achieve its goal. Given the substantial tailoring of the Texas scheme, plaintiffs 
overbreadth argument is unpersuasive. 
Id. at 349. 
  This is like saying “Neptune has no gravity, because Neptune is not Jupiter.” It is true 
that Jupiter has the most gravity of any planet; the fact does not prove that Neptune has no 
gravity. Likewise, strict scrutiny has the most rigorous test regarding alternatives; the fact does 
not prove that other forms of heightened scrutiny have no test for alternatives. 
  Ignoring the normal rules of intermediate scrutiny just because Second Amendment 
rights are involved is contrary to McDonald, which says that the Second Amendment is not a 
“second-class” right, to be “singled out for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment.” 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778–79, 780 (2010). 
 718. Heller III, 801 F.3d at 273. 
 719. Id. at 280. 
 720. Id. at 286–88. 
 721. Id. at 277. 
 722. Id. at 278. 
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place: the D.C. “requirement that gun owners report relevant changes in their 
information, such as a new address.”723 
Likewise, re-registration was supposed to help “determine when firearms 
have been lost or stolen.”724 Again, the substantially less burdensome 
alternative was already in operation: the law requiring immediate report of the 
loss or theft of a gun.725 
The Seventh Circuit, applying “not quite strict scrutiny” to a firing range 
ban, pointed out that there were alternatives to prohibition.726 The Ezell court 
agreed with the City that gun thefts from range patrons could endanger public 
safety, as could stray bullets exiting a range.727 But the danger “can be 
addressed through sensible zoning and other appropriately tailored 
regulations.”728 
Sergeant Bartoli testified about the availability of straightforward range-design 
measures that can effectively guard against accidental injury. He mentioned, 
for example, that ranges should be fenced and should designate appropriate 
locations for the loading and unloading of firearms. Other precautionary 
measures might include limiting the concentration of people and firearms in a 
range’s facilities, the times when firearms can be loaded, and the types of 
ammunition allowed.729 
The court then cited range safety manuals, and range safety statutes from other 
states, which demonstrated the availability of less burdensome alternatives.730 
The range prohibition was unconstitutional, because the City’s interests “may 
be addressed by more closely tailored regulatory measures.”731 
Evaluating a near-prohibition on defensive handgun carry, the Seventh 
Circuit in Madigan pointed out that there were many alternatives to 
prohibition.732 “Illinois has lots of options for protecting its people from being 
shot without having to eliminate all possibility of armed self-defense in 
public.”733 Indeed, every other state had similar concerns about the “dangers 
that widespread public carrying of guns may pose.”734 All the other states 
“have decided that a proper balance between the interest in self-defense and 
the dangers created by carrying guns in public is to limit the right to carry a 
 
 723. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.08 (2016). 
 724. Heller III, 801 F.3d at 278. 
 725. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.08(a)(1); Heller III, 801 F.3d at 278. 
 726. Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 709 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 727. Id. at 694. 
 728. Id. at 709. 
 729. Id. 
 730. Id. at 709–10. 
 731. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 710. 
 732. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 733. Id. 
 734. Id. 
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gun to responsible persons rather than to ban public carriage altogether, as 
Illinois with its meager exceptions comes close to doing.”735 
Among the alternatives, “some states sensibly require that an applicant for 
a handgun permit establish his competence in handling firearms.”736 Even 
“[t]he New York gun law upheld in Kachalsky,” despite being “one of the 
nation’s most restrictive such laws . . . is less restrictive than Illinois’s law.”737 
2. Cases Where Alternatives Were Not Found 
That courts must look for less burdensome alternatives does not mean that 
they will always find one. The Ninth Circuit in Jackson rejected a proposed 
alternative because it was actually more burdensome.738 The alternative would 
have criminalized the carrying of hollow-point ammunition for lawful self-
defense, instead of banning the sale (but not possession) of hollow-point 
ammunition as the law did.739 
The Tenth Circuit’s foundational Second Amendment case is United States 
v. Reese, which applied intermediate scrutiny to the domestic violence 
restraining order gun ban.740 Reese upheld the challenged law only after 
determining there was not “a severable subcategory of persons as to whom the 
statute is unconstitutional.”741 In other words, there was not an identifiable 
group of people whom the statute unnecessarily burdened. 
 
 735. Id. 
 736. Id. at 941. 
 737. Madigan, 702 F.3d at 941. 
 738. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 739. Id. 
Jackson contends that San Francisco could have adopted less burdensome means of 
restricting hollow-point ammunition, for example by prohibiting the possession of 
hollow-point bullets in public, but allowing their purchase for home defense. See, e.g., 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:39-3(f), (g). Even if this is correct, intermediate scrutiny does not 
require the least restrictive means of furthering a given end. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 
S.Ct. 2746. City of Renton emphasizes that a “city must be allowed a reasonable 
opportunity to experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems.” 475 U.S. at 52, 
106 S.Ct. 925 (internal quotation omitted). We also doubt that the laws to which Jackson 
points are indeed less burdensome than section 613.10(g). Because section 613.10(g) 
affects only the sale of hollow-point ammunition, San Franciscans are free to use and 
possess hollow-point bullets within city limits. Under Jackson’s “less burdensome” 
alternatives, individuals would face criminal prosecution for possessing such ammunition 
outside the home. Given the availability of alternative means for procuring hollow-point 
ammunition, section 613.10(g) imposes only modest burdens on the Second Amendment 
right. 
Id. at 969–70. 
 740. United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 741. Id. at 803. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2017] THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS’ SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINES 313 
In the Tenth Circuit’s Bonidy, all judges recognized the requirement to 
consider less burdensome alternatives.742 The majority and dissent disagreed 
about the feasibility of the alternative.743 The case involved a federal 
regulation banning guns in post office customer parking lots. 
In dissent, Judge Tymkovich pointed out that the Post Office could issue 
permits for guns in its parking lots: 
At any rate, the ease with which the government could alter this regulation to 
address its concerns while still respecting the Second Amendment rights of 
lawful carriers undercuts any substantial-relation argument. As the district 
court noted, rather than a flat ban on gun storage, the regulation could allow 
discretionary issuance of permits to use the parking lot with the gun in a locked 
vehicle concealed in a glove compartment or console. Such a policy would let 
the Postal Service control the carrying of firearms in locations where security 
concerns are indeed so pressing as to make a wholesale ban on firearms 
substantially related to those goals.744 
The majority countered that putting the Post Office into the gun-permit 
business was unfeasible: 
To require the USPS to tailor a separate gun policy for each of its properties or 
indeed for its many diverse customers would present an impossible burden not 
required by the intermediate scrutiny test. 
. . . [A]n alternative system involving piecemeal exceptions and individual 
waivers would be wasteful and administratively unworkable, and would raise 
entirely new problems related to fairness, official discretion, and equal 
administration of the laws. . . . Under a more nuanced or discretionary regime, 
problems of perceived unfairness or unreasonableness—and accompanying 
litigation—would likely multiply, not disappear.745 
CONCLUSION 
Collectively, the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted a 
doctrine for deciding Second Amendment cases. Although exceptions can be 
found, the mainstream approach of the circuits is as follows: 
When Second Amendment rights are at issue, rational basis review is off 
the table. The Second Amendment right has many purposes, including self-
defense, hunting, target shooting, militia, and all other lawful purposes. Self-
defense is at the core of the right. The “arms” protected by the Second 
Amendment are the common arms typically possessed by law-abiding citizens, 
rather than dangerous and unusual weapons. 
 
 742. Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1121 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 743. Id. at 1129. 
 744. Id. at 1123 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted). 
 745. Id. at 1127–28. 
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Most circuits apply the Two-Part Test created by the Third Circuit in 
United States v. Marzzarella. In Step One of the Test, the issue is whether the 
government law or action restricts the Second Amendment right, as that right 
has been traditionally and historically understood. The government may win 
the case at Step One if the government can carry its burden of proving that the 
restriction at issue is outside the traditional understanding of the Second 
Amendment right. 
If the government does not carry its burden on Step One, the case proceeds 
to Step Two, where some level of heightened scrutiny will be applied. Some 
laws, such as a near-complete ban on bearing arms in public, are 
unconstitutional, without need to resort to strict or intermediate scrutiny. For 
other laws, the choice between strict and intermediate depends on a variety of 
factors, including: the scope of the persons affected (all law-abiding persons 
vs. particularly dangerous persons), the scope of restriction (prohibition vs. 
regulation), where the law applies (inside the home vs. in public), whether the 
law limits a person’s choice of arms, and whether the law affects self-defense 
and defense of others. 
The Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald had described certain gun 
controls as being “presumptively lawful.” Laws which are exactly the same as 
the ones listed in Heller are often tested under Step One, but sometimes are 
tested under Step Two. Laws which are claimed to be analogous to the specific 
laws named in Heller are best tested in Step Two, but are sometimes analyzed 
under Step One. 
The standards for Second Amendment strict or intermediate scrutiny (or 
for “not quite strict scrutiny”) are drawn from their First Amendment 
analogues. The more stringent the scrutiny, the stronger a government interest 
must be shown, and the better the “fit” must be between the law and the 
government interest. For example, strict scrutiny requires proof that the law is 
the “least restrictive alternative.” In intermediate scrutiny, the government 
need only prove that there are no alternatives that would burden substantially 
less of the rights of law-abiding citizens. 
In Step Two, as in Step One, the burden of proof is always on the 
government. 
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